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 My thesis investigates whether the Roman authorities had any policies or 
practices in employing and deploying their armed forces to win the hearts and minds of 
the population in the eastern provinces under the Principate (27 BCE - 284 CE) as kind 
of military strategy for exploiting their human and material resources to confront the 
Arsacid - Sassanid empire. 
 Chapter 1 explains this aim with reference to previous scholarship. 
 In chapter 2, I update and review the data for the provenance of soldiers. I argue 
that the hypothesis of increasing ʻlocalisation’ in the pattern of recruiting soldiers is 
wrong. Military units in the eastern provinces always depended largely on the recruits 
from Italy, Africa and the Danube, as well as from the other eastern provinces. 
 Chapter 3 investigates the processes of recruitment and veteran settlement, and 
argues that the Romans had a strategic aim to strengthen social integration between 
soldiers and civilians. This is supported by a case study of the Roman garrison at Syene 
in Egypt.  
 Chapter 4 argues that the logistics system of the Roman armed forces and their 
military presence within or near urban areas did not hinder the economic growth of the 
eastern provinces. The Roman government took action against the abuse of requisitions. 
As in the West, Roman military occupation brought some economic benefit. 
 Chapter 5 shows the changing image of Roman soldiers in imperial Greek 
literature from invaders to guardians. Greek elites began to view themselves as part of 
the empire and to distinguish between insiders (Romans) and outsiders (barbarians). 
Provincials thought of Roman soldiers as more effective and reliable than their 
municipal police.  
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 Chapter 6 argues that, as part of their military strategy, the Romans used the 
propaganda that their emperor was a Roman Alexander who confronted the Parthian 
threat to protect his subjects in the East. This seems to have had some success in uniting 
the various eastern nations to support and serve in Rome’s military domination of their 
territories. 
 All these actions would have been impossible without a strategic intention to 
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1.1: The historical question 
 The principal question of this thesis is whether the Romans had any policy or 
practice of winning ʻhearts and minds’ in support of their deployment and use of armed 
forces in the eastern provinces from Asia to Egypt. Because we do not have any direct 
statements of policy, and it may have been more a question of habit and practice rather 
than conscious policy, I will investigate aspects of both Roman and local behaviour and 
thought which could indicate to us whether the Romans did, or did not, have any such 
ideology: that is, how far Roman army units behaved and were perceived as alien 
oppressors, or as a beneficial presence, and were drawn from and integrated with local 
civilian society. Campbell, to take one influential example, has argued that: “there is no 
sign that the government had any deliberate or consistent policy using serving soldiers 
or veterans to further Romanisation. If the soldiers made a contribution here, it will 
have been limited, indirect and largely accidental”.1 However, it is hard to believe that 
all the actions of the Roman army have been taken ad hoc, without any strategic 
planning or preparation.
2
 While we should be careful not to apply modern concepts of 
military strategy directly to the ancient world, we should not assume that the Romans 
lacked the cognitive ability to make strategic decisions. 
 Most discussions about the role of the Roman army in the East have focussed 
on two fields: on the one hand, warfare and strategy against the Arsacid - Sassanid 
empire, and on the other, the maintenance of law and order in the provinces. Luttwak’s 
The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire and Isaac’s critique of it in his The Limits of 
                                                     
1
 Campbell 2002: 104. 
2
 For discussions of decision-making at Rome, see also Millar 1982: 1-23, Isaac 1990: 377-87, and 
Mattern 1999: 5-18.  
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Empire made outstanding progress in the discussions of both fields.
3
 It is clear that the 
eastern policy of Rome under the Principate was centred on its diplomatic and military 
relations with the Arsacid - Sassanid empire, while in peacetime the Roman army was 
required to act as a police force to maintain law and order and enforce, when necessary, 
the collection of taxes in the provinces.
4
 However, these explanations still conform to 
the stereotype of the Roman army as an alien occupying force imposed the provincials. 
It is worth trying to go beyond these bounds to investigate whether the Roman army 
might have also been a beneficial force which contributed to social and economic 
evolution. 
 This study does not aim to re-evaluate Luttwak’s theory of a ʻdefensive grand 
strategy’ or Isaac’s counter-theory of ʻcontinued aggressive expansion’. Luttwak’s view 
of the eastern policy of Hadrian and Antoninus Pius still deserves consideration, and 
Isaac’s bottom-up approach to researching the role of the Roman army in the eastern 
provinces is also, or maybe more, relevant to the goal of this study. My objective is to 
examine the interactions between Roman soldiers and local civilians, and to see how far 
they conduced to the integration of the empire. Based on this, I shall seek to investigate 
whether there were any policies or practices commonly shared among the Roman 
authorities which seem to have been designed to win the support of the civilian 
population in the eastern provinces. 
 The impact of the Roman army on provincial communities has already been 
studied in various aspects: politics, economy, society, religion and culture.
5
 While its 
impact on the western provinces has earned positive judgements, that on the eastern 
                                                     
3
 Luttwak 1976; Isaac 1990: 372-418, supported by Whittaker 1997: 49-97. Alston (1995, 1999b) is a 
rare exception. 
4
 War and diplomacy: Millar 1988: 345-77 (in general); Campbell 1993: 213-40; 2001: 10-9; Ferguson 
2005. Law and order: Bagnall 1977: 67-86; Fuhrmann 2012: 147-238 (in general). 
5
 Erdkamp 2002a; De Blois and Lo Cascio 2007. 
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provinces has been suspected to have been negative or trivial because of the great 
tradition of Hellenistic civilisation there. The Roman army has been viewed as an 
advance guard for spreading Roman culture, and therefore the idea that divides the 
empire into Latin West and Greek East has also been used to deny so-called 
ʻRomanisation’ in the East. The Hellenised East did not need ʻcivilising’, and so there 
was no positive role for the Roman army to fulfil.  
 Contrary to the concept of Hellenisation, which is still generally accepted to 
mean the spread of Greek culture, notwithstanding its inventor Droysen’s definition of it 
as a cultural fusion between ʻGreek’ and ʻOriental’, Romanisation has become a 
controversial term, especially by the archaeologists of Roman Britain who adopt 
postcolonial perspectives.
6
 It is often challenged by the alternative vocabularies used by 
cultural and sociological theories, such as acculturation, creolisation, discrepant identity 
and globalisation.
7
 The old concepts of Hellenisation and Romanisation were 
ultimately based on a belief in the superiority of Greek and Roman culture, and the 
assumption that the Greeks and Romans had a conscious ʻmission civilisatrice’ like 
modern European imperial powers. However, rejecting this analogy does not mean we 
have to deny any cultural or ideological influence, either conscious or incidental, of the 
Roman government and army on the populations of the eastern provinces. In any case, 
my concern is not with the general question of ʻRomanisation’ but the more pragmatic 
question to what extent relations between the Roman army and the local populations 
were positive or negative. 
 An obvious initial question is, if the Roman army was viewed by provincials as 
an alien occupying force for the entire time of Roman rule, how was it possible for the 
                                                     
6
 Hellenisation: Mair 2012. Romanisation in postcolonial perspective: Millet 1990:1-2, and Webster and 
Cooper 1996. 
7
 Acculturation: Webster 1997: 324-38. Creolisation: Webster 2001: 209-25. Discrepant identity: 
Mattingly 2004: 12-22 and 2011: 213-8. Globalisation and beyond: Gardner 2013: 1-25. 
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empire to maintain the imperial order and ideology in its provinces across several 
centuries? The question can also be put in a positive form: what was it that enabled the 
longevity of the empire? This was the question posed by Ando in 2000 in his Imperial 
Ideology and Provincial Loyalty in the Roman Empire. Against earlier postcolonial 
views, he argues that the legitimacy of laws and institutions guaranteed by the emperors’ 
charisma and imperial bureaucracy did attract provincial consensus.
8
 He also briefly 
discusses the uses of triumphal ceremonies and imagery, and of military standards, for 
propaganda purposes to attract the loyalty of civilian provincials.
9
 However, he does 
not consider the role of the army in the relationship between the Roman state and its 
subjects. 
 My study seeks to assess how far the Roman army was an element in 
maintaining loyalty to Rome in the eastern provinces. Of course violence, crime and 
destruction committed by Roman soldiers in the era of conquest is undeniable, and their 
aggression and corruption are still detectable in the subsequent long period of peacetime 
rule. The image of Roman soldiers might have been close to that of foreign occupying 
troops in more recent imperial situations, with conflicts between soldiers and civilians. 
Thus, one important topic for us to investigate will be whether the imperial government 
had any serious desire, or established any policy, to control such abuses by soldiers, or 
indeed to make subjects adopt an image of the local presence of imperial troops as 
acceptable and even beneficial. In so doing, I hope to be able to assess to what extent 
the Roman authorities had a strategic intention of using the army to win the hearts and 
minds of the diverse subject peoples for the purpose of imperial integration.  
 The time-span of this study covers the first three centuries, principally from 
Augustus to the Severan emperors, when the Roman empire is believed to have been at 
                                                     
8
 Ando 2000: 406-12.  
9
 Ando 2000: 253-69. 
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the zenith of its power. It is well known that Roman territorial expansion had occurred 
mostly during the middle and late Republic, and conquest under the Principate was 
limited to a few additional provinces such as Britain, Dacia, Arabia and Mesopotamia. 
Thus, the Principate should have been a period of adaption and blending. If the Roman 
authorities were in practice conscious of the problem of integration, we might expect to 
find some indications in actions undertaken to ensure the continuance of their rule over 
the provinces during the Principate.  
 Under the Principate most Roman soldiers rarely experienced battlefield 
operations throughout the twenty-five years of their service. The total period of warfare 
involving the eastern provinces was about fifty years out of the three hundred (30 BCE - 
284 CE): Corbulo’s Parthian war in 58-63 CE, the first Jewish revolt and civil war in 
66-73, Trajan’s Parthian war and subsequent Jewish revolt in 114-7, the Bar Kokhba 
revolt in 132-5, Verus’ Parthian war in 161-6, the civil war after the fall of Commodus 
in 193, Severus’ Parthian war in 197-8, Caracalla’s Parthian war in 216-7, Alexander’s 
Persian war in 232-3, the wars against Shapur I in 242-4 and 250-60, Aurelian’s war 
against Zenobia’s Palmyrene empire in 270-3, Carus’ Persian war in 283, and the civil 
war between Carinus and Diocletian in 284-5. For most of the three hundred years the 
soldiers were engaged in minor border actions, maintaining law and order, 
administrative support, and military and civilian construction projects. 
 The sources for this study are various. The Latin authors used include the 
Augustan poets, Pompeius Trogus, Livy, Velleius Paterculus, Suetonius, Tacitus, the 
authors of Augustan History and some novelists. More Greek authors are cited because 
of the focus on the eastern provinces: Josephus, Plutarch, Epictetus, Pausanias, Arrian, 
Appian, Aelius Aristides, Cassius Dio, Herodian and some Greek novelists. Some 
sources of the late Republic and the Dominate are also cited, when it is necessary to 
look at the origins of the imperial system and its later legacy. Archaeology, epigraphy 
17 
 
and papyrology are complementary, and help to fill in gaps in the literary evidence. For 
example, gravestones and military diplomata tell us much about patterns of recruitment 
and service, while archaeology reveals the physical relationship between military and 
civilian settlements.  
 
1.2: Winning hearts and minds 
 The term ʻhearts and minds’ has been used and understood in various ways. In 
the age of modern imperialism, the phrase has had a specific sense in military strategy 
as part of psychological operations, to encourage and develop emotional and intellectual 
support or commitment on the part of the natives of colonies or protectorates to 
occupying military forces engaged in fighting insurgency or external threats. During the 
Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1960, some British armed forces began a counter-
insurgency campaign to win the ʻhearts and minds’ of the Malays and other indigenous 
peoples in British Malaya. Sir Gerald Templer, a British general, first used the phrase in 
a strategic context in his argument that: “The answer lies not in pouring more soldiers 
into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the Malayan people”.10 By training the 
Federation army and supplying food and medical equipment to the locals, the British 




                                                     
10
 Ramakrishna 2001: 79-92; http://www.defenceviewpoints.co.uk/articles-and-analysis/hearts-and-
minds-malayan-campaign-re-evaluated (31/7/15). 
11
 This strategic consideration of British armed forces has previously been detected in their policy for the 
civilians of Hong Kong and Port Hamilton (거문도, Geomundo) at the end of the nineteenth century. 
When British Royal Navy occupied Port Hamilton, a Korean isle, between 1885 and 1887 to 
counterbalance the advance of Russian power in the Far East, its marines developed friendly relations 
with the civilians. About three hundred Korean islanders were employed and paid for the fortification of 
the isle, and some local landowners even wanted to lease their land and property for military use. For the 
reports on these relations between the British soldiers and Korean civilians, see Park 1982: 641-4 (no. 
201.2), 653-4 (no. 2.2), 683-6 (no. 46.2, 46.4). The residents of Geomundo had preserved the soldiers’ 
18 
 
 During the Vietnam war from 1955 to 1975, the United States government also 
conducted a ʻhearts and minds’ campaign, which was popularised by the documentary 
film Hearts and Minds directed by Peter Davis in 1974. Gaining support from the 
southern Vietnamese was a pivotal element for the United States army in its war 
strategy against the People’s Army led by Ho Chi Minh. The United States army 
provided military training and medical service to the people of South Vietnam. A huge 
amount of budget and manpower were invested in developing the economic and social 
infrastructures of South Vietnam, and winning hearts and minds seems to have reached 
its zenith with the creation of a military and civilian organisation, the Civil Operations 
and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), although it is still a matter of 
dispute whether the campaign had much success.
12
 Between 2003 and 2010 the United 
States government again used ‘winning hearts and minds’ as a slogan during its military 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
13
  
 More recently, although the phrase has disappeared after its general failure, a 
considerable number of army units under the supervision of the United Nations (UN) 
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) are still providing aid to maintain 
public health and other facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as to train their 
national forces.
14
 The concept of integrating military and civilian cooperation is one of 
the main concerns of NATO in planning its military strategy, which was discussed in the 
NATO Defence College Forum at Rome in 2011, leading to the publication of a book, 
Towards a Comprehensive Approach: Integrating Civilian and Military Concepts of 
                                                                                                                                                           
cemetery, and rededicated it in April 1998 with the members of the British embassy in Seoul.   
12
 Hunt 1995: 252-79. 
13
 Iraq: http://www.cfr.org/iraq/win-iraq/p8847 (01/08/15). Afghanistan: Beath et al. 2013. 
14








 Winning the hearts and minds of populations still occupies an important part in 
the military strategy of the Western powers to strengthen solidarity with their allies and 
to confront their potential enemies. On 13th May 2015, the United Kingdom and New 
Zealand media reported that ʻthe soldier prince’ Harry had mastered and performed the 
Haka, a traditional Maori dance, with other soldiers at Linton military camp in New 
Zealand.
16
 Some United States army units, still stationed in Japan, South Korea, and 
Taiwan to implement the Asia-Pacific strategy of their Department of Defence, are 
occasionally seconded for local aid to the civil authorities, in cooperation with the local 
national forces. Peoples of the three countries accept the presence of foreign military 
force because they appreciate that it benefits the local economy and symbolises the 
close alliance with the United States. 
 The idea of a policy to win the hearts and minds of the locals in occupied areas 
is not a modern invention, but a similar idea or practice is also seen in some ancient 
sources. The Chinese strategist Sun Wu of the late sixth century BCE promoted the 
importance of winning hearts and minds to facilitate military logistics and to gain 




(2) One who excels in employing the military does not conscript the 
people twice or transport provisions a third time. If you obtain your 
equipment from within the state and rely on seizing provisions from the 
enemy, then the army’s foodstuffs will be sufficient. (善用兵者, 役不再
籍, 糧不三載; 取用於國, 因糧於敵, 故軍食可足也。) 
The state is impoverished by the army when it transports provisions far off. 
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 Sun Wu, The Art of War 2, 9. 
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When provisions are transported far off, the subjects are impoverished. 
(國之貧於師者遠輸, 遠輸則百姓貧。) 
Those in proximity to the army will sell their goods expensively. When 
goods are expensive, the subjects’ wealth will be exhausted. When their 
wealth is exhausted, they will be extremely hard-pressed to supply their 
village’s military impositions. (近於師者貴賣, 貴賣則百姓財竭, 財竭
則急於丘役。) 
… Therefore, a general who understands warfare is Master for the people, 
ruler of the state’s security or endangerment. (故知兵之將, 生民之司命, 
國家安危之主也。) 
(9) If orders are consistently implemented to instruct the people, then the 
people will submit. If orders are not consistently implemented to instruct 
the people, then the people will not submit. One whose orders are 
consistently out has established a mutual relationship with the people. (令
素行以敎其民, 則民服; 令素不行以敎其民, 則民不服。令素行者, 
與眾上得也。) 
 
His descendant Sun Bin of the fourth century BCE also pointed out the same 
strategic value in his treatise of the same title, which has been discovered 





(7) He who has mastered the way (Tao) understands the course of the 
heaven above and the topography of the earth below. Within his own state 
he wins the hearts and minds of his people, and beyond its borders he is 
fully aware of the enemy’s situation. … (知道者, 上知天之道。下知地
之理, 內得其民之心, 外知敵之情, …) 
(11) The way (Tao) to employ the military and win the allegiance of the 
people is the same as weighing something on a set of scales and balances. 
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A set of scales and balances should be used to select and promote superior 
and good men. (用兵移民之道, 權衡也。 權衡, 所以纂(選)賢取良
也。) 
(22) If an army loses the people, it does not know about excesses. (兵失民, 
不知過者也。) 
An army that is unable to overcome great adversity is unable to unite the 
people’s minds. (兵不能勝大患, 不能合民心者也。) 
(26) Sixth, if the people regard the army with bitterness, he (a general) 
can be defeated. (六曰: 民苦其師, 可敗也。) 
 
 Similar ideas can be found among the Romans under the Principate. In his 
Agricola, Tacitus introduced how his father-in-law had managed to gain the hearts and 
minds of provincials in the first year of his governorship of Britain before his campaign 
in the province (78 CE).
19
   
 
Be that as it may, Agricola was aware of the temper of the provincials, and 
took to heart the lesson which the experience of other suggested, that little 
was accomplished by force if injustice followed. He decided therefore to 
eliminate the causes of war. He began with himself and his own people: he 
put in order his own house, a task not less difficult for most governors that 
the government of a province. He transacted no public business through 
freedmen or slaves: he admitted no officer or private to his staff from 
personal linkings, or private recommendation, or entreaty: he gave his 
confidence only to the best. He made it his business to know everything; if 
not, always, to follow up his knowledge: he turned an indulgent ear to 
small offences, yet was strict to offences that were serious: he was 
satisfied generally with penitence instead of punishment: to all offices and 
positions he preferred to advance the men not likely to offend rather than 
to condemn them after offences. Demands for grain and tribute he made 
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less burdensome by equalising the burdens: he abolished all the profit-
making dodges which were more intolerable than the tribute itself. 
(Ceterum animorum provinciae prudens, simulque doctus per aliena 
experimenta parum profici armis, si iniuriae sequerentur, causas bellorum 
statuit excidere. a se suisque orsus primum domum suam coercuit, quod 
plerisque haud minus arduum est quam provinciam regere. nighil per 
libertos servosque publicae rei, non studiis privatis nec ex commendatione 
aut precibus centurionem militesve adscire, sed optimum quemque 
fidissimum putare. omnis scire, non omnia exsequi. parvis peccatis veniam, 
magnis severitatem commodare; nec poena semper, sed saepius 
paenitentia contentus esse; officiis et administrationibus potius non 
peccaturos praeponere, quam damnare cum peccassent. frumenti et 
tributorum exactionem aequalitate munerum mollire, circumcisis quae in 
quaestum reperta ipso tributo gravius tolerabantur.)  
 
The military system of the Roman empire in the second century CE was glowingly 





So these men (i.e. provincial recruits to the Roman army), once you 
eliminated the morally and the socially base, you <introduced into> the 
community of the ruling nation, not without the privileges I mentioned nor 
in such a way that they would envy those who stay in the city because 
they themselves were not of equal rights at the start, but in such a way that 
they would consider their share of citizenship as an honour. Having found 
and treated them thus, you led them to the boundaries of the empire. There 
you stationed them at intervals, and you assigned areas to guard, some to 
some, others to others. (τούτους δὴ ἄρα καθάραντες καὶ φυλοκρινήσαντες 
τὸ κοινὸν τῶν ἀρχόντων, οὐ χωρὶς ὧν εἶπον οὐδ᾽ ὥστε φθονεῖν ἐξεῖναι 
μᾶλλον τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς ἐπὶ τῆς πόλεως μένουσιν, ἅτε οὐκ οὖσιν ὁμοτίμοις 
τὸ ἀρχαῖον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τιμῆς αὐτοὺς μέρει λήψεσθαι τὴν μετουσίαν τῆς 
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πολιτείας, οὕτως εὑρόντες τε καὶ διαθέντες αὐτοὺς ἠγάγετε ἐπὶ τὰ πέρατα 
τῆς ἀρχῆς, κἀνταῦθα διαστήσαντες ἄλλοις ἄλλα φυλάττειν ἀπενείματε.)   
 
Vegetius, a Roman writer of the late fourth century CE, wrote a book of military 
strategy, The Epitome of Military Matters, in which he also emphasised the importance 
of civilian cooperation in terms of logistics and intelligence. Although he did not 
directly mention the ʻhearts’ or ʻminds’ of people, we can read the implication from 





(3.3) If the provinces can not raise their quotas in kind, they must 
commute for them in money to be employed in procuring all things 
requisite for the service. For the possessions of the subjects can not be 
kept secure otherwise than by the defence of arms. (Quod si tributa 
deficiunt, prorogato auro conparanda sunt omnia. Neque enin diuitiarum 
secura possessio est, nisi armorum defensione seruetur.) 
(3.6) If any difficulty arises about the choice of roads, he should procure 
proper and skilful guides. He should put them under a guard and spare 
neither promises nor threat to induce them to be faithful. They will acquit 
themselves well when they know it is impossible to escape and are certain 
of being rewarded for their fidelity or punished for their perfidy. 
(praeterea (sub periculo eligendum) viarum duces idoneos scientesque 
praecipere eosque custodiae mancipare addita poenae ostentatione vel 
praemii. Erunt enim utiles, cum intellegant nec fugiendi sibi copiam 
superesse et fidei praemium ac perfidiae parata supplicia.) 
 
 It is true that we should not apply the concept of winning ʻhearts and minds’ in 
modern strategic theory to the military policy of the Roman empire. First, the size of 
military strength and the geographical scope of military operations in the two periods 
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are enormously different. Second, more significantly, the modern concept of human 
rights can not be applied to the Romans’ way of thinking about people, especially 
provincials. However, as I have showed above, modern imperialists and the Romans 
shared a common idea or sense of winning the hearts and minds of people to achieve 
their military purposes. I will argue that the Roman authorities of the Principate did, in 
fact, employ strategic practices and policies to create and maintain provincial loyalty 
and consensus to their armed forces in the eastern provinces. 
 
1.3: Structure of the thesis 
 The structure of this study, after the introduction, is as follows: 
 Chapter 2 is an analysis of the changing pattern of Roman military deployment 
in the East and of the known origines of the Roman soldiers who served there during 
the first three centuries CE. I list the legionary, auxiliary, and navy units which were 
stationed in the eastern provinces for whatever purposes. All the epigraphic sources for 
the origins of soldiers, including Forni’s sources and all those since published up to 
2014, are analysed to examine whether the pattern of recruitment, in fact, supports the 
theory of increasingly local recruitment which is believed by most scholars. I argue for 
a rather different, more regional, pattern of recruitment, and discuss its implications. 
 Chapter 3 investigates the processes of recruitment and of the veteran 
settlement, and to what extent those contributed to the integration of soldiers in the 
eastern provinces. As serving in the army was the most common way of obtaining 
Roman citizenship, how a soldier and his family were practically reborn as Roman 
citizens is an important topic. Whether they formed a privileged class isolated from the 
provincial societies, with a growth of recruits ʻfrom the camp (e castris)’, or functioned 
as a bridge connecting local people to the Roman state is also considered. I argue that it 
is necessary to understand the procedures for recruitment and for veteran settlement in 
25 
 
the perspective of a policy of social interaction and integration. I include a special case 
study of Syene. 
 The aim of chapter 4 is to examine the material relations between soldiers and 
civilians in the eastern provinces. I investigate to what extent military bases were 
located in or by existing cities, and to test the idea that relations in such contexts 
differed significantly between the eastern and western provinces. In the less urbanised 
West many cities developed out of the civilian settlements (vici and canabae) which 
grew up around military camps, and the army is typically seen as a driver of 
urbanisation and economic growth. In the East it made sense to station army units in or 
near already existing cities in order to facilitate supply. However, soldiers stationed in 
eastern cities are often criticised by ancient authors for their lax discipline and low 
morale, and numerous complaints are attested about abuses of the requisition system. 
Using the available archaeological evidence from Cappadocia, Syria, Mesopotamia, 
Judaea, Arabia and Egypt, I examine whether the army camps (legionary and auxiliary) 
were located inside or outside the city walls, and if they were within it, to what extent 
the army was encroaching on civilian space. I also reconsider the evidence for abuses of 
the requisition system to re-assess the idea that, unlike in the West, the Roman army in 
the East had a negative effect on civilians.  
 Chapter 5 re-investigates the image of Roman soldiers revealed in Greek 
literature of the imperial period, including some Latin literature set in the Greek East. 
Rather than excerpting accounts or stories of abuses committed by them against 
provincials, I investigate the evidence for a positive image among provincials of 
soldiers as a beneficial presence. First, I give a general description of the change in the 
Greek elite’s view about Roman rule and military force. Second, through analysis of the 
portrayals of soldiers in the ancient novels, I suggest that their image among ordinary 
provincials was often closer to protectors than villains. Lastly, the cases of Aelius 
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Aristides and Lucius Flavius Arrianus enable us to appreciate two different ways in 
which Romanised provincials could contribute to imperial integration, as an orator 
formulating an ideal function of soldiers for imperial defence and as an actual military 
commander.   
 Chapter 6 investigates what Roman propaganda there was in the eastern 
provinces as part of the military strategy against the Arsacid - Sassanid empire, and to 
evaluate its impact on provincials by investigating the reaction of Greeks. First, I 
suggest that the Roman claim that the Parthians were a constant threat to the eastern 
provinces of the Roman empire offered a useful means to identify the security needs of 
the local populace with those of the imperial power, justifying the deployment of the 
Roman army in the area. Second, I suggest that the Romans exploited the legacy of 
Alexander the Great, because of his enduring appeal to many eastern peoples, as a way 
of uniting provincials in the Greek East to confront a mythical Parthian threat. I note 
that in fact there were few wars on the eastern frontier, and most of those few were 
provoked by Rome. The anti-Parthian propaganda - which included displays of 
Armenian and Parthian embassies, and the myth of the military danger of the ʻParthian 
shot’ - thus seems to have been deliberately designed to reinforce peacetime loyalty. 
 In my concluding chapter, I review the results of my researches, and argue that 
in various ways the Roman state did seek to embed and integrate its military forces 
among the civilian populations of the eastern provinces, and that there is sufficient 
continuity and coherence to these practices to suppose that the Romans had, in effect, a 




Ch. 2: Recruits to the Roman armed forces in the East: the data 
 
2.1: Introduction 
 In discussions about the recruitment of the Roman armed forces, historians 
traditionally believed that the legionaries were recruited solely from Roman citizens and 
the auxiliaries were recruited from peregrini (non-citizens), mostly provincials but 
occasionally from outside the empire. Non-citizen soldiers could become citizens only 
after they had been discharged from the armed forces. But the rigid application of this 
principle is no longer believed by scholars. At the end of the nineteenth century, 
Mommsen found various exceptions in inscriptions and, more importantly, suggested 
that the legionaries and the auxiliaries gradually came to depend on local recruitment.
22
 
Since then, many scholars have endeavoured to discover a pattern in the nature of 
recruitment. However, their studies were biased toward the legionary recruitment in the 
West, where Roman and Latin citizenship were more common, and only a rough 
agreement was reached that there were differences in the patterns of recruitment 
between the West and the East. Added to this, few studies have looked on the pattern of 
auxiliary recruitment, although there is no doubt that in the East the role of auxiliaries 
was of equivalent importance to that of legionaries. 
 Thus there are two important questions to which I try to provide answers. First, 
was the pattern of recruitment in the East different from that in the West, and if so, how 
substantial was it? Second, to what extent did the pattern of recruitment in the East 
became localised, and what does the ‘localisation’ mean? Answering these questions 
will contribute to our understanding of imperial military policy and strategy in the East 
since these issues came to the fore in terms of the relationship with the Arsacid - 
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Sassanid empire, which competed with the Roman empire for dominance over 
Mesopotamia through the first to third centuries.  
 The pattern of recruiting soldiers for the first three centuries is an important 
mean of accessing Romanisation in the eastern provinces and its strategic effect. First, I 
will investigate the origins and movements of the legions, auxiliary units and fleets 
deployed in the eastern provinces, and represent the increasing number of those units 
during the Principate. Second, I will introduce the views of previous scholars about the 
pattern of recruitment. Third, based on epigraphic evidence, I will illuminate whether 
there was a different nature in the pattern of recruitment to the eastern units, and how 
far it supports the theory of ʻlocalisation’.  
 
2.2: The origins and movements of the Roman military units  
 2.2.1: The legions 
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 The emergence of the imperial legions began with Augustus’ military reform 
after the battle of Actium in 31 BCE, which ultimately meant transforming the 
Republic’s amateur temporary armies into the professional standing armies of the 
empire.
25
 This reform was carried out in three areas: the size, remuneration and 
disposition of the army. Augustus reorganised some sixty legions, which had been 
created by competition between Caesarians and rival commanders throughout the civil 
wars, into twenty-eight legions.
26
 The total number fluctuated thereafter as some 
legions were lost and new ones formed; by the Severan period there were thirty-three 
legions. Augustus established a fixed annual stipend for soldiers and a cash bonus on 
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discharge, and founded the aerarium militare to pay the bonus.
27
 Lastly, the legionary 
units, except the praetorian cohorts based in Italy, were stationed mainly in the 
provinces along with auxiliary units. 
 In the East, the history of permanently stationed legions began with the eight 
legions allotted to Antony for his Parthian campaign after the battle of Philippi in 42 
BCE. Five of those were disbanded by the Augustan reform, but the legio III Gallica, VI 
Ferrata and XII Fulminata remained in the East throughout the Principate. The legio III 
Gallica, as Parker argued, was probably raised by Caesar in 48 BCE from veterans who 
had previously served in his Gallic campaign, and from soldiers of the old legio XV.
28
 
The full title including the cognomen Gallica is first attested in an inscription from 
Cyprus belonging to the end of Augustus’ reign or the beginning of Tiberius’. The legio 
VI Ferrata was created by Caesar in Gallia Cisalpina in 52 BCE to fight against 
Vercingetorix. The earliest mention of its full title is in an inscription of a veteran settled 
at Beneventum in 41 BCE.
29
 The legio XII Fulminata was formed with legio XI by 
Caesar in Italy in 58 BCE for his campaign against the Helvetii and later moved to the 
East with Antony. Its first cognomen was Paterna after Caesar as pater patriae, which 
changed to Antiqua when the legion passed to Antony, and then finally became 
Fulminata, which can be found in an inscription of a colonist at Patrae in 30 BCE.
30
 
 Augustus stationed four more legions in the East after his reform: the legio III 
Cyrenaica, VII Claudia, X Fretensis and XXII Deiotariana. The origin of legio III 
Cyrenaica is obscure. Parker’s hypothesis seems valid that this legion was probably 
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raised by Lepidus between 42 and 36 BCE since Augustus and Antony both already had 
legions numbered III.
31
 Antony stationed it in Cyrenaica, which is how it gained the 
cognomen. The legio VII Claudia was one of the oldest legions formed by Caesar for 
his Gallic wars. This legion had been called Macedonica, but the emperor Claudius 
granted it a new cognomen, Claudia Pia Fidelis, because of its loyalty during the revolt 
of Scribonianus in 41 CE.
32
 The legio X Fretensis was formed by Augustus in Italy 
after the battle of Philippi. In 36 BCE, it gained its cognomen from its victorious role in 
the battle of Naulochus in the strait (fretum) between Italy and Sicily.
33
 The legio XXII 
Deiotariana had an unusual background. This legion had its origin in two legions 
created by king Deiotarus of Galatia, who introduced Roman equipment and drill 
system into his army. His legions fought for Caesar against Pharnaces II, the king of 
Pontus, but were defeated in the first engagement, and then reorganised into one legion. 
This legion became the twenty-second Roman legion when Amyntas, the successor of 
Deiotarus, was killed and his kingdom annexed by the Roman empire in 25 BCE, but 
the founder’s name was left in its title.34  
 The defence of the East under Augustus was the responsibility of those seven 
legions. There was no obvious need to station more legions there since he had restored 
diplomatic relations with the Parthians. Augustus stationed three of them, the legio III 
Gallica, VI Ferrata and X Fretensis in Syria, and another three, the legio III Cyrenaica, 
XII Fulminata and XXII Deiotariana in Egypt. The exact location of each legion at that 
time is still uncertain, even though most scholars agree that the headquarters of the 
Syrian legions were located around Zeugma, Raphaneae and the Orontes, and those of 
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the Egyptian legions at Nikopolis and Babylon, and in the Thebaid.
35
 The legio VII 
Claudia had presumably been garrisoned in Galatia from 25 BCE, but in 6 CE it was 
redeployed to Pannonia and did not return to the East.
36
 It is noticeable that this legion 
and the XXII legion, in contrast to the other legions mostly comprised of Roman citizens, 
depended largely on the recruitment of native Galatians when they were reorganised by 
Augustus.   
 Augustus’ successors over the next three centuries transferred three legions, 
legio IV Scythica, XV Apollinaris and IX Hispana, and created six more legions, legio 
XVI Flavia Firma, II Traiana Fortis, I-III Parthicae and IV Italica, for offence and 
defence in the eastern frontier. The legio IV Scythica had presumably been formed by 
Antony between 40 and 31 BCE. Augustus stationed it in Moesia to conquer the 
Scythians, from which it moved to Syria in 56 or 57 CE for Corbulo’s campaigns 
against Armenia and Parthia.
37
 The legio XV Apollinaris was raised by either Caesar or 
Augustus, and it won its cognomen at the battle of Naulochus in 36 BCE. During the 
first century, it was located at Carnuntum in Pannonia, except during the period 63-71 
CE when it was dispatched to the East to fight in the Armenian war and the Jewish war. 
This legion was apparently redeployed to Egypt in c.106 CE, and then from 117 was 
stationed permanently at Satala in Cappadocia.
38
 It is uncertain whether the legio IX 
Hispana stemmed from Caesar’s ninth legion which had been disbanded in 46 or 45 
BCE, but Augustus formed it in 41 or 40 BCE. This legion probably gained its 
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cognomen because it served in Spain (Hispania) in the early years of Augustus’ reign.39 
The time when this legion was transferred to the East and was disbanded is still a 
controversial issue among the scholars.
40
 However, they roughly agree that this legion 
may have been annihilated in Judaea in 134-5 CE or in Cappadocia in 161, because it is 






Map 1: The eastern provinces of the Roman empire in the early second century CE 
 
 The formation of new legions in the Principate was a necessary procedure to 
control newly acquired territories and to prepare for major expeditions. The legio XVI 
Flavia Firma was raised by Vespasian as part of the process to integrate Cappadocia 
                                                     
39
 CIL 5.7443; Keppie 1984: 157, 208. 
40
 Mor 1986: 267-9; Keppie 1989: 247-55. 
41
 Campbell 2010: 48-53; CIL 6.3492 (= ILS 2288).  
34 
 
into the eastern provincial and military system in the mid-70s. This legion had been 
garrisoned at Satala in Cappadocia until it participated in Trajan’s Parthian war, and 
then substituted the legio III Gallica stationed at Samosata in Syria.
42
 The earliest 
evidence is a Latin inscription of 75 CE, recording the construction of a canal above 
Antioch.
43
 The legio II Traiana Fortis was one of two legions created by Trajan for his 
second Dacian war in 105-106 CE. It seems that he recruited this legion from Italian 
settlers in Spain and experienced legionaries who had served in Moesia.
44
 After 
fighting in the Dacian war and the Parthian war, it was stationed at Caparcotna in 
Judaea for less than ten years, and then finally based at Nikopolis in Egypt (Map 1).
45
 
 The creation of legiones I - III Parthicae was carried out, probably in Italy, 
before 197 CE by Septimius Severus for his expedition against the Parthian empire. 
After the successful expedition, he stationed the first and third legions in the new 
province of Mesopotamia and returned to Rome with the second legion which was now 
based at Castra Albana.
46
 During the first half of the third century, this second legion 
wintered at Apamea in Syria whenever it had to participate in the Persian wars.
47
 Lastly, 
the legio IV Italica was raised by Severus Alexander in Italy in 231. He led this legion 
to fight against the Sassanids and then dispatched it to Maximinus’ expeditionary forces 
in Germany. It was most likely based in Mesopotamia until the mid-250s.
48
 
 To sum up, the legio III Gallica, VI Ferrata and XII Fulminata had been 
stationed in the East since the Second Triumvirate, and so served there for the longest 
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period. The legio III Cyrenaica and XXII Deiotariana were deployed in Egypt, and the 
legio X Fretensis was transferred to Syria directly after the Augustan reform. The legio 
IV Scythica was permanently stationed in Syria after it had been redeployed to the East 
at the end of the Neronian period due to the Corbulo’s Armenian war. The legio XV 
Apollinaris, which had had its camp at Carnuntum, also participated in Corbulo’s 
campaign and stayed in Cappadocia and Egypt for almost ten years. It was permanently 
redeployed to the East in the reign of Trajan. The legio XVI Flavia Firma and II Traiana 
Fortis were stationed in the East from when they were created by Vespasian and by 
Trajan respectively. The legiones I and III Parthicae, and IV Italica were garrisoned in 
Mesopotamia from the Severan period. During the Principate, the number of legions 
stationed in the eastern provinces doubled from six to twelve, which indicates a 
percentage increase from 21% to 36% of the total imperial legions (see Table 1). 
 
 2.2.2: The auxiliary units 
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Syria Syria Syria 
II Flavia Pia 
Fidelis mil. 
- - ? 
Germania 
Syria 
Raetia Raetia Raetia Raetia 
I 
Commagenorum 
- - Commagene 
Egypt 



















? Moesia Inf. Cappadocia Cappadocia Cappadocia Cappadocia 
I Ulpia Dacorum - - - Dacia 
Cappadocia 




- - - Arabia ? 
Syria 
Syria Arabia Arabia? 
I Ulpia 
Singularium 
- - - ? 
Syria 
Syria Syria Syria 
II Ulpia Auriana - - - Raetia? 
Cappadocia 
Cappadocia Cappadocia Cappadocia 







Dacia Pannonia Sup. Pannonia Sup. Syria 
I Flavia civ. Rom. - - Italia 
Pannonia Inf. 
Dacia Dacia Dacia 
Pannonia Inf. 
Syria 
I praetoria sig. 
civ. Rom. 
Italia? Germania Inf. Pannonia Inf. Moesia Sup. Moesia Sup. Pannonia Inf. Cappadocia 
Alae in the East / 
the Empire 
13 / 49 
(27%) 
14 / 62 
(23%) 
20 (1) / 75 
(5)52 
(27%) 
19 (1) / 85 (7) 
(22%) 
17-21 (1) 
/ 88 (7)53 
(19-24%) 
15-17 (1)  
/ 80 (7)54 
(19-21%) 









69 - 96 
Trajan 
98 - 117 
Hadrian 
117 - 138 
Antonines 
138 - 193 
Severans 











Cappadocia Cappadocia Cappadocia 





















Cappadocia Cappadocia Cappadocia Cappadocia Cappadocia 
I    
Damascenarum 
equi. 






- - - - - - 
Flori ? 
Egypt 





Egypt Egypt Egypt Egypt Egypt Egypt 
Nigri ? 
Egypt 
- - - - - - 
I Thebaeorum 
equi. 
Egypt Egypt Egypt Judaea 
Arabia 
Arabia ? ? 






Syria Cappadocia Cappadocia Cappadocia Cappadocia 
II Classica sag. - Syria Syria Syria Syria Syria Syria 
I Hispanorum Hispania Galatia Galatia Galatia Judaea - - 
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 This unit may be identical with I Veterana Gaetulorum. See Cotton and Isaac 2003: 19-26. 
52
 The number of total auxiliary units (the number of milliaria). 
53
 Holder 2003: 145 (Table 18). 
54
 Spaul 1994: 265-6; 2000: 526. 
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equi. Egypt Judaea 
I Italica mil. vol. 
equi. civ. Rom. 
- Italia 
Syria 
Cappadocia Cappadocia Cappadocia ? ? 









? Cappadocia Cappadocia 
Egypt 
Egypt Egypt Egypt 
I Ascalonitarum 
sag. equi. 
- - Judaea 
Syria 














? Judaea Egypt Egypt Egypt Egypt 
III Augusta 
Thracum equi. 





















II Cantabrorum - Hispania-
Tarraconensis 




- - Syria Syria Syria Syria Syria 
I Flavia Cilicum 
equi. 
- - Cilicia 
Egypt 
Egypt Egypt Egypt Egypt 
I Flavia civ. Rom. 
equi. 




I Gaetulorum - Mauretania-
Tingitana 
Syria Syria ? ? ? 
II Hispanorum 
equi. civ. Rom. 
Hispania ? Cappadocia Cappadocia Cappadocia Cappadocia Cappadocia 
Syria 
I Ituraeorum mil. 
equi. sag. 







III Ituraeorum - - Judaea 
Egypt 
Egypt Egypt Egypt Egypt 

























Africa ? Syria 
Cappadocia 
? Cappadocia ? ? 
I Pannoniorum 
equi. 





I Raetorum equi.  - Raetia Syria 
Moesia 
Cappadocia Cappadocia Asia 
Phrygia 
Raetia? 






III Syrorum sag.   Syria 
Cappadocia 
Cappadocia ? ? ? 
I Thracum mil. 
equi. 






II Thracum civ. 
Rom. 
- Thracia Judaea 
Syria 
Egypt Egypt Egypt Egypt 
II Thracum 
Syriaca 
- Thracia Syria Syria Syria Syria Syria 
III Thracum 
Syriaca 
- Thracia Syria ? Cappadocia ? ? 
IV Thracum 
Syriaca 
- Thracia Syria ? Moesia Inf. - - 
I Augusta 
Cyrenaica equi. 
Cyrenaica ? ? Galatia Galatia ? ? 
II Augusta 
Thracum 
Thracia ? ? Cappadocia Pannonia Inf. Pannonia Inf. Pannonia Inf. 
I Claudia equi.  ? ? Cappadocia Cappadocia Cappadocia Cappadocia 
II Claudia  ? ? Cappadocia Cappadocia Cappadocia Cappadocia 
II Hemesenorum 
equi. 
- - - Syria 
Arabia 
? ? ? 
VI Hispanorum 
equi. Praetoria 
Hispania ? ? Bithynia-
Pontus 
? ? Arabia 
I Italica mil. - - Italia? Cappadocia Cappadocia ? ? 
I Ulpia Dacorum - - - Dacia Syria Syria Syria 
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- - - Bithynia-
Pontus 
Cappadocia 




- - - Bithynia-
Pontus 
Syria 




- - - Bithynia-
Pontus 
Syria 












- - - Arabia 
Cappadocia 
Cappadocia Cappadocia Cappadocia 
IV Ulpia 
Petraeorum 






- - - Arabia ? Syria Syria 
VI Ulpia 
Petraeorum 




VII Gallorum Gallia ? Moesia Inf. Moesia Inf. Syria Syria Syria 
V Gemella civ. 
Rom. 






- - ? ? Cappadocia Cappadocia Cappadocia 
I Lepidiana equi. 
civ. Rom. 















- Raetia Moesia Sup. Moesia Sup. Cappadocia Cappadocia ? 
I Ulpia Afrorum 
equi. civ. Rom. 
- Africa Britannia Britannia Britannia 
Egypt 
Egypt Egypt 
Aurelia civ. Rom. - - - - - Cappadocia Cappadocia 
VI Brittonum 
equi. 
- - Britannia 
 
Germania Inf. ? Cappadocia Cappadocia 
I Claudia 
Sugambrorum 
Germania? ? Moesia Moesia Inf. Moesia Inf. Syria Syria 
I Flavia 
Numidarum equi. 










mil. equi. civ. 
Rom. 





mil. equi. sag. 
- - - - - Syria Syria 
II Ulpia Equitata 
civ. Rom. sag. 
- - - ? ? Syria Syria 
V Afrorum - - - - - - Africa 
Arabia 
Cohortes in the 
East /  
the Empire 
11 / c. 200 
(5.5%) 
13-16 41-44 (5) 57-61 (9) 63-67 (10) 
/ 279 (29)56 
(23-24%) 
70-75 (13)  




 The Augustan reform also changed the auxiliary system. The auxiliary units 
began to be transformed from supplementary contingents to professional standing units. 
In the Republic, the Romans used to reinforce their army with auxiliary troops from 
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 Holder 2003: 145 (Table 18) 
57
 Spaul 2000: 526. 
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their allies. During the civil war, Caesar and Pompey relied primarily on auxiliary units 
for their cavalry forces. These units had regular pay and, probably from the reign of 
Claudius, could expect citizenship and other privileges after at least twenty-five years of 
mandatory service.
58
 It is hard to trace the formation of auxiliary units from the late 
Republic to the Julio-Claudian period because most ancient authors minimised the 
importance of those units. Reliable epigraphic evidence of the imperial auxiliary units 
begins to appear on tombstones of the mid-first century when diplomata attesting grant 
of citizenship also began to appear.
59
 
 For the organisation of auxiliary units, most scholars still rely on the treatise 
attributed to Hyginus, the Formation of the Roman Camp, which is probably dated to 
the late second century.
60
 The structure of auxiliary units basically mirrored that of the 
legions. There were three types of units: cohors peditata, cohors equitata and ala. A 
cohors peditata consisted of six centuriae of eighty infantrymen each. A cohors 
equitata was divided into six centuriae of infantrymen, the same as cohors peditata, and 
four turmae of thirty cavalrymen each. A turma of an ala had thirty-two mounted men, 
and sixteen turmae composed an ala. Thus the paper strength of each type of unit was 
480, 600, and 512 men respectively. Later, from the reign of Nero or Vespasian on, 
roughly double-strength units called milliaria began to appear, and the existing units 
were called quingenaria to differentiate them from milliaria. A cohors peditata milliaria 
was composed of ten centuriae, a cohors equitata milliaria had ten centuriae and eight 
turmae of thirty cavalrymen each, and an ala milliaria consisted of twenty-four turmae 
of thirty-two. The paper strengths of these milliariae units were 800, 1,040, and 768 
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 Cheesman 1914: 7-20; Saddington 1982: 1-26. 
59
 CIL 16.2 is the earliest known diploma which was issued in 54 CE. 
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 The titles of auxiliary units are the pivotal evidence in tracing their origins. 
Through the titles we can identify when they were formed, where they were recruited 
from or where they were stationed, what sizes and to which branches they belonged. For 
instance, the title of the cohors I Ulpia Petraeorum milliaria equitata reveals that this 
unit was a part-mounted regiment of around 1,040 men raised from Petra in the reign of 
Trajan. But it is rare to know titles in full because inscriptions normally abbreviate titles. 
There were some auxiliary units named after their first commanders in the reign of 
Augustus and Tiberius, such as ala Atectorigiana named after Atectorix. Some units had 
titles with two different tribal names or two different ethnic names, such as cohortes 
Asturum et Callaecorum, alae Gallorum et Thraecum. The former were levied from the 




 It is possible to identify which auxiliary units have been stationed in the eastern 
provinces through their veterans’ diplomata and gravestones, while it is not easy to 
establish the exact time when these units were formed and were deployed to the East. 
As was the case with the legions, most auxiliary units were created and were relocated 
for military campaigns or to defend newly acquired territories. We can see the main 
military events that occurred in the East in Table 1 (and note 24). Paradoxically, the 
creation of auxiliary units from recently conquered regions could contribute to diluting 
rebellious groups there.
63
 We have evidence for only twenty-eight alae and seventy-
nine cohortes employed in the eastern provinces, but it is apparent that a greater number 
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 Josephus, Jewish War 3.67; Cheesman 1914: 21-56; Holder 1980: 5-9; Gilliver 2007: 193-4. 
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 Cheesman 1914: 45-9; Holder 1980: 14-27. 
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 Haynes 2013: 120, 134. 
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of auxiliary units served there.
64
 
 The number of units continuously increased from the first to third century. We 
can see in Table 2 a remarkable increase between the reign of Nero and that of 
Vespasian. This increment proves the fact that most of the auxiliary units which had 
been raised and redeployed for the Corbulo’s Armenian war and the first Jewish war 
remained in the eastern provinces after the campaigns. After Vespasian, while the 
number of attested alae remained around twenty, the number of cohortes increased 
steadily, which means more and more cohortes were required and formed to fight 
against the Arsacid - Sassanid empire. Almost half of the cohortes were cohortes 
equitatae, presumably formed in order to match the Parthian and Sassanian cavalrymen. 
It is hard to identify how many auxiliary units were still active in the late third century, 
but it is likely to have been almost the same or a greater number since we can find the 
existence of new units such as Palmyrene archers in Egypt. During the Principate, while 
the percentage of the alae in the eastern provinces fluctuated between 20% and 27% of 
the total alae of the empire, the percentage of the cohortes increased steadily from 5.5% 
to 30% of the total. 
 
 2.2.3: The fleets 





41 - 68 
Flavians 
69 - 96 
Trajan 
98 - 117 
Hadrian 
117 - 138 
Antonines 
138 - 193 
Severans 
193 - 235 
Alexandrina Alexandria Alexandria Alexandria Alexandria Alexandria Alexandria Alexandria 
Pontica - Trapezus Byzantium Trapezus Trapezus Cyzicus Trapezus 










Total classes 1 / 365 2 / 866 3 / 967 3 / 9 3 / 9 3 / 9 3 / 9 
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 Tacitus (Annals 4.5) says that the number of auxiliaries in service was almost the same with that of 
legionaries. 
65
 Classis Misenensis, Ravennatis and Alexandriana 
66




in the East / 
the Empire 
(33%) (25%) (33%) (33%) (33%) (33%) (33%) 
 
 In the late Republic the Mediterranean Sea already had become mare Romanum. 
After the end of the civil wars in 30 BCE, Roman fleets no longer had to fight large-
scale naval battles, but were used to carry troops and to protect official and other 
shipping from sporadic piracy. Like the legions and the auxiliary units, the fleets 
became permanent. There were two main fleets in the reign of Augustus. The western 
sea and the eastern sea of Italy were the responsibilities of the classis Misenensis at 
Misenum and classis Ravennatis at Ravenna respectively. Each fleet was commanded 
by a prefect of equestrian rank or an imperial freedman. Under the prefect, there were 
navarchs, trierarchs, and centurions in order of rank. A navarch commanded a squadron, 
a trierarch was responsible for a battleship, and centurions commanded the marines on a 
ship. The strength of each squadron varied according to the size of the ships employed. 
Members of the fleet were recruited from provincials and, like auxiliaries, were granted 
citizenship after twenty-five years of service.
68
 
 In the East, most imperial fleets originated from those of the Hellenistic 
kingdoms. The classis Alexandrina stationed at Alexandria had its origin in the fleets of 
Antony and Cleopatra. The earliest evidence for it is in Philo’s work from the reign of 
Gaius, and then in an inscription of some rowers discharged in 86.
69
 This fleet was 
responsible for escorting the grain convoys from Egypt to Italy, and policing the coast 
of North Africa and the Nile. The classis Pontica was stationed at Trapezus. This fleet 
seems to have existed from the reign of Augustus, but it was reformed by Nero when he 
amalgamated the kingdom of Pontus with the province of Bithynia. There was also the 
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 Classis Misenensis, Ravennatis, Britannica, Germanica, Pannonica, Moesica, Alexandriana, Pontica 
and Syraica. 
68
 Saddington 2007: 208-15; Pitassi 2009: 201-16;  
69
 Philo, Flaccus 163; CIL 16.32. 
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classis Syriaca stationed at Seleucia Pieria. This fleet seems to have been created before 
Domitian’s reign because a diploma attests a rower discharged in 119, but its origin is 
obscure.
70
 During the Principate, the number of eastern classes maintained roughly a 
third of the total classes of the empire. 
 
 2.2.4: The size of demand for military recruits 
Table 4: Estimated annual demand for legionaries in the eastern provinces 
 I (Aug. to Flavians) II (Trajan to Antonines) III (Severans and after) 
Number of legions 6 → 8 9 → 10 12 
Number of legionaries 30,000 → 40,000 45,000 → 50,000 60,000 
Averaged annual 
discharge 
720 → 960 1,080 → 1,200 1,440 
Averaged annual 
recruitment 
1,680 → 2,240 2,520 → 2,800 3,360 
 
 The number of eastern legions increased steadily from six to twelve during the 
period from Augustus to Severus Alexander, which represents an increase from 21% to 
36% of the total number of legions in the empire (see Table 1). More legions required 
more replacements. Scheidel estimates that each legion of 5,000 soldiers discharged 120 
veterans per year but required 280 recruits to make up the number of soldiers who died 
in action or from natural causes before discharge.
71
 Thus we can infer that the average 
number of annual recruits needed, in theory, for the eastern legions also increased from 
1,680 to 3,360. This figure had never exceeded 26% of the available number of annual 
citizen-recruits aged 20 in the empire. The number of these potential recruits had 
increased from 8,550 under Augustus to 19,950, assuming 14 million Roman citizens 
under Marcus Aurelius, but after the outbreak of the plague probably dropped to below 
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 Saddington 1991:397-9; 2001: 581-6; 2007: 215. 
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 Scheidel 1996: 120-2, Table 3.14. On the other hand, Alston (1995: 44-8, and Table 3.3) suggests 150 
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sources what Gilliam (1986a: 237) has used: CIL 3.6178, AE 1955 238, CIL 3.8110, CIL 8.18067, CIL 
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9,500, and then trebled to 28,500 as a result of the Constitutio Antoniniana in 212.
72
 In 
the East, under Julio-Claudian period, there were far fewer communities with Roman 
(or Latin) citizenship than in the West, so the recruitment pool was in theory much 
smaller, that is if the criterion of prior Roman citizenship was respected.  
 
Table 5: Estimated annual demand for auxiliaries and sailors  
in the eastern provinces 
 I (Aug. - Flavians) II (Trajan - Antonines) III (Severans and after) 
Number of auxiliary units 
Number of fleets 
24 → 64 (6 mil.) 
1 → 3 
80(10 mil.) → 92(14 mil.) 
3 
92 (15 mil.) 
3 
Number of auxiliaries 
Number of sailors 
12,000 → 35,000 
5,000 → 15,000 




Averaged annual discharge 288 → 840 
120 → 360 






672 → 1,960 
120 → 360 





 Assuming an average strength for cohortes of 500 men, it is also possible to 
estimate the minimum annual demand for recruits to auxiliary units in the East. A 
standard cohors probably discharged 12 veterans and recruited 28 soldiers per year, 
while a milliaria discharged 24 veterans and required 56 recruits. The number of annual 
demand for auxiliary recruits increased from 672 under Augustus to 2,996 under the 
Severan emperors, which is almost 90% of the demand for legionary recruits of 3,360. 
In contrast to legionary recruitment, it was not difficult to find recruits qualified to serve 
in auxiliary units, because there was no requirement to be a Roman citizen. After the 
Constitutio Antoniniana in 212, all free-born provincials were Roman citizens anyway, 
so there was now no distinction, even in theory, between legionary and auxiliary 
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 Scheidel 1996: 95, note 18. He estimates that the percentage of available citizen-recruits aged 20 was 
about 0.1425% (0.95% x 15%) of the total Roman citizens in the empire, and that before the Constitutio 
Antoniniana the number of citizens has been recovered to a third of 20 million. For the plague under 
Marcus Aurelius, see Gilliam (1986a: 227-53), although he doubts and minimises its negative impact on 




 There is no evidence concerning the strength of the eastern fleets. We can only 
consider the hypothetical number of men in the Italian fleets, which is estimated by 
Starr. He presumes the strength of the classes Misenensis and Ravennatis to have been 
more than 10,000 and 5,000 men because of Tacitus’ record that two legions and one 
legion were formed from the sailors of the Misenum fleet and the Ravenna fleet 
respectively during the civil war of 68-69.
73
 If we estimate that the number of sailors 
serving in the eastern fleets was around 5,000, we can expect 360 veterans to have been 
discharged annually from the three fleets, because their term of service was the same as 
that of auxiliaries. The number of annual replacements recruited to these fleets was 
probably not far different from the figure of the veterans, because they rarely died in a 
battle. When this figure is added to the annual demand for auxiliaries, it becomes 
possible to estimate the annual demand of provincials to serve in auxiliary units and 
fleets in the East, which increased from 792 to 3,356 during the period from Augustus to 
Severus Alexander. 
 
Table 6: Estimated size of population and armed forces in the eastern provinces
74
 
 14 CE East 164 East 212 East 
Population 45,500,000 20,400,000 61,400,000 23,100,000 55,200,000 ? 
Citizens 6,000,000 ? 14,000,000 ? 20,000,000 ? 
Soldiers75 270,000 47,000 385,700 118,000 c. 407,500 128,500 
Available 8,550  19,950  28,500  
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 Tacitus, Histories 1.6; 3.50, 55; Starr 1960: 16-7. The legio I Adiutrix and Vitellius’ temporary legion 
were raised from classis Misenensis, and the legio II Adiutrix was created from classis Ravennas. 
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 For detailed information and discussions about the sizes of population and military force, see Scheidel 
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 14 CE: 25 legions + 9 praetorian cohorts (5,000) + 250 auxiliary units + 3 fleets; 164: 31 legions + 
8,000 metropolitan troops + 327 (37 mil.) + 9 fleets; 212: 33 legions + 15,000 metropoltian troops + 327 
(38 mil.) + 9 fleets. The estimated number of eastern soldiers that I have calculated can be regarded as its 
minimum strength because there is a possiblity that a greater numer of vexillationes and auxilia served 



















 When Augustus died in 14 CE, he left an armed force of some 270,000 soldiers 
to Tiberius, which was about 0.6% of an estimated total population of the empire at the 
time. In the mid-second and early third century, the empire maintained its military 
strength at around 385,700 to 407,500 troops which comprised 0.6-0.7% of an estimated 
total imperial inhabitants.
77
 The percentage of armed forces employed in the eastern 
provinces increased from 17.4% to 31.5% of the total military strength during the 
Principate.  
 We can see from Table 6 that in the reign of Augustus the number of annually 
available male citizens in their twenties did not meet the annual demand for recruits, 
and would have barely filled up the legionary and Praetorian units. Thus the recruitment 
of peregrini must have been necessary for the East. From the mid-second century, 
however, the number of available young male citizen exceeded the annual demand for 
recruits, which was probably because of the extension of citizenship during the first 
century, and the Hadrian’s subsequent policy of elevating many municipia to colonies 
and of founding new colonies, especially in the eastern provinces. There would have 
been no problem in recruiting soldiers, although a number of citizens tried to be 
exempted from military service, to find substitutes for it, or to commute it for cash 
payment. More importantly, this means that it was no longer necessary to use forcible 
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 Jacques and Scheid (1992: 141) estimates that in the second century the annual demand for legionary 
recruits was 9,000-14,000 men. 
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 The figure I use is around a quarter of the military strength of the European Union in 2012: 
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conscription of provincials except in an emergency. But the plague under Marcus 
Aurelius reduced the number of the available young male citizens to below 9,500, 
which was even lower than the annual demand for the legionary and Praetorian recruits 
of 9,728. The emperor allegedly had to recruit even gladiators, bandits and slaves to 
make up the demand.
78
 The size of Roman armed forces on the eastern frontier was 
now particularly important because of hostilities with the Parthians, which were 
becoming more frequent. At the time, Caracalla’s edict giving citizenship to all free men 
in the empire was an inevitable choice to solve this problem. 
                                                     
78
 Augustan History (Marcus Aurelius) 21.6-7. 
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69 - 96 
Trajan 
98 - 117 
Hadrian 
117 - 138 
Antonines 
138 - 193 
Severans 












I Augusta Gemina Col. 
 
Apula civ. Rom. 
I Augusta civ. Rom. 
I Bosporanorum sag. 
 





I Augusta Gemina Col. 
 
Apula civ. Rom. 
I Bosporanorum sag. 




1 Legio, 2 Alae, 
3 Cohortes, 1 Classis 
XII FULMINATA 
XVI FLAVIA FIRMA 
 
Augusta Germaniciana 
I Augusta Gemina Col. 
Thracum Herculana 
 
Apula civ. Rom. 
I Augusta civ. Rom. 
I Bosporanorum mil. equi. 
sag.  
I Hispanorum equi. 
I Italica mil. vol. equi. civ. 
Rom. 
I Apamenorum sag. equi. 
II Hispanorum equi. civ. 
Rom. 
I Numidarum equi. sag. 




2 Legiones, 3 Alae, 
9 Cohortes, 1 Classis 
XII FULMINATA 
XVI FLAVIA FIRMA 
 
Augusta Germaniciana 
I Augusta Gemina Col. 
I Bosporanorum 
Thracum Herculana 
II Claudia Gallorum 
I Ulpia Dacorum 
II Ulpia Auriana 
 
Apula civ. Rom. 
I Augusta civ. Rom. 
I Bosporanorum mil. equi. 
sag. 
I Damascenarum equi. 
III Augusta Cyrenaica sag. 
equi. 
I Hispanorum equi. 
I Italica mil. vol. equi. civ. 
Rom.  
I Apamenorum sag. equi. 
II Hispanorum equi. civ. 
Rom. 
I Ituraeorum mil. equi. sag. 
I Raetorum equi. 
III Syrorum sag. 
I Augusta Cyrenaica equi. 
II Augusta Thracum 
I Claudia equi. 
II Claudia 
VI Hispanorum equi. 
Praetoria 
I Italica mil. 






I Augusta Gemina Col. 
Thracum Herculana 
II Claudia Gallorum 
I Ulpia Dacorum 
II Ulpia Auriana 
 
Apula civ. Rom. 
I Bosporanorum mil. equi. 
sag. 
I Damascenarum equi. 
III Augusta Cyrenaica sag. 
equi. 
I Italica mil. vol. equi. civ. 
Rom.  
II Hispanorum equi. civ. 
Rom. 
I Ituraeorum mil. equi. sag. 
I Musulamiorum equi. 
I Numidarum equi. sag. 
I Raetorum equi. 
III Thracum Syriaca 
I Augusta Cyrenaica equi. 
I Claudia equi. 
II Claudia 
I Italica mil. 
I Ulpia Galatorum 
I Ulpia Paphlagonum 
III Ulpia Petraeorum mil. 
equi. sag. 






I Augusta Gemina Col. 
II Claudia Gallorum 
I Ulpia Dacorum 
II Ulpia Auriana 
 
Apula civ. Rom. 
I Bosporanorum mil. equi. 
sag. 
III Augusta Cyrenaica sag. 
equi. 
II Hispanorum equi. civ. 
Rom. 
I Ituraeorum mil. equi. sag. 
I Musulamiorum equi. 
I Raetorum equi. 
I Claudia equi. 
II Claudia 
I Ulpia Paphlagonum 
III Ulpia Petraeorum mil. 
equi. sag. 
I Germanorum mil. equi. 
I Lepidiana mil. equi. 
IV Raetorum equi. 
Aurelia civ. Rom. 
VI Brittonum equi. 
I Flavia Numidarum equi. 










I Augusta Gemina Col. 
II Claudia Gallorum 
I Ulpia Dacorum 
II Ulpia Auriana 
I praetoria sig. civ. Rom. 
 
Apula civ. Rom. 
I Bosporanorum mil. equi. 
sag. 
III Augusta Cyrenaica sag. 
equi. 
II Hispanorum equi. civ. 
Rom. 
I Claudia equi. 
II Claudia 
I Ulpia Paphlagonum  
III Ulpia Petraeorum mil. 
equi. sag. 
I Germanorum mil. equi. 
I Lepidiana mil. equi. 
Aurelia civ. Rom. 
VI Brittonum equi. 
I Flavia Numidarum equi. 




6 Legiones, 6 Alae, 
14 Cohortes, 1 Classis 
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 Some units an emperor redeployed during his reign are repeated in this table. The point here is to know how many troops were employed in each province for each period. 
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2 Legiones, 7 Alae, 
20 Cohortes, 1 Classis 
I Lepidiana mil. equi. 




3 Legiones, 6 Alae, 
21 Cohortes, 1 Classis 
3 Legiones, 5 Alae, 
18 Cohortes, 1 Classis 





I Augusta Thracum 
III Augusta Thracum 
I Bosporanorum 
Gallorum et Thracum 
Antiana Sag. 
Gallorum et Thracum 
Constantium 
II Pannoniorum Veterana 
Veterana Gallica 
 
I Augusta Thracum equi. 
civ. Rom. 
I Damascenarum equi. 
 







I Augusta Thracum 
III Augusta Thracum 
I Bosporanorum 
Gallorum et Thracum 
Antiana Sag. 
Gallorum et Thracum 
Constantium 




III Augusta Cyrenaica sag. 
equi. 
II Classica sag. 
I Italica vol. equi. civ. 
Rom. 
II Italica civ. Rom. 
 






I Augusta Thracum 
III Augusta Thracum 
I Bosporanorum 
Gallorum et Thracum 
Antiana Sag. 
Gallorum et Thracum 
Constantium 
II Pannoniorum Veterana 
Veterana Gallica 
VII Phrygum 
II Flavia Pia Fielis mil. 
 
III Augusta Cyrenaica sag. 
equi. 
II Classica sag. 
II Italica civ. Rom. 
I Ascalonitarum sag. equi. 
I Augusta Pannoniorum 
equi. 
III Augusta Thracum equi. 
IV Bracaraugustanorum 
I Flavia Chalcidenorum 
equi. sag. 
I Flavia civ. Rom. equi. 
I Gaetulorum 
I Ituraeorum mil. equi. sag. 
I Lucensium equi. 
IV Lucensium equi. 
I Musulamiorum equi. 
I Numidarum equi. sag. 
I Raetorum equi. 




II TRAIANA FORTIS 
 
Gallorum et Thracum 
Antiana Sag. 
Gallorum et Thracum 
Constantium 
VII Phrygum 
I Ulpia Dromedariorum 
mil. 
I Ulpia Singularium 
 
II Classica sag. 
II Italica civ. Rom. 
I Ascalonitarum sag. equi. 
I Augusta Pannoniorum 
equi. 
III Augusta Thracum equi. 
IV Bracaraugustanorum 
I Flavia Chalcidenorum 
equi. sag. 
I Flavia civ. Rom. equi. 
I Gaetulorum 
IV Lucensium equi. 
I Sebastena mil. 
II Thracum Syriaca 
I Ulpia Dacorum 
I Ulpia Galatarum 
II Ulpia Galatarum 
II Ulpia Paphlagonum 
equi. 





XVI FLAVIA FIRMA 
 
Augusta Germaniciana 
Gallorum et Thracum 
Antiana Sag. 
Gallorum et Thracum 
Constantium 
VII Phrygum 
II Flavia Agrippiana 
Thracum Herculana 
I Ulpia Dromedariorum 
mil. 
I Ulpia Singularium 
 
II Classica sag. 
II Italica civ. Rom. 
I Ascalonitarum sag. equi. 
I Augusta Pannoniorum 
equi. 
III Augusta Thracum equi. 
I Flavia Chalcidenorum 
equi. sag. 
I Flavia civ. Rom. equi. 
IV Lucensium equi. 
II Thracum Syriaca 
I Ulpia Dacorum 
I Ulpia Galatarum 
II Ulpia Galatarum 
II Ulpia Paphlagonum 
equi. 






XVI FLAVIA FIRMA 
 
Vocontiorum 
II Flavia Agrippiana 
I Ulpia Singularium 
 
I Augusta Thracum equi. 
civ. Rom. 
II Classica sag. 
II Italica civ. Rom. 
I Ascalonitarum sag. equi. 
I Augusta Pannoniorum 
equi. 
III Augusta Thracum equi. 
I Flavia Chalcidenorum 
equi. sag. 
IV Lucensium equi. 
II Thracum Syriaca 
I Ulpia Dacorum 
II Ulpia Paphlagonum 
equi. 
III Ulpia Paphlagonum 
equi. 
I Ulpia Petraeorum mil. 
equi. 
V Ulpia Petraeorum 
VII Gallorum 
I Claudia Sugambrorum 
XX Palmyrenorum mil. 
equi. sag. 






XVI FLAVIA FIRMA 
 
Augusta Germaniciana 
I Ulpia Singularium 
II Flavia Agrippiana 
Vocontiorum 
II Ulpia Auriana 
I Flavia Augusta 
Britannica mil. civ. Rom. 
I Flavia civ. Rom. 
 
II Classica sag. 
II Italica civ. Rom. 
I Ascalonitarum sag. equi. 
I Flavia Chalcidenorum 
equi. sag. 
I Aug. Pannoniorum equi. 
III Aug. Thracum equi. 
II Thracum Syriaca 
I Ulpia Dacorum 
II Ulpia Paphlagonum 
equi. 
III Ulpia Paphlagonum 
equi. 
I Ulpia Petraeorum mil. 
equi. 
VII Gallorum 
I Aug. Thracum equi. civ. 
Rom. 
V Ulpia Petraeorum 
XX Palmyrenorum mil. 
equi. sag. 




I Thracum mil. equi. 
II Thracum civ. Rom. 
II Thracum Syriaca 
III Thracum Syriaca 




3 Legiones, 9 Alae,  
22 Cohortes, 1 Classis 
Classis Syriaca 
 
4 Legiones, 5 Alae,  
17 Cohortes, 1 Classis 
Classis Syriaca 
 
3 Legiones, 8 Alae,  
15 Cohortes, 1 Classis 
 
3 Legiones, 3 Alae,  
18 Cohortes, 1 Classis 
II Hispanorum equi. 
 















Pia Gemina Sebastena 
 
I Augusta civ. Rom. 
I Augusta Thracum equi. 
civ. Rom. 
 




Pia Gemina Sebastena 
I Flavia Gaetulorum 
I Thracum Mauretana 
 
I Augusta civ. Rom. 
I Augusta Thracum equi. 
civ. Rom. 




I Thracum mil. equi. 
II Thracum civ. Rom. 
 





I Thracum Mauretana 
 
I Augusta Thracum equi. 
civ. Rom. 
I Theaeorum equi. 
I Hispanorum equi. 
III Bracaraugustanorum 
I Thracum mi. equi. 
II Hemesenorum equi. 
I Ulpia Petraeorum mil. 
equi. 
II Ulpia Petraeorum mil. 
equi. 
IV Ulpia Petraeorum 
V Ulpia Petraeorum 
VI Ulpia Petraeorum 
 






II TRAIANA FORTIS 
 
I Thracum Mauretana 
 
I Augusta Thracum equi. 
civ. Rom. 
I Theaeorum equi. 
I Hispanorum equi. 
III Bracaraugustanorum 
IV Bracaraugustanorum 
I Sebastena mil. 
I Thracum mi. equi. 
IV Ulpia Petraeorum 
VI Ulpia Petraeorum 
V Gemella civ. Rom. 
I Montanorum civ. Rom. 
 






Gallorum et Thracum 
Antiana sag. 




I Ulpia Dromedariourm 
mil. 
 
I Damascenarum equi. 
III Bracaraugustanorum 
IV Bracaraugustanorum 
I Flavia civ. Rom. equi. 
I Sebastena mil. 
I Thracum mi. equi. 
I Ulpia Galatarum 
II Ulpia Galatarum 
IV Ulpia Petraeorum 
VI Ulpia Petraeorum 
V Gemella civ. Rom. 
I Montanorum civ. Rom. 
IX Maurorum mil. 
 






Gallorum et Thracum 
Antiana sag. 
Gallorum et Thracum 
Constantium 
VII Phrycum 
I Ulpia Dromedariourm 
mil. 
 
I Damascenarum equi. 
III Bracaraugustanorum 
IV Bracaraugustanorum 
I Flavia civ. Rom. equi. 
I Sebastena mil. 
I Thracum mi. equi. 
VI Hispanorum equi. 
Praetoria 
II Ulpia Galatarum 
IV Ulpia Petraeorum 
VI Ulpia Petraeorum 
V Gemella civ. Rom. 
IX Maurorum mil. 
V Afrorum 
 
3 Legiones, 3 Alae,  
13 Cohortes 

















II TRAIANA FORTIS 
 
Apriana Provincialis 
















II Ituraeorum equi. 
Nigri 





3 Legiones, 3 Alae,  




II Ituraeorum equi. 





2 Legiones, 3 Alae,  





II Ituraeorum equi. 
I Thebaeorum equi. 
II Thebaeorum 
I Hispanorum equi. 
I Flavia Cilicum equi. 
III Ituraeorum 




2 Legiones, 4 Alae,  




II Flavia Agrippiana 
 
II Ituraeorum equi. 
II Thebaeorum 
I Apamenorum sag. equi. 
I Augusta Praetoria 
Lusitanorum equi. 
I Flavia Cilicum equi. 
III Ituraeorum 
I Pannoniorum equi. 




2 Legiones, 5 Alae, 





II Ituraeorum equi. 
II Thebaeorum 
I Apamenorum sag. equi. 
I Augusta Praetoria 
Lusitanorum equi. 
I Flavia Cilicum equi. 
III Ituraeorum 
I Pannoniorum equi. 
II Thracum civ. Rom. 





2 Legiones, 4 Alae,  




I Thracum Mauretana 
 
II Ituraeorum equi. 
II Thebaeorum 
I Apamenorum sag. equi. 
I Augusta Pannoniorum 
equi. 
I Augusta Praetoria 
Lusitanorum equi. 
I Flavia Cilicum equi. 
III Ituraeorum 
I Pannoniorum equi. 
II Thracum civ. Rom. 





1 Legio, 6 Alae,  
10 Cohortes, 1 Classis 
Veterana Gallica 
Thracum Herculiana 
I Thracum Mauretana 
 
II Ituraeorum equi. 
I Apamenorum sag. equi. 
I Augusta Praetoria 
Lusitanorum equi. 
I Flavia Cilicum equi. 
III Ituraeorum 
II Thracum civ. Rom. 
I Ulpia Afrorum equi. civ. 
Rom.  




1 Legio, 5 Alae, 
8 Cohortes, 1 Classis 
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 Strabo (17.1.12) reports that there were three legions, three alae and nine cohortes in the late first century BCE. 
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2.3: The views of previous scholars about the pattern of recruitment 
 The first detailed investigation of the pattern of recruitment was published by 
Mommsen in 1884.
81
 From epigraphic evidence he drew three broad conclusions. First, 
the legionaries were recruited mostly from the public provinces, while the auxiliaries 
were enlisted solely from the imperial provinces. Second, the legionaries began to 
depend on local recruitment from the reign of Hadrian onwards, as had auxiliary 
recruitment from the reign of Vespasian. Lastly, there were differences in recruiting 
patterns between the East and the West. These three points were taken as fundamental 
for discussions about the recruitment pattern until the advances made by Forni and Kraft 
in their respective studies of legionary and auxiliary recruitment.
82
 They adduced 
enough epigraphic evidence to support the claim that Roman soldiers were recruited 
from every province without any distinction between ‘imperial’ and ‘public’, and to 
suggest that the tendency to local recruitment was not a sudden result of an emperor’s 
decision, but a gradual process which developed through the first two centuries. 
However, the evidence they discussed came mostly from the western provinces, leaving 
it unclear whether their views could also be applied to the East.  
 Mann advanced Forni’s study, and tried to identify patterns in legionary 
recruitment and veteran settlement.
83
 For example, he divided the recruitment sources 
of the legionaries stationed in Egypt into five groups: Italy and Gallia Narbonensis, Asia 
Minor and Syria, Egypt and Cyrenaica, e castris or sons of soldiers, and elsewhere. He 
also divided forms of veteran settlement into four types: returned to homes outside 
Egypt, settled privately in Egypt, settled in canabae in Egypt, and settled outside the 
province. According to his investigation, the number of veterans who settled in canabae 
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constantly increased, and the origin of legionaries changed from the West, mainly Italy, 
and Asia Minor to Egypt and e castris over the first two centuries. In particular, 
recruitment e castris became predominant in the third century. This could support 
Webster’s hypothesis that legionaries and veterans began to develop into a hereditary 
privileged class, the so-called ‘caste model’.84 In other words, the legionary soldiers 
and veterans came from a closed group separate from the civil life of the provincials. 
Contrary to this, Alston, who has also studied the recruitment of soldiers in Egypt, 
pointed out that a majority of legionaries were still recruited from Africa, Syria and Asia 
Minor in the second century despite the undoubted growth of recruitment e castris. 
Therefore he argued that the ‘caste model’ should be revised.85 
 According to Fentress, the legio III Augusta, which was the only legion 
stationed in Numidia and Africa, mostly recruited replacements e castris, including 
some from the colonies formed in its previous camps. She argued that there was a close 
connection between the civilians and soldiers at both the upper and lower levels of the 
society, but little contact across the respective social levels.
86
 She pointed out that 
military service and its rewards could only help people move up from being a landless 
labourer to a smallholder, rarely from a peasant to a decurion. Shaw, by contrast, argued 
that the soldiers formed an isolated military class and, even after discharge, they 
contributed only to their own communities without any wider interest in the local 
society.
87
 Mócsy, who studied the soldiers serving in Pannonia and Upper Moesia, 
proposed a compromise argument about the interaction between soldiers and civilians. 
He admitted that the hereditary character of military service established a privileged 
military class in the frontier zone, but contended that it was neither an isolated nor an 
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independent group, separated from the local communities. While the upper ranks of the 
soldiers could transfer to the ruling class of civilians after discharge, the poorer civilians 
were able to improve their status by serving in the army. Thus he concluded that the 
army provided the link between the two levels of the population on the frontier.
88
 
 Le Bohec focused on the question of local recruitment because it had been 
considered as a principal factor to the interaction between soldiers and civilians. On the 
base of understanding the ʻlocalisation’ as a trend of recruitment, decreasing ʻforeigners’ 
and increasing ʻnatives’, he argued that the existing concept of local recruitment needs 
to be divided into regional recruitment and local recruitment.
89
 The former he defined 
as provincial recruitment and the latter as recruitment e castris. He explained the pattern 
of legionary recruitment in the second and early third century as a steady evolution from 
regional to local recruitment. For auxiliaries, he noted that local recruitment, which had 
already begun in the reign of Tiberius, accounted for more than half of new enlistment 
from the Flavian period onwards, and that the ratio of citizen recruits increased 
continuously from the reign of Vespasian to c.170; thereafter, only a few peregrini 
became auxiliaries until the Constitutio Antoniniana issued by Caracalla.
90
 He 
concluded that while the legionaries were recruiting from humbler backgrounds, the 
auxiliaries were generally recruiting more and more Roman citizens, and thus there was 
a gradual convergence in recruiting the two types of units.
91
  
 Le Bohec introduced various cases of the western provinces, mainly Spain (VII 
Gemina) and Africa (III Augusta), to explain the localising pattern of legionary 
recruitment, but all the eastern provinces except Egypt (II Traina) were not dealt in his 
study. In terms of the gradual tendency to localisation, according to Le Bohec, it seems 
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that there were not great differences in the pattern of legionary recruitment between 
Africa and Egypt. In both the number of recruits e castris to the legions, though not 
overwhelming, steadily increased throughout the late second century. However, these 
two provinces may not represent the general pattern of recruitment in the western and 
the eastern parts of the empire. 
 The first intensive researches on recruitment specifically in the eastern 
provinces were carried out by Speidel, Mitchell and Kennedy. Speidel added more 
recent evidence to Forni’s study and investigated the pattern of recruitment in Asia 
Minor.
92
 His study was based on the premise that ‘local’ recruitment in Asia Minor 
should mean that the auxiliary units there and the six legions (XV Apollinaris, XII 
Fulminata, XVI Flavia Firma, IV Scythica, I and III Parthicae) stationed along the 
Euphrates frontier from Armenia to Mesopotamia were drawing their recruits from the 
provinces of Asia Minor.
93
 He ascertained that recruitment to these units from Asia 
Minor began in the reign of Augustus, and that by the second and third centuries Asia 
Minor was also contributing to the legionary and auxiliary units in the Danube and 
Egypt.  
 Mitchell drew on many new inscriptions for recruitment to the eastern legions 
and focused on the number of recruits from Anatolia, especially Galatia, to the legions 
stationed in the Balkans, Cappadocia and Syria over the first three centuries.
94
 He 
argued that while the Balkan legions recruited the bulk of their replacements from their 
local area, the legions garrisoned in Cappadocia and Syria depended largely on 
Anatolian recruitment. In addition to this, he noted that in the late second century most 
of the legionaries recruited from Asia Minor did not come from urbanised areas such as 
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Asia and Bithynia, but from mountainous regions. He argued that the civilians living in 
urban areas were generally able to commute possible conscription for cash payments, 
unless there was an emergency.
95
 
 Kennedy focused on the Romany army in Syria because it was the most 
important militarised province in the East.
96
 He reaffirmed that peregrine recruitment to 
legionary units was relatively common in the eastern provinces where there were few 
Roman citizens. Thus partial dependence on western sources was indispensable at least 
until the early second century. The legionaries in Syria were mostly recruited from the 
old cities located on the Phoenician coast and the Greek cities of Syria. On the other 
hand, numerous sources for recruitment to auxiliary units in Syria originated from 
mountainous or desert areas. The dependence on the recruitment from rural areas seems 
to have been gradually gaining more importance as urban civilians became to prefer 
commuting military service for cash payments, as the case of Asia Minor. Many 
auxiliary units formed in Syria were deployed to other parts of the empire. As a result, 
the recruitment of these units then became localised, but a few of the replacements were 
still recruited from Syria.  
 Of Mommsen’s three conclusions, only one is still valid: that there were 
differences in the pattern of recruitment between the West and the East. To sum up the 
previous studies, the general views of scholars on the broad patterns of recruitment in 
the eastern provinces during the first three centuries were as follows: 1) legionary and 
auxiliary recruitment in the East became ‘local’ relatively earlier than that in the West, 
because from the Augustan period the eastern units had to recruit a significant number 
of provincials, mostly from Asia Minor; 2) people in some urban areas became to 
reluctant to be recruited, while in rural, mountainous, and desert areas there were still a 
                                                     
95
 Mitchell 1994: 142-5. 
96
 Kennedy 1989: 235-46. 
57 
 
good number of candidates for soldiers. However, because investigation has not been as 
detailed in the East as for the western provinces, various problems remain. 
 A significant question is what is meant by ‘local’: most scholars mentioned 
above have used the term without precise definition, athough to Le Bohec it meant 
precisely e castris. For the pattern of recruitment in the East, in particular, ‘local’ has 
often conflated regional and provincial. Also, when discussing provincial ‘localisation’, 
we need to distinguish recruitment e castris from recruitment of provincials. Thus the 
recruiting areas for the army units in the eastern provinces need to be more precisely 
categorised as Italy, the West, the Danube, regional (i.e. other neighbouring eastern 
provinces), provincial and e castris. For instance, the ʻneighbouring’ provinces for 
recruitment to Egypt are taken to be Syria, Judaea and Arabia. In the following section, I 
will rearrange the epigraphic evidence for the origins of legionaries using my new 
categories, which then shows a distinct pattern; I will then examine the pattern of the 
eastern auxiliary recruitment. 
 
2.4: The pattern of recruitment to the eastern units: the epigraphic evidence 
 2.4.1: Asia Minor, Cappadocia, Mesopotamia
97
 
Table 8: Origins of legionaries serving in Asia Minor, Cappadocia  
and Mesopotamia 
 Augustus – Gaius 
VII Claudia 
Claudius – Nero 
III Gallica 
VI Ferrata 
Flavian – Trajan 
XII Fulminata 
XVI Flavia Firma 
Hadrian - 3C 
XII Fulminata 
XV Apollinaris 
I and III Parthicae 
IV Italica 
Total 
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e castris 1 (2%) - - - 1 (1%) 
Total 59 - 1 32 92 
 
 Asia Minor is normally considered to have been a peaceful region where there 
were fewer military units. However, as previous scholars noted, the legio VII Claudia 
was stationed there in the reign of Augustus and at least one auxiliary unit was stationed 
in each province during the Principate. Furthermore, it was actually one of the main 
recruiting grounds for legionaries to serve in the Danube area and the eastern 
provinces.
98
 Asia Minor was divided into five provinces: Asia, Bithynia-Pontus, Galatia, 
Lycia-Pamphylia, and Cilicia. Among these, Galatia was the kingdom from which the 
legio XXII Deiotariana had been created and it continued to recruit a majority of its 
replacements from the province for some time, even after it had been stationed in Egypt. 
Tacitus reports that Asia, along with Gallia Narbonensis and Africa, was one of the 
sources of levies in 65 CE for the legions stationed in Illyricum.
99
 
 The legio VII Claudia was garrisoned in Galatia for almost thirty years from 25 
BCE to 6 CE. I provide information about fifty-nine soldiers (updated by Forni, 
Mitchell and Speidel) who were enrolled in this legion in the period from Augustus to 
Gaius.
100
 The proportion of recruits from Italy, the Danube, neighbouring provinces, 
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and Galatia was 32%, 14%, 16%, and 38% each. It is noticeable that this legion 
recruited more soldiers from Galatia itself than from Italy, although at that time most of 
the western legions were taking the bulk of their replacements from Italy. Adjacent 
provinces in Asia Minor and some provinces in the Balkans, such as Macedonia and 
Dalmatia, were also recruiting areas. Only one recruit e castris is attested. It is usually 
supposed that most of the recruits were peregrini who gained Roman citizenship when 
they were enlisted, since this region was an area lacking Roman citizen communities. 
However, this hypothesis is debatable and will be assessed in the next chapter.  
 Cappadocia had been annexed to the Roman empire in the early years of 
Tiberius’ reign, but only a few auxiliary units were stationed there.101 Some legions led 
by Corbulo were temporarily active in this province during his Armenian war in 58-63 
CE. According to Tacitus, Corbulo discharged many incapacitated soldiers from his 
Syrian legions, and held levies in Galatia and Cappadocia for reinforcements.
102
 These 
legions were most likely the legio III Gallica and VI Ferrata, but the epigraphic 
evidence relating to the replacements is not enough to support Tacitus’ record. Although 
Cappadocia became a province with two legions (XII Fulminata and XVI Flavia Firma) 
after Vespasian took possession of the imperial throne, there is little epigraphic evidence 
to show the recruiting pattern until the reign of Hadrian.
103
  
 From the reign of Hadrian to the third century, Cappadocia was the permanent 
base for the legio XII Fulminata and XV Apollinaris, and Mesopotamia, which was 
annexed as a Roman province at the end of the second century, hosted the newly-raised 
legions, I and III Parthicae and IV Italica. Although there is no evidence concerning the 
soldiers of IV Italica as yet, it is possible to identify the origins of thirty-two soldiers 
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who served in the other legions at this period.
104
 The proportion of Italian, western, 
Danubian, regional, and provincial recruits was 9%, 10%, 28%, 50% and 3% 
respectively. Easterners came to make up over half of the total known recruits, a quarter 
of them from Galatia alone. The ratio of soldiers from the Danube doubled from what it 
had been in the first century. No recruit e castris is attested. 
 
 2.4.2: Syria 
Table 9: Origins of legionaries serving in Syria 













Hadrian - 3C 
III Gallica 
IV Scythica 
XVI Flavia Firma 
II Parthica 
Total 


























































+ 4 easterners  
16 (14%) 
Syria - 1 - 21  22 (20%) 
e castris - - - 2  2 (2%) 
Total 2 3 6 100 111 
 
 Syria was the province where the greatest number of military units was 
garrisoned in the East, and the most important bridgehead for invasions of or by Parthia. 
The legio XII Fulminata was transferred from Egypt to Syria after 23 CE, and the legio 
IV Scythica was redeployed to Syria at the end of the Neronian period. In the early years 
of his reign, Hadrian redeployed the legio XVI Flavia Firma from Satala in Cappadocia 
to Samosata in Syria, and transferred the legio VI Ferrata from Raphanaea in Syria to 
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 In 197 CE, Septimius Severus created the legio II Parthica, which 
took up its camp at Apamea in Syria from 215 to 234 CE. Yet despite its military 
importance, this province has yielded little epigraphic evidence; from the reign of 
Augustus to Trajan the origins of eleven soldiers are all that we can identify, too few to 
identify a definite pattern of recruitment.
106
 Recruits nonetheless came from Italy and 
Asia Minor, as they continued to do for over 150 years. 
 From Hadrian’s reign to the third century, there is more evidence compared to 
the previous period. We can identify the origins of one hundred soldiers.
107
 Syrian 
legions recruited 21% of known soldiers from Italy, 3% from the West, 40% from the 
Balkans, especially Thrace, 36% from the eastern provinces (13% from regional, 21% 
from Syria itself, 2% e castris).  
 
 2.4.3: Judaea, Arabia 
Table 10: Origins of legionaries serving in Judaea and Arabia 
 Augustus - Gaius 
 
Claudius - Nero 
 
Flavians - Trajan 
X Fretensis 



















































1 3 (4%) 
6 (9%) 
10 (14%) 
e castris - - - - - 
Total - - 3 69 72 
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 Judaea and Arabia have relatively short histories of permanently stationed 
legions. The legio X Fretensis was garrisoned at Jerusalem directly after the first Jewish 
war in 66-73 CE. The legio VI Ferrata was transferred from Bostra in Arabia to 
Caparcotna in Judaea between 123 and 130 CE.
108
 The legio III Cyrenaica participated 
in Trajan’s plan to establish a new province of Arabia in 106 CE, returned to Egypt, and 
then was finally stationed at Bostra after the legio VI Ferrata. These three legions 
remained in the same camps until Diocletian reformed the military system at the end of 
the third century. 
 The evidence of recruitment for the Flavian-Trajanic period is thin: only two 
Galatians were recruited to the legio X Fretensis, and Titus Flaivus Pudens, who was 
recruited from Judaea or Arabia, also served in this legion in the late first century.
109
 
From the reign of Hadrian to the third century, the origins of sixty-nine legionaries are 
identifiable: the percentages of known soldiers from Italy, the West, the Danube, the 
East region, and the provinces of Judaea and Arabia are 4%, 19%, 3%, 61%, and 13% 
respectively. It is clear that the three legions relied mostly on replacements enlisted from 
neighbouring provinces such as Egypt and Syria rather than their own provinces.
110
 In 
both Judaea and Arabia, legions appear to have experienced difficulties in provincial 
recruitment. The legio VI Ferrata enlisted only three soldiers from Judaea and one from 
Arabia, and the legio III Cyrenaica recruited five soldiers from Arabia. There are no 
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 2.4.4: Egypt 
Table 11: Origins of legionaries serving in Egypt 




Claudius - Nero111 
III Cyrenaica 
XXII Deiotariana 
Flavians - Trajan 
III Cyrenaica 
XXII Deiotariana 
Hadrian - 3C  
II Traiana Fortis 
Total 





































































Egypt 1 (7%) - 8 (14%) 12 (6.5%) 21 (8%) 
e castris - - 6 (11%) 22 (12%) 28 (11%) 
Total 14 5 56 182 257 
  
 Egypt has the largest number of inscriptions concerning the origins of 
legionaries who served there. Despite the fact that this province was a comparatively 
peaceful place, being distant from the eastern frontier, three and then two legions had 
been stationed there until Hadrian. Added to these, many auxiliary units were deployed 
along the Nile, and the classis Alexandriana was responsible for securing the grain 
supply to Italy. The legio III Cyrenaica and XXII Deiotariana had been garrisoned at 
Nikopolis close to Alexandria from 23 CE or before to 119, after which the former was 
redeployed to Arabia, the latter disappeared, and the legio II Traiana Fortis was 
transferred from Judaea and became the sole legion in Egypt.
112
 The reason why the 
eastern legions were relocated in the early years of Hadrian’s reign is obscure, but there 
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 In the early first century, about 36% of legionary replacements were drawn from 
Asia Minor. This high proportion results partly from peregrine recruits from Galatia to 
the legio XXII Deiotariana. There were also a few Italian recruits, but it was not a 
significant figure.
114
 In the period of the Flavians to Trajan, legionary recruitment in 
Egypt still depended largely on Asia Minor: 50% of the total known recruits were drawn 
from there, 14% came from Egypt, and 11% e castris.
115
 After the reign of Hadrian, the 
legio II Traiana still recruited many replacements from these provinces, especially 
Egypt and Syria, but the figure was overtaken by the remarkable number of African 
soldiers which is 50%. Italian recruits are still attested, but the total was less than 
10%.
116
 The proportions of known soldiers from Italy, the West, the Danube, the 
neighbouring provinces, the province of Egypt, and e castris are 9%, 51.5%, 2.5%, 
18.5%, 6.5% and 12% respectively. 
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 Table 12: Origins of legionaries serving in the East 
 Augustus - Trajan Hadrian - 3C Total 
Italy 30 (20%) 43 (11%)  73 (14%) 
The West 9 (6%)  113 (29%)  122 (23%) 
The Danube 9 (6%) 56 (15%)  65 (12%) 
Regional 52 (35%) 91 (24%)  143 (27%) 
Provincial 42 (28%) 56 (15%)  98 (18%) 
e castris 7 (5%) 24 (6%)  31 (6%) 
Total 149 383 532 
 
 Now we can calculate the total origins of legionaries who served in the eastern 
provinces from the first to third century. Although new epigraphic evidence may change 
these statistics, for now, we can identify three characteristics in the pattern of 
recruitment to the eastern legions as follows: 1) The percentage of Italian recruits 
decreased as in the case of the recruiting pattern of the West, but that of regional and 
provincial recruits also declined from 63% to 39%; 2) The rate of replacements 
recruited from the western and Danubian provinces increased from 12% to 44%, 
surpassing that of regional and provincial recruits after the reign of Hadrian; 3) The 
percentage of provincial recruits and e castris decreased from 33% to 21%. Even in the 
third century the proportion of recruits e castris was still more or less 5%.  
 To summarise, according to this epigraphic evidence, the pattern of legionary 
recruitment in the eastern provinces seems very different from the theories of previous 
scholars. For example, the Syrian evidence does not support the orthodox hypothesis 
(see Table 9). The period from the reign of Hadrian to the third century has been 
considered as the peak period of ‘localisation’, but over a fifth of recruits to Syrian 
legions still came from Italy. The percentage of Thracian recruits was even slightly 
higher than that of provincial recruits. For recruitment e castris, there is little evidence 
to validate the narrow theory of ‘localisation’ of previous scholars; known recruits e 
castris are largely confined to the province of Egypt (see Table 11). In the period from 
Hadrian to the third century, the ʻforeigners’ were the majority in the legionary 
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recruitment of the eastern provinces. Thus, it is simply not true that the eastern legions 
became increasingly localised during the Principate.  
  
 2.4.5: Auxiliary units 
 There have been no detailed researches into the origins of recruits to the 
auxiliary units stationed in the East. The one reasonably certain statistical finding is that 
the percentage of officers of alae across the whole empire who originated from the 
eastern provinces, increased from 13% to 23% during the first three centuries.
117
 In fact, 
it is difficult to find a clear pattern of recruitment from the handful of epigraphic 
sources relating to the origins of auxiliaries. An altar discovered near the Tropeum 
Triaiani at Adamklissi in Romania, possibly dating to the period of Domitian, lists 
twenty auxiliary soldiers from various western provinces to a single unit, and a papyrus 
of 117 CE records 123 recruits from Asia to the cohors I Lusitanorum in Egypt.
118
 Le 
Bohec estimates that 78.5% of the auxiliary units that were created in the Roman empire  
had names implying that they had initially been raised in Europe (about 56% of the 
units in the western Europe), 15% in Asia, and the remaining 6.5% in Africa.
119
 But this 
too does not reveal the ongoing pattern of auxiliary recruitment. Although the auxiliary 
units originally raised in Asia seem to have comprised only 15% of the total, we have 
just seen that inhabitants of eastern provinces were regularly recruited to units that had 
originated in the West. However, at least it is possible to estimate the number of 
                                                     
117
 Devijver 1992: 120; Eck 2014a: 94-5. 
Region I (Aug.-Flavians) II (Trajan-Antonines) III (Severans and after) 
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auxiliary units which were raised in the East, and to determine which units of them 
continued to be employed in the East (see Table 13). 
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 From the Julio-Claudian to the Flavian period, at least seven alae and twenty-
seven cohortes were formed in the eastern provinces. More than half of them were 
deployed in the East, even though the provinces near the Rhine and Danube rivers seem 
to have required more military units than the eastern frontier before Corbulo’s 
retaliation against the Parthians. The rest of them were employed all over the empire. As 
in the case of most auxiliary units from Gaul and Germany, the eastern units also 
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consisted of tribal recruits and served under their own chiefs. However, while the units 
from Gaul and Germany gradually came to rely on provincial recruitment, the eastern 
units probably recruited replacements from their homelands owing to their specialised 
military skill, for example, the Syrian archers.
123
  
 After the Trajanic period, although only two alae remained, the majority of 
cohortes raised in the East were deployed in the eastern provinces; Trajan stationed all 
of the fourteen new units there. These units were garrisoned near their founding places 
or in neighbouring provinces, where it was comparatively easy to recruit provincial and 
regional candidates. In addition to this, during the first three centuries 50-70% of the 
eastern units continued to remain in the East, contrary to the view of some scholars that 
Vespasian made a strategic decision to redeploy the auxiliary units to provinces distant 




 In conclusion, provincials in the eastern provinces were liable to be recruited to 
three sorts of auxiliary units: those that had been formed there but dispatched all over 
the empire; those that had been formed elsewhere but were transferred to the eastern 
provinces; and those that had been formed in the East and were still stationed there. In 
other words, easterners filled up the auxiliary units stationed in the East and also 
contributed to the recruitment of eastern units distributed all over the empire. 
 
2.5: Conclusion 
 As the importance of the eastern frontier grew, more and more armed units were 
raised, redeployed and stationed in the eastern provinces. Over the period from 
Augustus to Severus Alexander, the military strength of the eastern units increased from 
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47,000 to 127,500, which was from 17.4% to 31.5% of the total military power of the 
empire. The annual demand for the recruits was around a third of the total annual 
demand for the recruits of the entire empire. However, most Italians were reluctant to 
serve in the East because they thought the camps were too distant from their home town. 
Italians, in particular, preferred to serve in the Praetorian units stationed in Rome. Thus 
from the early Principate the legions, auxiliary units and fleets seem to have depended 
largely on provincials to maintain their strengths. Since the Augustan period, Egyptians 
had been recruited to the fleets at Misenum and Ravenna in addition to their 
contribution to the Alexandrian fleet. The Egyptian legions also occasionally drew 
recruits from among the provincials. From the mid-second century, as the human 
resources for military recruitment became sufficient, there was no need to compulsorily 
recruit provincials, but it was possible to rely on volunteers, at least in theory. After the 
plague under Marcus Aurelius, when it became more important to maintain military 
strength on the eastern frontier to confronting the Arsacid - Sassanid empire, the 
importance of recruitment from eastern provincials also increased. It will be worth 
considering whether the increased number of provincials serving in the Roman armed 
forces improved their political and diplomatic leverage in the frontier zones.  
 As scholars have previously maintained, the pattern of recruitment in the East 
throughout the first three centuries was different from that in the West. However, the 
nature of this recruitment, as I have re-examined it, turns out to be very different from 
their expectations according to the theory of ʻlocalisation’. From the early first century, 
the eastern legions relied largely on regional and provincial recruits (63%), but in the 
second century the proportion of recruits from the western and Danubian provinces 
increased to 44%, and even surpassed that of regional and provincial recruits (39%). 
Moreover, recruits e castris made up only 5 or 6% of the total known recruits 
throughout this period, and are almost all attested in Egypt. By contrast, it is difficult to 
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know the pattern of auxiliary recruitment, but the eastern provincials were evidently 
recruited to auxiliary units and fleets not only in the eastern provinces but across the 
entire empire. Thus, in the eastern provinces under the Principate, the pattern of 
recruiting soldiers was not localised, and therefore the theory that the Roman soldiers 
came to form a privileged class in provincial society, following the trend of ʻlocalisation’ 




Ch. 3: The processes of recruitment and veteran settlement 
 
3.1: Introduction 
 Following the standard view, Millar asserts that “the recruitment of non-citizens 
into the auxiliaries and their discharge as citizens was one factor in the Romanization of 
the provinces.”125 Auxiliary soldiers who had been recruited from a conquered region 
were granted Roman citizenship after completion of their mandatory service, and the 
benefit was shared with their families, so that the military service of a non-citizen 
provincial could lead to the creation of several new citizens. Sons of veterans might 
enlist in the Roman army, taking after their fathers.
126
 However, some details of the 
processes of recruitment and veteran settlement are little known to us: recruitment 
(dilectus) - physical testing (probatio) - taking the oath (sacramentum), service and 
discharge with a diploma (in the case of a non-citizen soldier). Vegetius’ Epitome of 
Military Matters, probably dating to 380s, provides some information about 
recruitment.
127
 But it is doubtful how far his account reflects the recruitment process of 
the Principate, and there is no mention of veteran settlement. Therefore, we depend 
largely on archaeological evidence, mostly collected from Egypt.  
 It is also important to investigate the relationships between veterans and 
civilians, that is whether veterans formed a separated caste, isolated from civilian 
societies, or were closely integrated and blended with them. As we have seen in the 
previous chapter, in the eastern provinces the hypothesis of ʻlocalisation’ is not valid, 
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because the percentage of recruits e castris and from the province decreases from 33% 
to 21% during the Principate (see Table 12). Contrary to this, in the second century, a 
considerable number of recruits came from other provinces.  
 In this chapter, I will first examine the process of recruitment, and suggest it 
was a process by which non-citizen provincials were, in a sense, reborn as Roman 
soldiers. Second, I will investigate the relations between veterans and civilians, and 
suggest that there was a strategic intention of the Roman authorities behind the 
procedure of veteran settlement. Third, I will use the Roman garrison at Syene in Egypt 
as a case study for discussion of soldiers’ relations with civilians and their influence in 
provincial communities. I will argue that the Roman army contributed to the 
incorporation of provincial societies into the empire, and thus played a pivotal role in 
the integration of the empire  
 
3.2: The procedure for recruiting soldiers 
 3.2.1: The timing of recruitment: regular or occasional? 
 It is necessary to establish at the outset whether wartime recruitment should be 
deemed an abnormal event, distinguished from peacetime recruitment. Recruiting 
patterns and processes in emergencies have been considered to have been different from 
those in normal situations. However, recruitment was probably carried out more 
frequently in preparation for military operations, in order to supply recruits to army 
units which had normally been left under full strength in peacetime, and then to replace 
wartime casualties. For example, Gaius Fabricius Tuscus carried out recruitment on 
Augustus’ order at Rome in 6 CE as part of measures to deal with the Illyrian revolt of 
6-9.
128
 Cassius Dio reports Augustus’ difficulties with recruitment after Varus’ disaster 
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 Tacitus says that in 54, in planning the war against the Parthians, Nero ordered 
the recruitment of new soldiers from the neighbouring provinces of Cappadocia, and 
probably Asia Minor and Syria, to reinforce the strength of eastern legions.
130
 A few 
years later, Corbulo also held levies in Galatia and Cappadocia for his Syrian legions 
which were under strength.
131
 During the Bar Kokhba revolt in 132-5, Hadrian 
dispatched Voconius Saxa Fidus and Caesarianus Statianus to Italy for recruitment to 
replace the casualties of the eastern units to support Julius Severus’ counter-insurgency 
operations against the Jews.
132
  
 Two texts also deserve mention. Eck argues that PSI 9.1026 (= CPL 117) and 
AE 1969/70 633 attest recruitment in an emergency situation at the beginning of the Bar 
Kokhba revolt.
133
 The former is a papyrus recording twenty-two Egyptians discharged 
from the legio X Fretensis at Jerusalem in 150, who had originally been recruited as 
marines in the classis Misenensis in 125, and then transferred to the legion a few years 
later. The latter inscription, found in Alexandria, is a dedication to Antoninus Pius by 
136 soldiers discharged from the legio II Traiana Fortis in 157. Recruited in 132 or 133, 
they included fifteen men from Italy and eighty-six men from Africa. Eck concludes that 
these transfers and recruitment were abnormal and were intended to replace serious 
losses in the Roman forces. Contrary to this, in his attempt to downplay the scope of the 
revolt, Mor contends that the transfers and recruitment were carried out before the 
outbreak of revolt and were caused by a shortage of proper legionary candidates, rather 
than an urgent need to deal with the Jewish rebels.
134
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 The twenty-two Egyptians in PSI 9.1026 were apparently transferred before 
130 because they claim that they had served in the legio X Fretensis for over twenty 
years, and therefore their transfer does not seem to have related to the Bar Kokhba 
revolt in 132-135.
135
 Instead, some scholars have interpreted this as evidence that there 




We, Dionysius son of Socrates and the associate collectors of public 
clothing for the guards, have received from the weavers of the village of 
Socnopaei Nesus nineteen … tunics, total nineteen, and for the needs of 
the soldiers serving in Judaea five white cloaks, total five. The thirteenth 
year of the Emperor Caesar Trajanus Hadrianus Augustus, Choiak 23. 
(Signed) Received by me, Diogenes. Received also by me, Onesas. 
Received also by me, Philoxenus. 
  
However, this receipt is just one of the many receipts surviving from Roman Egypt for 
requisitions - in fact purchases - of military supplies, which occurred regularly in 




 On the other hand, the recruitment in AE 1969/70 633 postdates the outbreak of 
the revolt, 132/133. It may indicate emergency recruitment to bring the legio II Traiana 
up to strength as a precautionary measure, because part of this legion seem to have been 
dispatched to Judaea; Nummius Constans, a primus pilus of the unit, was decorated by 
Hadrian for his deeds during the war against the Jewish rebels.
138
 Egypt had been a 
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centre of Jewish revolt some fifteen years previously.  
 CIL 3.6580, which has often been thought to illustrate the normal process of 
recruitment in peacetime, also needs to be re-examined. It is a dedication to Septimius 
Severus by thirty-nine veterans discharged from the legio II Traiana in 194, who had 
been recruited in 168. Of the thirty-nine veterans, the presence of twenty-four e castris 
and eight from Egypt has been regarded as evidence for ʻlocal recruitment’. But they 
had enlisted in 168, two years after Lucius Verus and his soldiers returned from their 
Parthian campaign, bringing the plague. The recruitment was carried out after the 
outbreak of the plague, and so should rather be considered to relate to abnormal 
recruitment. In the same inscription Alston notices that eight of the twenty-two centuries 
needed to replace their centurions, and argues that this delay implies less pressure in 
peacetime to maintain a legion at full strength.
139
 However, the year 194 was wartime 
in practice; the eastern provinces were involved in the civil war between Septimius 
Severus and Pescennius Niger. The legio II Traiana Fortis had supported Pescennius 
Niger, but switched sides just before the decisive battle in 194. A number of soldiers, 
including the centurions, had probably stuck to the side of Niger or had deserted from 
the unit when it changed sides. Nevertheless, the argument that the army units were 
normally left under strength in peacetime and only brought up to full strength when 
necessary still stands. 
  It seems that the Roman armed forces did not rely on an annual recruiting 
system (even if it is convenient for us, as I have done in the previous chapter, to 
estimate demand in annual terms). But every unit should have maintained a minimum 
strength, say around 80% of full strength, to fulfil its routine peacetime duties. The 
occasional shortage caused by discharge and injuries was probably filled by recruiting 
volunteers. As discussed in chapter 2, the human resources of the empire were able to 
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meet this demand. The emperor delegated oversight of recruitment to the governor. An 
Oxyrhynchus papyrus dating to 103 attests six recruits who were sent to an auxiliary 
unit by the order of the prefect of Egypt, Gaius Minicius Italus.
140
   
 
Gaius Minicius Italus sends greetings to his own Celsianus. Give orders 
that the six recruits approved by me should be included in the roster of the 
cohort which you command, to take effect from February 19. I have 
appended their names and distinguishing marks to this letter. Farewell 
dearest brother. 
Gaius Veturius Gemellus, age 21, no distinguishing mark. 
Gaius Longinus Priscus, age 22, a scar on left eyebrow. 
Gaius Julius Maximus, age 25, no distinguishing mark. 
[…] Julius? Secundus, age 20, no distinguishing mark. 
Gaius Julius Saturninus, age 23, a scar on left hand. 
Marcus Antonius Valens, age 22, a scar on right side of forehead. 
Received February 24, year six of our Emperor Trajan by means of 
Priscus, aide. I, Avidius Arrianus, senior clerk (cornicularius) of the third 
(or second) cohort of Ituraeans, declare that the original letter is in the 
archives of the cohort. 
 
 In the majority of cases, however, recruitment was carried out only when it 
became necessary: in preparation for military campaigns and to replace casualties. The 
Roman army in the eastern provinces usually conducted military expeditions and 
counterattacks only after spending a certain time on preparations, that is recruiting and 
training new soldiers. Thus, we should not regard wartime recruitment as an unusual or 
irregular event, but understand it as part of the normal recruiting process. 
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 3.2.2: Volunteering, conscription, and civil status 
 Brunt divided the processes of recruitment into volunteering, conscription and 
substitution, as illustrated in a letter from Trajan in answer to a letter from Pliny the 
Younger: voluntarii, lecti and vicarii.
141
 Pliny had asked the emperor about the 
punishment of two slaves who had been enlisted either as volunteers or possibly as 
substitutes put up by their masters to evade conscription. Based on this, Brunt argued 
that conscription still existed as common practice into the second century, although 
volunteering seems to have been predominant, but by the Severan age local recruitment 
and improvement in the conditions of military service were the two main factors which 
made volunteering the norm.
142
 After this, there has been a general consensus among 
scholars that conscription was required when an emergency situation arose, such as a 
revolt or an external war, or in peacetime if there were insufficient volunteers. Yet, in 
terms of volunteering and conscription, we can obtain more information from the 
correspondence.  
 
Pliny to the emperor Trajan. Sempronius Caelianus, who is an excellent 
young man, has discovered two slaves among his recruits and has sent 
them to me. I have postponed judgement on them until I could ask your 
advice on what would be a suitable sentence, knowing that you are the 
founder and upholder of military discipline. My chief reason for hesitating 
is the fact that the men had already taken the oath of allegiance but had 
not yet been enrolled in a unit. I therefore pray you, Sir, to tell me what 
course to follow, especially as the decision is likely to provide a precedent. 
 
Trajan to Pliny. Sempronius Caelianus was carrying out my instructions in 
sending you the slaves. Whether they deserve capital punishment will 
need investigation; it is important to know if they were volunteers or 
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conscripts, or possibly offered as substitutes. If they are conscripts, then 
the blame falls on the recruiting officer; if substitutes, then those who 
offered them as such are guilty; but if they volunteered for service, well 
aware of their status, then they will have to be executed. The fact that they 
were not yet enrolled in a unit makes little difference, for the truth about 
their origin should have come out on the actual day they were accepted for 
the army.  
 
 Pliny served as the governor of Bithynia and Pontus in 109-11. The period was 
apparently a time of peace between Trajan’s second Dacian war of 105-6 and his 
Parthian war of 114-7. However, it is uncertain whether Pliny’s correspondence show 
evidence for conscription, because we do not have his subsequent letter to Trajan, 
reporting the outcome of his legal actions in response to Trajan’s reply, and whether he 
had managed to discover how the two slaves had come to be recruited. In his reply to 
Pliny, Trajan had only listed the various possible routes to recruitment, but had not 
indicated whether he thought volunteering or conscription was the more usual. The 
slaves might have volunteered to aim at elevating their own status, although the 
enrolment of slaves to the armies was strictly prohibited by the Roman law, and 
permitted only in emergency situations such as civil wars or plagues.
143
 Thus, we can 
not take this correspondence as good evidence for the existence of conscription in 
peacetime as a normal practice. 
 During the civil wars of 69-70 the Romans appear to have begun to appreciate 
the East as an integrated strategic area. Tacitus notes that there were enough sources of 
recruits and wealth in the eastern provinces, such as Asia Minor, Cappadocia, Syria, 
Judaea, and Egypt, to meet the needs of the armed forces led by Vespasian and 
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 Vespasian, after he had gained power, reformed the military system of the 
eastern provinces into an establishment of seven legions and thirty-four or more 
auxiliary units. He and his sons created the legio XVI Flavia Firma and nineteen 
auxiliary units drawn largely from eastern provincials. Trajan formed one legion and at 
least sixteen auxiliary units in the East for his campaigns in Dacia and Parthia.
145
 Later 
he raised three auxiliary units from Paphlagonia in Pontus for defence duties or to 
support his Parthian campaign in 113/4. It is likely that these spates of recruitment were 
achieved by using conscription, because in the short span of years it would probably 
have been impossible to meet the heavy demand for recruits with only volunteers. But it 
can not be excluded that this heavy recruitment was welcomed by the eastern 
provincials as an increased opportunity to gain Roman citizenship, and that Tacitus 
meant there were sufficient numbers of volunteers. 
 Of course, in every part of the empire some men tried to avoid conscription by 
mutilation or bribery, which could lead to severe disciplinary action against them. 
Suetonius tells us that Augustus put an equestrian and his property up for auction 
because he had cut off his sons’ thumbs.146 In 59, the Senate expelled Pedius Blaesus, 
who had been the governor of Crete and Cyrene, because the provincials of Cyrene 
accused him of bribery to grant exemption from conscription.
147
 The penalty seems to 
be somewhat severe. At that time Corbulo was campaigning on the eastern frontier, and 
wartime demanded effective implementation of recruitment. Contrary to this, there was 
also a case of a candidate who was exempted from military service by fair means. An 
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Oxyrhynchus papyrus, dating to 52, records that a weaver was released from service 
because his poor eyesight, impaired by a cataract, had been diagnosed in the process of 
probatio conducted in Alexandria.
148
 Thus, we should not jump to a conclusion that the 
evasion of military service was endemic in the eastern provinces.  
 Conscription has often been thought of as an ad hoc measure. But it does not 
seem that the emperor and governors ordered recruitment in absolute ignorance of 
provincial human and material resources. The results of local censuses could have been 
utilised for recruitment.
149
 The governor sometimes dispatched officers to provincial 
areas in order to carry out a census, which was used not only for levying taxes but also 
for recruiting soldiers.
150
 In emergency situations, the emperor sent special officers to 
the provinces to perform both a census and recruitment, presumably selecting areas 
thought to have enough human resources for recruitment. Le Teuff presents a list of five 
attested officers who were responsible for those tasks, all, as it happens L. Clemens 
Volusenus in Narbonensis and Aquitania in 14-6, Torquatus Novellius Atticus in 
Narbonensis under Tiberius, C. Mocconius Verus in Hispania Citerior at the end of the 




 One more point to note from the Pliny’s correspondence whether recruitment 
was carried out with the needs of specific units, or categories of units (legions or auxilia) 
in mind. According to another letter of Pliny, in which he asks Trajan how to deal with a 
centurion’s petition for a grant of Roman citizenship to his daughter, there was an 
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auxiliary unit stationed permanently in Bithynia and Pontus.
152
 This unit was almost 
certainly the cohors VI Hispanorum equitata Praetoria.
153
 One scholar assumes that 
Pliny had ordered Sempronius Caelianus, whom he took to have been an officer of this 
unit, to carry out recruitment to bring the unit up to strength.
154
 Indeed, there is some 
evidence that the province needed more soldiers.
155
 However, there is another 
possibility that he recruited men for units stationed in neighbouring provinces. Pliny’s 
letter shows that although the slaves had taken the military oath (sacramentum), they 
had not yet been assigned to any units (numeri). This implies that recruits drawn from a 
province were generally distributed to a number of units, and perhaps the Romans 
recruited for legions or auxiliary units together, and then distributed the recruits 
according to their status.  
 The principle of recruiting citizens to the legions was sometimes strictly applied. 
According to a Fayum papyrus dating to 92, Titus Flavius Longus, an optio of the legio 
III Cyrenaica, had to declare on oath that he was a freeborn Roman citizen before his 
three guarantors and companions. This case supports Mommsen’s theory that only 
citizens could be recruited to legions, and so, if peregrini were recruited to legions, they 
had to be given citizenship on enlistment. However, a legionary veteran named L. 
Pompeius Niger in the middle of the first century provides a counter case. He 
presumably began his military service in the early years of Tiberius’ reign, was 
discharged from the legio XXII Deiotariana in 44 CE, and gained Roman citizenship 
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with his children the following year.
156
 Pompeius, originally a metropolite of 
Oxyrhynchus called Nilos, had therefore not formally been given Roman citizenship at 
the time of his recruitment to the legion, although he had been given a full Roman name 
with the tria nomina and a tribal affiliation (the Fabian tribus standard for Alexandrians 
who became Roman citizens). This is the earliest example of a provincial achieving 
promotion in status through military service.
157
 Pompeius’ children were also given 
Roman citizenship after their father returned to his hometown, Oxyrhynchus, on 
discharge. 
   
 3.2.3: Integration under Roman military law and discipline  
 For provincial non-citizens, the process of recruitment was in itself an elevation 
of their social status. After the physical fitness test (probatio), a qualified recruit was 
given a Roman name and then swore the military oath (sacramentum). Several texts 
attest the change of identity marked by the new name: Pompeius Niger under Tiberius, 
the six auxiliary recruits sent the Ituraean cohort in 103, Antonius Maximus in the 
second century (below). While the given name marked a provincial recruit as belonging, 
prospectively, to the citizen body, the military oath created a personal connection 
between him and the emperor.
158
 
 After these steps, a recruit had to journey to his designated unit. For most 
recruits to the eastern army units, as noted in chapter 2, this generally meant an 
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interprovincial journey, even from the West to the East.
159
 The first payment received 
from the Roman state by each recruit was a ʻtravel allowance’ (viaticum), set at a flat 
three aurei.
160
 This may also have symbolised that he had now achieved legal and 
financial independence from his pater familias. A second-century papyrus from a 
Fayum village gives us a recruit’s own account of the process in a letter to his father.161 
 
Apion to Epimachus, his father and lord, very many greetings. Before all 
else I pray for your health and that you may always be well and 
prosperous, together with my sister and her daughter and my brother. I 
thank the lord Serapis that when I was in danger at sea he straightway 
saved me. On arriving at Misenum I received from Caesar three gold 
pieces for travelling expenses. And it is well with me. Now I ask you, my 
lord and father, write me a letter, telling me first of your welfare, secondly 
of my brother’s and sister’s, and enabling me thirdly to make obeisance 
before your handwriting, because you educated me well and I hope 
thereby to have quick advancement, if the gods so will. Give many 
salutations to Captio and my brother and sister and Serenilla and my 
friends. I have sent you by Euctemon a portrait of myself. My name is 
Antonius Maximus, my company the Athenonica. I pray for your health.  
 
 The oath of allegiance was repeated collectively by every unit at a special 
parade on the first day of January every year, and a new oath was worn when a new 
emperor came to power. This collective oath was probably quite effective in promoting 
loyalty to the emperor by linking it to pride in and loyalty to the unit. Civilian 
communities throughout the empire also took the oath of allegiance on the accession of 
a new emperor, but we do not know whether this event was carried out together with the 
local garrison (if any) or separately. Campbell has hypothesised that leading civilians 
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may have attended the annual oath-taking in military camps.
162
 If so, this ceremony 
would have been a significant contribution to integration between soldiers and civilians, 
but its importance should not be exaggerated until we have better evidence to support it.  
 One more thing to note is that through the process of recruitment all the recruits, 
regardless of whether they had volunteered or been conscripted, became soldiers with 
equal rights. Provincial non-citizens could expect a formal grant of Roman citizenship 
after their mandatory service of twenty-five years. However, under military law and 
discipline, they already enjoyed equal rights and privileges with their colleagues who 
were already citizens. More importantly, local and provincial recruits gradually blended 
with a large number of foreign replacements throughout their military service. Arguably, 
recruitment e castris did not practically means ʻlocal’ recruitment, that is from the local 
civilian population, but ʻinternal’ recruitment from military families. Discussing a 
Philadelphia papyrus of 122-45, Speidel points out the multi-national nature of auxiliary 
recruitment, and argues that the recruitment of soldiers from all provinces did not only 
contribute to increasing military strength but also to strengthen the loyalty of the 
soldiers to Rome.
163
 After discharge they also exercised their rights as veterans. There 
might have been some distinctions between legionaries and auxiliaries, although this is 
not certain, but there was no disparity between citizens and non-citizens under Roman 
military law and discipline. 
 Provincials’ perception of recruitment and military service appears to have 
gradually improved during the second century. Bussi explains this trend with reference 
to three texts on papyrus.
164
 BGU 4.1097, dating to the mid-first century, is a private 
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letter sent from a wife to her husband. In this letter, she is angry with her husband and 
complains because he had persuaded their son to become a soldier. SB 4.7354 of the 
second century is also a letter from a father to his son. This father is bitterly 
disappointed in his son because the son did not desire to join the fleet. However, BGU 
7.1680 from Philadelphia is a letter sent from a girl, Isis, to her mother at the beginning 
of the third century. She wrote that: “So if Aion wants to become a soldier, he just needs 
to come, since everyone is becoming a soldier”. This phrase is supposed to reflect a 
positive perspective on military service after Septimius Severus had raised military pay 
and substantially improved their standard of living. According to Cassius Dio, the 
emperor had left an instruction to his two sons Caracalla and Geta before he died: “Be 
harmonious, enrich the soldiers and scorn all other men”.165  
 
3.3: The procedure for veteran settlement 
 3.3.1: Veterans and civilians 
 The honourable discharge from the Roman armed forces after the military 
service for twenty-five years guaranteed a soldier various legal privileges. A veteran and 
his children may not have been subjected to flogging or forced labour, and he was 
exempted from public manual liturgies, although he had to pay for road maintenance 
cost and property taxes.
166
 Legionary veterans were also granted a large cash payment, 
or a piece of land (whether instead of or in addition to the cash payment), as a 
retirement bonus which was disbursed from aerarium militare instituted by Augustus.
167
 
Non-citizen soldiers were granted Roman citizenship attested in bronze diplomata. This 
honourable discharge was only granted by the emperor or governors to soldiers who had 
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completed their mandatory service or who had been discharged for health reasons.  
 There seem to have been certain differences in treatment between legionary 
veterans and auxiliary veterans which remained in force until 212. Haynes notes, 
correctly, that the Roman government did not found coloniae for auxiliary veterans, and 
that purpose-founded coloniae were for the benefit of legionary veterans only.
168
 
However, this applies to the West only, because in the East the Roman government 
simply did not, on the whole, found any coloniae for veterans. Most of the coloniae in 
the eastern provinces were cities granted the status of a colonia under Vespasian and 
Hadrian, rather than purpose-founded coloniae, and there were not necessarily cities 
where veterans had been settled. The foundation of Aelia Capitolina at Jerusalem in the 
130s was a unique exception.
169
  
 As we have seen, a considerable number of recruits took a journey from the 
West to the East. After spending half or a third of their lifetime in service, staying in the 
province where they had served may have been preferable to returning to their native 
places. On the other hand, they did not have to go on staying near the camps. The 
eastern provinces were more urbanised than the western provinces, and thus there were 
more options for the veterans to settle down. Of course the veterans who had come from 




 An interesting papyrus, dating to 63, throws light on the issue of discrimination 
between or integration of legionary and auxiliary veterans. A group of veterans 
petitioned the governor of Egypt apparently to complain about the failure to respect 
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 The governor’s official response reads:  
 
With reference to discharged soldiers, in respect of status (politeia): 
[Tuscus]: I told you before that the situation of each of you is neither 
similar nor identical. For some of you are veterans from the legions, 
others from alae, others from cohorts, others from the fleet, with the result 
that your legal rights are not the same. I shall deal with this matter, and I 
have written to the strategoi in each nome to ensure that the rewards of 
[each] person are completely guaranteed, according to the legal rights of 
each person. 
 
Various interpretations of this text are possible. Although Tuscus insists that their rights 
were different, and this is the normal view in most modern scholarship, it remains 
unclear what specific differences there were in practice. However, even if there were 
differences, this group of assorted veterans apparently thought that the differences were 
not significant, or possibly were unaware of the differences. In any case, the text shows 
a common consciousness and solidarity between veterans from different units, and now 
living in different areas of Egypt. 
 It is difficult to judge the state of relations between veterans and civilians, and 
to what extent they were integrated into most provinces of the East. However, we have 
much evidence from Karanis in Egypt, from which Alston argues that veterans did not 
develop into a separate caste but became integrated and blended with the population.
172
 
Based on Jones’ study on the Ituraean principality in Syria, Haynes argues that veterans 
functioned as benefactors and founders of civilian settlements in rural areas.
173
 In 
section 4, I shall add one more case to these with a case study of Syene in Roman Egypt. 
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 3.3.2: The strategic implications of veteran settlement 
 It is hard to find evidence for the intentions of the Roman government in 
veteran settlement, but there are some hints of a strategic policy with regard to relations 
between veterans and civilians. Roman-period accounts of Alexander the Great record 
his policy of encouraging marriage of his Companions and soldiers with local women in 
Asia and Persia.
174
 Pompeius Trogus, a Roman historian of the late first century BCE, 
presents a strategic interpretation of the policy in his Philippic History which has been 




He (Alexander the Great) permitted his soldiers also, if they had formed a 
connexion with any of the female captives, to marry them; thinking that 
they would feel less desire to return to their country, when they had some 
appearance of a house and home in the camp, and that the fatigues of war 
would be relieved by the agreeable society of their wives. He saw, too, 
that Macedonia would be less drained to supply the army, if the sons, as 
recruits, should succeed their veteran fathers, and serve within the 
ramparts within which they were born, and would be likely to show more 
courage, if they passed, not only their earliest days of service, but also 
their infancy, in the camp. This custom was also continued under 
Alexander’s successors. Maintenance was provided for the boys, and arms 
and horses were given them when they grew up; and rewards were 
assigned to the fathers in proportion to the number of their children. If the 
fathers of any of them were killed, the orphans notwithstanding received 
their father’s pay; and their childhood was a sort of military service in 
various expeditions. Inured from their earliest years to toils and dangers, 
they formed an invincible army; they looked upon their camp as their 
country, and upon a battle as a prelude to victory. 
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Although Pompeius Trogus says this was the policy of Alexander the Great, his 
interpretation probably reflects, or was designed to influence, contemporary Augustan 
policy. Augustus was one of the emperors who paid particular attention to veterans 
because he had to disband a considerable number of units after he came to power. In 
this context, Trogus’ interpretation of Alexander’s so-called ʻassimilation’ policy could 
be understood to imply the principle of exploiting veterans for a strategic use: 
encouraging relations between soldiers and veterans on the one hand and civilians on 
the other to contribute to strengthening military power and to the incorporation of local 
communities into the Roman social system.  
 In his Histories, Tacitus recounts how Mucianus tried to incite the population 
of Antioch to be hostile to Vitellius, in a passage which has often been cited as an 





Then he (Mucianus) entered the theatre at Antioch, where the people 
regularly hold their public assemblies, and addressed the crowd which 
hurried there, and expressed itself in extravagant adulation. His speech 
was graceful although he spoke in Greek, for he knew how to give a 
certain air to all he said and did. There was nothing that angered the 
province and the army so much as the assertion of Mucianus that Vitellius 
had decided to transfer the legions of Germany to Syria, where they could 
enjoy a profitable and easy service, while in exchange he would assign to 
the troops in Syria the wintry climate and the laborious duties of Germany. 
For the provincials were accustomed to live with the soldiers, and enjoyed 
association with them; in fact, many civilians were bound to the soldiers 
by ties of friendship and of marriage, and the soldiers from their long 
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service had come to love their old familiar camps as their very hearths and 
homes. 
 
 Settling veterans seems to have been more effective in frontier zones. Under 
Hadrian, Arrian reported to the emperor that he had overseen the construction of 
fortifications by the fort at Phasis in the Caucasus to protect both veterans and 
traders.
177
 This permitted and encouraged the veterans to band together while their 
presence also could be exploited to achieve social integration in the province. For a 
more detailed study of the impact of soldiers on provincial societies and their role in 
social integration, I present in the next section a case study of Syene in Roman Egypt. 
 
3.4: A case study of the Roman garrisons at Syene in Upper Egypt  
 The impact of the Roman army on provincial communities has been 
investigated in various ways. Because the term ʻimpact’ embracing those numerous 
subjects is rather vague, I shall use it here to refer to socio-economic changes embodied 
in social interaction and urbanisation. It is also important to clarify who was receiving 
the impact and in what ways. As the majority of provincials stay silent or invisible in 
our sources, our target can scarcely extend beyond local elites, whose experience deeply 
influenced the social life of local people in substance. In Roman Egypt, for example, the 
Roman authorities depended largely on the close cooperation of the local elites for the 
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 Located on the southern border of Upper Egypt, near the First Cataract, Syene 
(modern Aswan) had held military, religious and commercial significance since at least 
the New Kingdom (Map 2).
180
 In Roman time, the town functioned as the headquarters 
of three auxiliary cohorts for more than three centuries from the conquest under 
Augustus to the withdrawal by Diocletian.
181
 About 1,500 soldiers were garrisoned in 
Syene and its environs, and the town expanded to 16 ha from an estimated 12 ha in the 
Ptolemaic period.
182
 Syene makes a good case study to help our understanding of 
soldiers’ relations with civilians and urban development because of the inscriptions and 
graffiti left by soldiers in the temples, and the results of a decade of recent excavations 
by the Swiss Institute for Architectural and Archaeological Research on Ancient Egypt. 
In this section I shall argue that the Roman camps in and around Syene did not encroach 
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 Syene was of vital strategic importance to protect Egypt from the peoples to the 
South and to monitor trade and transportation up the Nile valley.
184
 Under Augustus 
three camps were established to accommodate three auxiliary units in the region of 
Syene: one at Syene, one on the facing island of Elephantine, and the third at Shellal, a 
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plain east of Philae a few km to the south of Syene.
185
 These camps were presumably 
founded by Cornelius Gallus, the first prefect (governor) of Egypt, after his advance 
into this area recorded in his trilingual inscription from Philae.
186
 Strabo reports that 
while Aelius Gallus, the second prefect of Egypt, was mounting an invasion of Arabia in 
25 BCE, the Ethiopians made a surprise attack on the area and occupied Syene, 
Elephantine, and Philae.
187
 In 24-22 BCE the next prefect Petronius recaptured these 
areas and established a military zone to the South with outposts at Pselkis, Talmis, and 
Hiera Sykaminos.
188
 This southern frontier and the number of units there seem to have 
been maintained until Diocletian’s reign.189  
 In the Ptolemaic period a road connecting the harbours at Syene and Shellal had 
already existed. Archaeological evidence shows that in the Roman period this road was 
first equipped with some watch or signal towers guarded by soldiers, and then was 
gradually protected by a wall, over a distance of some 7.5km, which was 5m thick at the 
base and might have reached 10m high (Map 3).
190
 This wall protected access from 
Syene to the temple of Isis at Philae and the auxiliary camp at Shellal, and made Syene 
and Philae one fortified zone.
191
 With this defence the Romans gave security from 
desert raiders to the civil settlement of Syene, which presumably contributed to its 
development so that it expanded its area to the North nearly to the centre of the modern 
urban area. 
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 The exact location of the camp in the city of Syene has not been discovered 
despite archaeological traces of the massive military presence.
193
 Two ditches south of 
the modern Coptic Church (Map 4: Area 32) seem to be defensive works, but are not 
necessarily a trustworthy indication of the Roman camp.
194
 We might expect the camp 
to have been sited near the harbour which is supposed to be located in the area of the 
modern Sofitel Legend hotel or, to the north, in the Ferial Garden. So for now, the 
Roman army camp in the city of Syene was most likely located inside the modern sector 
of the Coptic Church. Some traces of the northern enclosure of a fortress in the Late 
Period (664-332 BCE) were also found in Area 13 (Map 4), just north of the church. 
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This would fit with other evidence that in the eastern provinces the Roman army re-used 
pre-existing camp sites when they could. The sector of the Coptic Church (150m x 
100m) is greater than the typical size of other forts in Egypt, such as Dionysias (94.4m 
x 80m), Mons Claudianus (75m x 70m), and Mons Porphyrites (85m x 55m), but it is 
closer to the size of fort at Nag’al-Hagar (150m x 150m), which functioned as the 
headquarters of a Roman army unit.
195
 Thus, although the army camp at Syene seems 
to coexist as part of the city, it was physically separated from the civilian area and never 
encroached on it.   
 The military character of Syene, because of its strategic importance, was 
reflected in its religious cults. Ptolemy III and Ptolemy IV dedicated a temple to the 
goddess Isis with the epithet “who fights in front of the army” (Map 4: Area 1).196 A 
demotic graffito, that is in Egyptian language, on the temple, dating to 23 January 19 
CE, also shows that a priest offered sacrifices to the goddess with the title “the chief of 
the army”.197  
 
Regnal year 5, Tiberius Caesar Augustus, Tybi, day 28. 
Petidjhuty […] came (?) in order to … giving to the  
chief of the army (?). And he will say it (?) 
during the first month of Tybi festival. His name en- 
dures [here] forever, …, the chief pastophoros of Isis, 
the scribe of the Qenbet for (to?) his brother (?) 
Petiese son of Nakhtus, the prophet of Isis-Anukis, 
scribe of the wab-priests of Isis, forever 
 
 An epigram to Isis of Iunius Sabinus, apparently of the Augustan period, 
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presents us much information, which is inscribed into a victory relief on the south pylon 




Iunius Sabinus commander of the Ituraean cohort(?) came here leading the 
multitude of the Syene forces, solemnly celebrating with new chants Isis 
who knows how to save the world. Having conquered the Nubian tribes 
that raged against the sons of Romulus, he came here with his troops. […] 
in the fray, you will say, then, Caesar’s man […] put on the crown. 
 
Speidel suggests that this Roman soldier was not only the prefect of a cohors 
Ituraeorum but also the commander of the entire force of three cohorts at Syene.
199
 It is 
noticeable that the epigram of Iunius Sabinus was inscribed in Greek, not in Latin which 
has generally been considered the ʻofficial language’ of the army. Adams provides 
abundant evidence to show that Greek was regularly used, even for official purposes, by 
the Roman army in Egypt, and he argues that there was not a fixed linguistic practice 
using Latin as the ʻofficial language’ of the army.200 Latin, as a sort of super-high 
language in the army, was normally used among its highest ranks to communicate for 
interprovincial duties and to interact with the imperial government at Rome. On the 
other hand, Fewster argues that bilingualism, mostly Greek and Demotic, in Roman 
Egypt must be reconsidered. She suggests that the bilingualism is to be expected among 
the civic elites because of their role in administration, but that otherwise it was limited 




 The priestly class, as a group of the local elite and of bilinguals in Greek and 
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Demotic, were presumably able to influence people and to facilitate the connection 
between soldiers and civilians. We do not know if the dedication of Iunius Sabinus had 
been composed by the soldier himself or one of the priests of the sanctuary, but at least 
it had probably been set up with the approbation of the priests, which implies some 
collaboration by the Egyptian priests with the local garrison from the very beginning of 
the Roman rule. Added to this, more dedicatory inscriptions written in Greek by soldiers 
are found in Egyptian temples at Talmis and Pelchis.
202
 Myers argues that these are 
evidence for individual soldiers’ concern for ʻreligious sensibilities’. 203  Religious 
dedications by soldiers to the Egyptian goddess Isis continued at Syene during the 
second century. For instance, the following dedication by a soldier of cohors II 




Liberalis Sarapion, soldier of the second cohort of the Ituraeans, century 
of Valentinus, dedicated this with good luck for her favours to the Lady 
Isis. In the year 20, on the sixth day in the month Hadrian. 
 
 In 166 the soldiers of cohors I Flavia Cilicum equitata made a dedication for 
the welfare and victory of Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus.
205
 It is interesting that 
they erected matching obelisks for the dedication. Haynes argues that: “the choice of 
obelisks as a medium is telling: the emperors’ soldiers are happy to use an Egyptian 
form of great antiquity to assure the welfare of their imperial rulers”.206 This is a good 
example that soldiers were not reluctant to use practices of local religion which were 
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familiar to the local people. Many soldiers also worshipped local gods.
207
 Thus 
adoption of local religious practices, with the aid of the priests, played a crucial role in 
blending soldiers into the local elites and of settling them down in local societies. 
 I have attempted to evaluate the spatial and psychological distances between 
Roman soldiers and civilians through investigating the location of the camp at Syene 
and the inscriptions on the temples in the area. This case study shows that during the 
three centuries of its occupation the camp maintained a certain distance from the 
civilian area, and the development, or urbanisation, of the town was never stunted by 
this military presence. Rather, the civil settlement could be safely expanded to the north 
under the protection of the army from the South. On the individual level the soldiers’ 
religion was an important avenue for interaction between soldiers and civilians. The 
local priests, who were able to communicate in Greek and Egyptian, played a pivotal 
role as a bridge connecting the soldiers and the locals. Of course, this case study is not 
necessarily valid for all the eastern provinces, let alone the entire empire. However, 
when it is put together with other case studies from the eastern provinces, I will be able 
to argue whether the Roman army was generally so oppressive to civilians in the East as 
it has often been supposed to have been there, and whether the presence of military units 
near civilian settlement seriously hindered urbanisation in the East. Yes, for provincials, 
Roman soldiers were obviously occupiers at the time of conquest, but it did not take 
much time for them to change their role to that of protectors, and they became part of 
provincial society throughout the long period of Roman rule.     
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 In the eastern provinces, conscription was not a common way of recruitment, 
and was probably carried out only when volunteers were not sufficient to maintain units 
at what was thought to be the necessary strength (about 80% in peacetime and at full 
strength in wartime). During the second century, the military importance of the eastern 
provinces increased because of conflicts with the Parthian empire. The growing number 
of military units helped to control the provincials and to improve security in the frontier 
zones, but it also led to much heavier recruitment. Initially, this seems to have triggered 
some discontent among the provincials, and some upper-class local youths, in particular, 
appear to have tried to evade military service. For many more provincials, however, 
serving in the army still represented a good opportunity of being granted Roman 
citizenship. In the second and third centuries, 79% of new legionary soldiers were 
recruited from the Latin West and neighbouring provinces. They blended in with local 
and provincial recruits, because all recruits were reborn as Roman soldiers under the 
same military law and discipline. After discharge, veterans settled in urban areas or 
large villages, and became part of local societies. The case study of the Roman garrisons 
at Syene in Egypt shows the interaction of the soldiers with the civilians throughout the 
three hundred years from 25 BCE to the reign of Diocletian that they were stationed 
there. They seem to have cooperated with the local priests, an important element in the 
local elite. Since socio-economic exchanges and good relationships between soldiers 
and civilians would have contributed significantly to assuring the dominance of Roman 
empire in the East, and this must have been realised by the Roman authorities, we may 
assume that their policies of recruitment and settlement of veterans had a conscious 




Ch. 4: The logistics of the Roman army and civilians 
 
4.1: Introduction  
       Careful planning and execution of the logistics for military operations has been 
essential for commanders to succeed in warfare across all times and places. An ancient 
Chinese general pointed out this basic concept in the 6th century BCE: “An army 
without its baggage-train is defeated; without rations it is defeated; without bases of 
supply it is defeated”, which was reiterated by a lieutenant colonel of the US army who 
experienced the Second World War.
208
 The importance of supplying an army at war was 
not neglected by the Romans.
209
 For example, Vegetius stated: “Frequently indeed, lack 
of supplies rather than the battle destroys an army, and hunger is harsher than the sword. 
Then the army can be rescued from other calamities: foraging and food-supply have no 
remedy in necessity except being stored beforehand. In every expedition the sole and 
most powerful weapon is that provision is sufficient to you while the lack of it crushes 
the enemy”.210 
       In the Republic, logistics meant supplying armies in the field, and had largely 
depended on ad hoc preparations by commanders just before their campaigns.
211
 A 
system of peacetime logistics became necessary with the establishment of a professional 
standing army during the early Principate. This involved a major transformation of the 
supply system, as Rathbone has summarised, from “the Rome-based private contractors 
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used in the Republic to supply the expeditionary forces levied for each war” to “a 
province-based civil administration supplying, still from taxation and purchases, the 
dispersed units of the standing, largely peacetime, army of the Principate”.212 The 
logistics of the standing army for their food, clothing and equipment became ‘normal’, 
but still required extra levies for emergencies, such as campaigns and imperial visits. 
       Despite its importance, because ancient authors rarely mention the logistics 
system, scholars have tended to pay more attention to wartime logistics which were 
often coercive and exploitative of civilians.
213
 Many attested complaints about 
requisitions (annona militaris, hospitium, angareia) from the East, in particular, give us 
the impression that the duty of provision imposed on the civilians was more oppressive 
than it was in the West.
214
 However, this distinction between “the East” and “the West” 
may be false: for example, in the meantime Roman Britain also experienced many 
campaigns requiring extra levies from its civilians, and abuses of the system are attested 
by Tacitus; indeed, the abuse of requisitions in peacetime appears not to have been a 
phenomenon of a specific region but of every frontier province.
215
 My focus will be 
concentrated on ‘normal’ supply system for the army logistics in the eastern provinces, 
in order to re-examine critically the view that this system was so exploitative that it 
strained the relationships between soldiers and civilians, and probably hindered the 
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growth of the civilian economy.
216
  
       The aim of this chapter is to illuminate the interplay between soldiers and 
civilians through investigating the logistics system of the Roman imperial army in the 
eastern provinces. I will explain the general system of logistics, and then estimate to 
what extent provincial societies were burdened by it. I will also examine whether the 
demand for supplies for the army units stimulated economic growth in the surrounding 
civilian areas, which is a common idea in scholarship about the army in the western 
provinces.  
 
4.2: The system of logistics 
       4.2.1: The views of scholars 
       The purpose of Roman military logistics was basically to meet the needs of the 
military system including remuneration, food, clothing, equipment, accommodation, 
fodder and transport. These supplies largely depended on the provincial economy, and 
therefore scholars have focused on the relationship between soldiers and civilians based 
on literary and archaeological evidence from the provincial societies. Although many 
opinions have been suggested, the key issue is whether the impact of the Roman army 
was positive or negative on the provincial economy. While the positive contribution of 
the armies to the economies of the western provinces is largely accepted, in the East it is 
considered nothing or negative, because scholars believe the economy in the eastern 
provinces had already developed to a substantial level before the Romans came. In his 
book on the economy of Roman frontiers, Whittaker does not even devote one page to a 
discussion of the economy of the eastern frontiers.
217
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       Isaac evaluates the soldiers’ requisitions of annona, hospitium and angareia 
(supplies, lodging and transport) as heavy burdens on civilians in the East: “generally 
speaking, it is hard to distinguish between excessive taxation and plain robbery by 
soldiers”, and he concludes that corrupt practices by the soldiers in the East were severe 
because they were garrisoned in cities.
218
 The period of his study is the Later Empire, 
but his evidence is largely drawn from Rabbinic literature and Roman laws of the 
Principate. Alston asserts that the economic impact of the army in Egypt was 
insignificant and never promoted the economic growth of the province.
219
 Adams also 
notes that imperial visits and military campaigns imposed a heavy burden on the local 
economy of Egypt.
220
 Pollard on one hand suggests that in Syria “the army was a key 
element in the provincial economy through its position in a chain of cash taxation, army 
pay, and army spending”, but on the other hand appears to share Isaac’s view in his 
concluding chapter.
221
 Focusing on the road system, Kissel explains that the most 
important purpose of its construction was to smooth the progress of military 




       Other scholars, however, assess the contribution of the Roman state and its 
army to the provincial economy in more positive terms. In his study of the provinces of 
Asia Minor, Mitchell suggests that it was enormous, although the Roman authorities do 
not seem to have had a conscious policy of promoting the economic development of the 
provinces.
223
 On the economy of Judaea/Syria-Palaestina under Roman rule Roth 
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argues that: “the region evolved from a closed economy, based on subsistence 
agriculture and the Temple, to an export economy driven by a powerful private sector. 
This change was due in large part to the capital infusion brought by the army, in the 
form of payroll, purchase of supplies and discharge bonuses; the construction of 
infrastructure for military purposes; as well as the entrepreneurial skill of the veterans 
who settled in the province”.224 
       It seems that the logistics system of the Roman army in the East was not 
different from that in the West. Existing studies are insufficient for us to draw a 
comprehensive conclusion, because all but Isaac have focused on the case study of a 
single province. However, despite regional differences, the system which the imperial 
government had introduced into each province was essentially consistent across the 
empire.
225
 It is true that relatively many petitions and complaints of civilians are 
attested in the East, but this fact does not indicate or prove systemic differences of 
military logistics between the East and the West. The greater number of these appeals 
probably simply reflects the strong ‘epigraphic habit’ of the East, which was rooted in 
greater cultural confidence in complaining and greater literacy than existed in the 
western cultural environment.  
 
       4.2.2: The officials 
       Military supplies probably involved almost all the standing Roman officials of 
the empire and all local authorities.
226
 The central imperial posts in Rome comprised 
the emperor and his staffs, notably the a rationibus and praefectus annonae and, and at 
times the Senate. The emperor appointed a freedman at the head of the a rationibus to 
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manage the financial accounting of the imperial treasury; this post was held by an 
equestrian from the second century, and the equestrian praefectus annonae supervised 
food supplies. The praefecti vehiculorum administered the cursus publicus to facilitate 
the transport of food supplies arranged by the praefectus annonae. In wartime more 
temporary offices, such as the curator copiarum, were appointed specifically for 
handling the logistics of expeditionary forces.
227
  
       The governors and procurators of all provinces were ultimately responsible for 
paying and supplying the troops in their provinces on behalf of the emperor, the 
supreme commander of the Roman army. The governors assigned some soldiers to work 
for the supply system: the beneficiarii were dispatched to supervise its logistical 
infrastructure, and the frumentarii were attached to the procurators when they had the 
tasks of collecting and purchasing grain. The legati and praefecti of units with their 
staffs like the tribuni laticlavius and praefecti castrorum administered the distribution 
of money and food to their soldiers. The local authorities often had to provide supplies 
for the units under the name of contributions. The private contractors called publicani 
were also used for supplies and transport.  
       Some scholars have been sceptical about whether the praefectus annonae was 
responsible for the peacetime food supply to the armies. Roth suggests that it is very 
unlikely that the emperor would have entrusted control of the military supply system to 
one official such as the praefectus annonae, which could have created a potential threat 
against his own authority.
228
 Kehne thinks that the system was under the supervision of 
the a rationibus. However, most scholars consider the praefectus annonae to have been 
a permanent position instituted by Augustus, which had the responsibility for arranging 
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the annona (food supply) to Rome and to the army units in the provinces.
229
 They 
identify this office as the highest bureaucrat for the logistics system, just under the 
emperor and above the governors and procurators. At the overarching imperial level 
there was normally no separation in management of civilian and military resources. The 
praefectus annonae primarily worked for the food supply of Rome, but probably also of 
the praetoriani, cohortes urbanae, and vigiles there. He also managed the surplus of 
food resource generated in this supply process for interprovincial supplies which could 
be diverted at Rome, from elsewhere, to the army units in both the western and eastern 
provinces. This interprovincial supply to the frontiers was considered important among 
the imperial authorities. A governor of Baetica, Umbonius Silio, was even expelled 
from the Senate, because he had been falsely accused of that he provided too little grain 




       4.2.3: The structure of system and the annona militaris 
       The emperor and his officials administered the empire by drawing on standard 
taxes in cash and kind raised throughout it. The governors and procurators normally 
collected the annual amount of taxes in cash and kind from each community, and 
arranged its transport toward Rome or wherever it was needed. Under the supervision of 
the a rationibus, soldiers were paid out of these standard cash taxes managed by the 
procurators.
231
 Taxes in kind were also collected through this regular system: taxpayers 
themselves delivered taxes to near local villages or cities, and then these were gathered 
to the state, normally by the private contractors, to be distributed to public granaries 
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within or outside the army camps and near the mansiones.
232
 For long distances private 
entrepreneurs were contracted to provide transport, and then the military commander of 
each unit distributed the supplies to his soldiers.
233
 Although the basic food, clothing, 
and equipment were provided by the state, soldiers might individually buy extra goods 




       Sometimes the state made compulsory purchases of wheat when normal taxes 
were insufficient. If there was a shortage of supplies, particularly in emergency 
situations, they also had to prepare supplements by compulsory purchase at a flat price. 
When the emperor had planned an expedition or was visiting provinces, or rebellions 
were being suppressed, irregular and extra levies were required from the provinces. 
During his governorship of Pontus and Bithynia Pliny the Younger was ordered by 
Trajan to arrange for extra grain supply from Paphlagonia as a preparation for his 
Parthian war in 114-7.
235
 Some soldiers from the local units would often escort the 
supplies. 
       The theory of a new and distinct annona militaris in the third century has often 
confused understanding of army supplies during the Principate. Van Berchem invented 
the hypothesis that Septimius Severus instituted the annona militaris to supply the 
soldiers directly with materials collected from provincials, which implied the 
replacement of taxation in cash.
236
 Although his controversial idea of the specific 
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annona for military use has been much discussed and has caused much confusion, it is 
no longer accepted by most scholars, including van Berchem himself.
237
 Some instead 
now consider it part of Diocletian’s reforms, drawing on the practice of extraordinary 
taxes in kind for expeditions or imperial itineraries under the Principate.
238
 Others 
suggest that it was a certain proportion of the annona (annual food supply) destined for 
military use, which was controlled by the praefectus annonae who was also responsible 
for the grain distribution at Rome.
239
  
       There was no fundamental change of taxation from the Late Republic to the 
Principate, and taxation in kind, mostly of grain, but also fodder and other food stuffs, 
was a normal source of the food supply system throughout the period.
240
 The food 
production from the relatively fertile provinces of Spain, Asia Minor, Egypt, and Africa 
normally exceeded the demand of annona for the armies stationed there and also for 
Rome. The surpluses were thus transported to frontier areas. For example, a 
considerable quantity of Baetican olive oil was shipped to the Rhine, Danube and 
Mauretania frontiers, while the Danube and Euphrates frontiers were supplied with olive 
oil produced in the provinces of Asia Minor.
241
  
       The army units on the eastern frontier depended on food supplies mainly from 
the provinces of Asia Minor and Egypt.
242
 The bulk of grain supply from the province 
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of Egypt was supplied to Rome, and also some to the eastern frontier for military use. 
The soldiers and civilians at Mons Claudianus in the Eastern Desert of Egypt could 
enjoy a diet as good as the ordinary people at Rome.
243
 Wierschowski estimates that 
generally 10-12% of the agricultural income was provided to soldiers, and Mitchell 
estimates that roughly a tenth of the total crop cultivated from Asia Minor was sent to 
those frontiers as tax in kind.
244
 
       To conclude, under the Principate taxation in kind was part of normal food 
supply system for Rome and its soldiers stationed in the provinces, and it did not 
impose a heavy extra burden on civilians. In emergency situations such as famine, war 
or imperial visits, the government could require extraordinary grain supplies from 
provincials. This was carried out by means of compulsory purchase, but not by illegal 
extortion or confiscation. The problems were the abuse of taxes and requisitions 
committed by some soldiers, officials and local elites in the name of military use. The 
imperial authority (the emperor, governors, and procurators) had the intelligence to 
sense the danger of condoning illegal forced requisition, and thus issued edicts and legal 
regulations to control it. The imperial government retained this food supply system at 
least until the crisis of the later third century.  
 
4.3: Soldiers and civilians: requisition, petition, and regulation 
       4.3.1: Compulsory requisition 
       Compulsory requisition from civilians was more or less acceptable in an 
emergency, but its abuses were problematic. Under the normal supply system providers 
possessing officially issued receipts had the right to reimbursement from the state. Even 
in wartime the state arranged to purchase their grain and service for flat price. However, 
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some soldiers, officials, and local elites tended to require unreasonable provisions from 
provincials which the imperial authorities tried to prevent. Hadrian issued an edict that 
if a private contractor or official had collected more products than that they were 




Of the things, which governors order to be brought to themselves for their 
use, the deified Hadrian wrote to governors saying that when a provincial 
governor or a legionary commander or a procurator or such a person 
dispatches someone to make a purchase, he should indicate this in a 
memorandum signed in his own hand and should send this memorandum 
to a private contractor so that anything that is brought in excess of what 
was ordered can be counted as tax. It is normal for customary usage to be 
taken into account in almost all matters concerning taxes, and this is also 
assured in imperial constitutions. 
 
       There was another law to prevent the abuse of compulsory requisition, and to 




Any illegal exaction, private or public, is paid back to the victims with as 
much again; but where the extortion was made by force, the restitution is 
threefold; those responsible are in addition liable to extraordinary criminal 
punishment. The one measure is demanded by the interests of private 
individuals, the other by the need for strong public discipline.  
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It is difficult to judge to what extent these legal remedies were effective or practical, but 
they imply that the imperial authorities were concerned to try to prevent, or at least limit, 
abuses regarding food supply. They recognised the potential danger of people’s 
complaints as a threat public discipline, which might arouse revolts, and obviously 
appreciated the importance of maintaining the balance of supplies and compensation 
between soldiers and civilians.  
  
       4.3.2: Angareia and hospitium 
       Angareia and hospitium have been often cited as forms of extortion at the level 
of the local logistics system. Angareia was a forced requisition of transport for soldiers 
and officials, while hospitium or hospitium militare was compulsory billeting, included 
providing food and drink. The practice of angareia (a Persian word) dated back to the 
Achaemenid period.
247
 Hospitium was an ad hoc measure of the Republic (and other 
states) to quarter troops on civilian houses. These previously ad hoc practices were 
probably institutionalised as part of the regular supply system under the reign of 
Augustus, when soldiers and officials were deployed over all the provinces to maintain 
and to supervise the logistics of the standing armies. However, the official foundation of 
these institutions has often been forgotten in discussion of the abuses, because most of 
the available evidence consists of legal regulations against abuses in the Codex 
Theodosianus and the Codex Justinianus. 
       As regards the issues of angareia and hospitium in the eastern provinces under 
the Principate, we have to depend on the slight documentary evidence of petitions and 
responses (letters and edicts). The first attested regulation is the edict of Libuscidianus, 
the governor of Pisidia, concerning angareia to the people of Sagalassus in 13-15 CE.
248
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Sextus Sotidius Strabo Libuscidianus, legtus pro praetore of Tiberius 
Caesar Augustus, says: It is the most unjust thing of all for me to tighten 
up by my own edict that which the Augusti, one the greatest of gods, the 
other the greatest emperors, have taken the utmost care to prevent, namely 
that no-one should make use of carts without payment. However, since the 
indiscipline of certain people requires an immediate punishment, I have 
set up in the individual towns and villages a register of those services 
which I judge ought to be provided, with the intention of having it 
observed, or, if it shall be neglected, of enforcing it not only with my 
power but with the majesty of the best of princes from whom I received 
instructions concerning these matters.  
The people of Sagalassus must provide a service of then waggons and as 
many mules for the necessary uses of people passing through, and should 
receive, from those who use the service, ten asses per schoenum for a 
waggon and four asses per schoenum for a mule, but if they prefer to 
provide donkeys, should give two in place of one mule at the same price. 
Alternatively, if they prefer, they can pay people of another town or 
village who undertake the duty the same price for individual mules and 
waggons as they would have received if they had provided the service 
themselves, in order that these perform the same service. They are obliged 
to provide transport as far as Cormasa and Conana.  
(…) 
I want nothing to be provided for those who transport grain or anything 
else of that sort either for their own use or to sell, and (nothing should be 
provided) for anyone for their own personal baggage animals or for their 
freedmen’s or for their slaves’ animals. Shelter and hospitality should be 
provided without payment for all members of my own staff, for persons 
on military service from other provinces and for freedmen and slaves of 
the best of princes and for the animals of these persons, in such a way that 





This edict, as Mitchell comments, was based on the instructions of Augustus.
249
 Thus it 
is clear that angareia had been instituted in the reign of Augustus, and therefore its 
abuse became subject to legal regulations. More importantly, this governor re-affirmed 
the precise criteria for angareia and specified the reasonable price for each service, 
prohibiting the private use of this service without payment. This implies that angareia 
itself was part of the normal transport system with the deferred payment arranged by the 
state, and its abuse on the individual level was the real problem.  
       A few years later, hospitium is attested in Germanicus’ edict on his visit in 
Egypt. Imperial visits needed almost as much transport and billets as military campaigns 
from the provincial societies. In these special cases, as imperial authorities scheduled 
appropriate payment for the services of hospitium, likewise they had done for angareia, 
but unplanned requisitions by individual soldiers and officials had to be regulated. 





Proclamation of Germanicus Caesar, son of Augustus and grandson of the 
deified Augustus, proconsul. [Being informed that in view of my visit] 
requisitions of boats and animals are being made and that quarters for 
lodging are being occupied by force and private persons intimidated, I 
have thought it necessary to declare that I wish neither boat nor beast of 
burden to be seized by anyone except on the order of Baebius my friend 
and secretary, nor quarters to be occupied. For if it be necessary, Baebius 
himself will allot the quarters fairly and justly; and for boats or animals 
which we requisition I command that hire be paid in accordance with my 
schedule. Those who disobey I desire to be brought before my secretary, 
who will either himself prevent private persons from being wronged or 
will report the case to me. And I forbid beasts of burden to be forcibly 
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appropriated by those who meet them traversing the city; for this is 
nothing but an act of open robbery.  
 
       It is unclear when hospitium was officially institutionalised, but the abuse of 
hospitium was probably subject to regulations during the Julio-Claudian period. 
Pretending to perform official duties, soldiers and officials often lodged in private 
houses even though there was some state-organised accommodation for them in most 
cities and towns.
251
 In the reign of Commodus a governor of Syria, Julius Saturninus, 
sent a letter to the village of Phaina: “For on the one hand you do not owe a general 
contribution to visitors; and since on the other you have a guest house, you can not be 
compelled to take the visitors into your homes”.252 In another example of general 
regulation by the imperial authority, Domitian ordered to his procurator of Syria, 




Among items of special importance that required great attention by my 
father, the god Vespasianus, I know that he gave great care to the cities’ 
privileges. With his mind fixed on them he ordered that neither by the 
renting of beasts of burden nor by the distress of lodging should the 
provinces be burdened, but, nevertheless, by conscious decision or not, 
deliberate neglect has set in and this order has not been observed, for there 
remains up to the present an old and vigorous custom which, little by little, 
will progress into law if it is not obstructed by force from gaining strength. 
I instruct you to see to it that nobody commandeers a beast of burden 
unless he has a permit from me. 
 
This ruling has two important points. First, it shows the process by which the abuse of 
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hospitium, along with that of angareia, became the subject of the imperial regulation. 
Second, Vespasian had apparently managed to win hearts and minds among the 
populations of the cities in Syria, and the support of the civilians had been crucial to his 
victory in the civil war.
254
 Domitian needed to maintain the good relationship instituted 
by his father, and so ordered the procurator to eradicate the wrong practices to ease the 
burden on civilians.  
       The emperor sometimes intervened directly to protect the inhabitants of cities 
located at major traffic points, which made them vulnerable to abuses by official 
travellers, especially requisitions by soldiers. Sometimes the emperor ordered governors 
to dispatch some soldiers, probably beneficiarii, to control abuses. In year 112, for 
instance, Trajan ordered Publius Calpurnius Macer, the governor of Moesia Inferior, to 
send a centurion to a city of Byzantium in the neighbouring province of Thrace, despite 
the existence of auxiliary units and marines there. In his correspondence with Trajan, 
Pliny the Younger, the governor of Pontus and Bithynia, where there were no legionary 
units, asked the emperor to implement the same measure for the dwellers of Juliopolis, 
and then accepted his agreement.
255
 
   
You acted agreeably, Sir, to your usual prudence and foresight in ordering 
the illustrious Calpurnius Macer to send a legionary centurion to 
Byzantium: you will consider whether the city of Juliopolis does not 
deserve the same regard, which, though it is extremely small, sustains 
very great burdens, and is so much the more exposed to injuries as it is 
less capable of resisting them. Whatever benefits you shall confer upon 
that city will in effect be advantageous to the whole country; for it is 
situated at the entrance of Bithynia, and is the town through which all who 
travel into this province generally pass. 
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The circumstances of the city of Byzantium are such, by the great 
confluence of strangers to it, that I held it incumbent upon me, and 
consistent with the customs of former reigns, to send thither a legionary 
centurion's guard to preserve the privileges of that state. But if we should 
distinguish the city of Juliopolis in the same way, it will be introducing a 
precedent for many others, whose claim to that favour will rise in 
proportion to their want of strength. I have so much confidence, however, 
in your administration as to believe you will omit no method of protecting 
them from injuries. If any persons shall act contrary to the discipline I 
have enjoined, let them be instantly corrected; or if they happen to be 
soldiers, and their crimes should be too enormous for immediate 
chastisement, I would have them sent to their officers, with an account of 
the particular. 
 
       In the twilight of Hadrian’s reign, the edict of a governor of Egypt shows that 
illegal requisitions of transport by members of the local elites or officials were as 
serious as those of soldiers. At this time the nearby province of Judaea was facing the 
Bar Kokhba revolt, to confront which the Roman forces largely depended on supplies 
from Egypt. Wartime gave people room to distort the institution to their own profits. 





Proclamation of Marcus Petronius Mamertinus, praefect of Egypt. I am 
informed that without having a warrant many of the soldiers when 
travelling through the country requisition boats and animals and persons 
improperly, in some cases seizing them by force, in others obtaining them 
from the strategi through favour or obsequiousness, the result of which is 
that private persons are subjected to insults and abuses and the army is 
reproached for greed and injustice. I therefore command the strategi and 
royal scribes never in any case to furnish to any person without a warrant, 
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whether travelling by river or by land, any contribution for the journey, 
understanding that I will vigorously punish anyone who after this edict is 
discovered receiving or giving any of the aforesaid things. The … year of 
Hadrianus Caesar the lord, Thoth 8.  
  
       Sometimes military tribunes, quoting the governor’s edict, regulated soldiers’ 
abuses of hospitium. In the province of Asia a tribune on behalf of his governor, T. 
Flavius Sulpicianus, announced that he would not longer connive at his soldiers’ 




[…, greetings. I have read the petition of n. n. presented to the most 
illustrious proconsul, T. Fl. Su]lpicianus - alleging that his estates, and 
especially Z[.]mos and Madilos, are being harassed by soldiers - and the 
response [which is] quoted below:  
‘The most honourable Ligy[s] shall see to it that your estates are not being 
abused in any way. The most honourable tribune shall also take care of the 
same.’  
Consequently, if any of the soldiers placed under my command on his way 
through the estates of your master show misconduct by demanding either 
a guide, breakfast, dinner or any such thing, that the most illustrious 
[proconsul] … 
 
There is doubt to what extent this kind of self-regulatory approach among soldiers could 
be effective. However, it is noticeable that at the end of the second century, as this letter 
has been dated to 187-191, civilians’ petitions could still be sent to the governors 
without being censored, and that the governors did not ignore them. 
       Angareia and hospitium in the eastern provinces under the Principate, which 
originated from the Republican practice or even further back, were still managed 
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reasonably as part of the regular supply system for the Roman armies. The contributions 
of civilians by these institutions were properly compensated by the imperial government. 
On the personal level, however, the abuses of these requisitions by individual soldiers 
and officials were still problematic. In the perspective of imperial authorities, 
controlling these systems was very important to maintain their supply lines for the army 
and to keep the hearts and minds of the provincials. Thus they never ignored civilians’ 
petitions but responded with re-statement of the official regulations.  
 
4.4: The impact of the Roman army on the provincial economy 
       4.4.1: Military budget 
       The size of the military budget needs to be estimated to understand the 
economic impact of the Roman army on provincial societies. Duncan-Jones suggests 
that the military budget of the Roman empire was approximately three quarters of the 
imperial government’s annual budget in the mid-second century.258 Accepting Duncan-
Jones’ analysis, Erdkamp says that it confirms the fact that maintaining the army was 
the most important imperial expense.
259
 Despite this, he argues that the driving force of 
economic growth was Rome itself and major cities along the Mediterranean coast rather 
than the army. However, cities also drew on civic revenues and private wealth. 
 Rathbone instead estimates the fiscal burden of the army on the empire to be a 
quarter of the total imperial budget or less, and then he concludes: “However, through 
the participation of individual soldiers in the civilian economy, the army did help diffuse 
a more sophisticated model of economic behaviour. Roman soldiers of the Principate 
belonged to the largest salaried labour force known before the Industrial Revolution. 
Their lives were highly monetised; they used accounting based on paper credits and 
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debits; they constantly borrowed and lent; they had frequent contact with civilian 
craftsmen, merchants, and transporters; they travelled and took this behaviour with 
them”.260 More scholars, however, believe higher estimates than that of Rathbone, and 
the whole issue is still the subject of unresolved debate.  
 
       4.4.2: Cities as supply bases and urban development
261
 
       Roman military camps were established at strategic points which were also 
convenient for receiving supplies.
262
 These points in the eastern provinces had already 
been occupied by cities, whereas in the West many cities developed from the 
settlements (vici and canabae) around the camps. It was a rational decision to station the 
eastern army units in or near already existing cities which could function as their supply 
bases. The eastern soldiers were often criticised by ancient authors because of their 
relaxation of military discipline and low morale. Tacitus, for instance, accused the 




His (Corbulo’s) legions indeed, transferred from as they had been from 
Syria and demoralised by a long peace, endured most impatiently the 
duties of a Roman camp. It was well known that that army contained 
veterans who had never been on piquet duty or on night guard, to whom 
the rampart and the fosse were new and strange sights, men without 
helmets or breastplates, sleek money-making traders, who had served all 
their time in towns.  
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His negative representation of the soldiers is based on the assumption that they had 
adopted a civilian lifestyle because they were garrisoned in cities and towns. Although 
the camp was demarcated physically by a wooden or stone perimeter, soldiers interacted 
constantly with civilians beyond it. We might expect some relaxation of military 
discipline caused by this close interaction between soldiers and civilians, but could 
hardly conclude that it was true only of the soldiers in the East.
264
 The western soldiers 
also interacted with civilians because many civilian settlements had developed around 
them and depended on the military economy. Tacitus’ description, as Wheeler suggests, 
was likely a topos to emphasise the military initiatives of a new general rather than an 
objective assessment of the actual situation.
265
  
       Some scholars have argued that in the East the presence of the army units in the 
cities and towns explains the absence of forts on the frontiers, and have concluded that 
the primary purpose of garrisons was to control the provincials rather than to defend the 
imperial limes.
266
 They have given more importance to the nature of soldiers, forming 
the ruling class in provincial societies, which was unblended with civilians. Pollard 
argues that the ‘military quarter’, with restricted access for civilians, signified the 
remoteness of soldiers from civilians, and that soldiers maintained their identity through 
emphasising the ‘otherness’ of the army.267 This argument confirms the conclusion of 
his previous article that the army existed as a ‘total institution’ isolated from provincial 
societies.
268
 However, there are some opposite suggestions that soldiers coexisted and 
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communicated with civilians, and that their role was like a bridge connecting local 
communities with the imperial polity.
269
 
       We need to examine whether Roman army camps were located inside or 
outside the city walls, and if they were within it, to what extent the ‘military quarter’ 
encroached on the ‘civilian area’. Of course distinguishing between each area accurately 
from the archaeological remains has many difficulties. The archaeological sites of some 
legionary bases in these six eastern provinces of the Near East are known to us: Satala 
(Sadak), and Melitene (Malatya) in Cappadocia; Samosata (Samsat), Zeugma 
(Gaziantep), Cyrrhus (Khoros), Apamea (Qalaat al-Madiq), and Raphanaea (Rafniye) in 
Syria; Nisibis (Nusaybin) and Singara (Beled Sinjar) in Mesopotamia; Caparcotna 
(Kefar ‘Othnai) and Jerusalem in Judaea; Bostra (Busra al-Sham) in Arabia; Nikopolis 
(Alexandria) and Babylon (Old Cairo) in Egypt.
270
  
       Many fortified cities, towns, and ports for legionary vexillations and auxiliary 
units are also known to us: Sebastopolis/Dioscurios, Phasis, Absarus, and Trapezus 
(port) in Cappadocia; Beroea/Aleppo, Palmyra, Dura-Europos, Ana, Kifrin, Antioch, 
Seleucia Pieria (port), Sidon, Damascus, and Tyre in Syria; Rhesaina and Hatra in 
Mesopotamia; Scythopolis, Samaria, Neapolis, Emmaus-Nicopolis, Eleutheropolis, and 
Hebron in Judaea; Gerasa, Rabbatmoba, Mampsis, Petra, Elath/Aela (port), and Leuke 
Kome (port) in Arabia; Pelusium, Koptos, Contrapollonsopolis Magna, Thebes, Syene, 
and Berenike (port) in Egypt.
271
 Some ruins of forts have also been discovered in the 
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east of Cappadocia, in Mesopotamia, in the south-eastern desert of Judaea, and in the 
Eastern Desert in Egypt, but these forts were not near civilian settlements and mostly 
date from the Later Empire, with the well-known exceptions of the fortresses at Mons 
Porphyrites and Mons Claudianus in Egypt.  
 
Table 14: The Roman army units and cities in the eastern provinces
272
 
Province City or town Camp location Period of garrison First attested units 
Cappadocia Sebastopolis 
(city) 
Outside? Vespasian ~ 5C 
(founded in 540 BCE)  
Vex. of XII Fulminata 
and XVI Flavia Firma? 
Phasis 
(town or city) 
Within? 
(evolved from fort) 
Vespasian ~ 5C  Vex. of XII Fulminata 
and XVI Flavia Firma? 
Absarus 
(town or city) 
Within? 
(evolved from fort) 
Vespasian ~ 5C  Vex. of XII Fulminata 





64 ~ mid-3C 
(756 BCE) 





(evolved from camp) 




(evolved from camp) 
70 ~ 4C  XII Fulminata276 
Syria Samosata 
(major city)  
Outside? 
(evolved from city) 
72 ~ 7C 
(2C BCE) 
III Gallica or  




(evolved from city) 






(evolved from city) 
18 ~ mid-3C 







mid-1C ~ 3C? 
(early 3C BCE) 
Vex. of IV Scythica  





mid-2C ~ mid 3C  
(flourished since 1C BCE) 
Ala I Ulpia singul.  
in 150281 
Dura-Europos 
(town or city) 
Within 
(evolved from fort) 







(evolved from fort) 






(evolved from fort) 
3C  Coh. XX Palm. 
Antioch Outside 51 BCE ~ 390s Vex. of X Fretensis  
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(major city) (301 BCE) under Julio-Claudian284 
Seleucia Pieria 
(port) 
Adjacent? 70s ~ 4C 




(major city)  
Outside 
(evolved from city) 
43 BCE ~ mid-3C 
(301-299 BCE) 





(evolved from city) 




Outside? first half of 3C 
(before 1M BCE) 
Vex. of III Gallica and  
VI Ferrata in early 3C 
Damascus 
(major city) 
Outside? first half of 3C 
(1M BCE) 
Vex. of III Gallica and  
VI Ferrata in early 3C 
Tyre 
(city) 
Outside? first half of 3C 
(before 1M BCE) 
Vex. of III Gallica and  




(evolved from camp) 
197 ~ mid-3C Vex. of III Parthica  
in early 3C 
Nisibis 
(major city)  
Within? 
(evolved from city) 
197 ~ 390s 
(early 3C BCE) 
III Parthica  




(evolved from city) 
197 ~ 363 
(flourished in 2C) 
I Parthcia 




(evolved from town) 







(evolved from camp) 




Outside? 66 ~ 180s 





Outside? Hadrian ~ ? 
(rebuilt in 57 BCE) 





(evolved from town) 
Trajan ~ mid-3C 
(refounded in 72) 
Vex. of XII Fulminata 




(evolved from camp) 





(evolved from city) 






? Hadrian ~ ? 
(flourished since 40 BCE) 
Vex. of VI Ferrata 
under Hadrian?292 
Hebron 
(town or city) 
? 
(evolved from fort) 
Hadrian ~ 390s 
(rebuilt in 30s BCE) 
Coh. I Mil. Thracum 




(evolved from camp) 




Adjacent 1C ~ 7C 
(330s BCE) 





(evolved from camp) 
106 ~ 4C Ala 
in 127 
Mampsis 
(town or city) 
Within 
(evolved from camp) 
early 2C ~ early 4C Coh. I Augusta Thracum 
in early 2C 
Petra 
(city) 
Outside? early 2C ~ mid-5C 
(flourished since 1C 
BCE) 
Vex. of III Cyrenaica 
in early 2C 
Elath/Aela 
(port) 
Adjacent? early 2C ~ 390s 
(flourished since 3C 
BCE) 
Vex. of III Cyrenaica 
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(evolved from fort) 
early 1C ~ 211-7 
(332-1 BCE) 
III Cyr., XII Ful., or XXII 
Dei. in late 1C BCE296 
Pelusium 
(town or city) 
? early 3C 
(mid-8C BCE) 
? 




(evolved from fort) 
1C BCE ~ 2C? 
(flourished in early 2C) 
III Cyr., XII Ful., or XXII 
Dei. in late 1C BCE? 
Koptos 
(city) 
Outside mid-1C ~ 390s 




polis Magna (city) 
? 110s ~ 150s 
(?) 




Outside? early 1C ~ early 3C 
(before 2M BCE) 
? 




(evolved from town) 
1C ~ 3C 
(before 3M BCE) 
Coh. II Ituraeorum 








       Table 14 above shows us the locations of the units and the length of their 
occupation. The majority of the camps, contrary to the expectations of scholars, were 
adjacent to the city sites or a short distance outside them. The Roman army apparently 
tended to establish garrisons in the outer areas of cities rather than inside them where 
there was insufficient space for their camps; confiscation and demolition of inhabited 
areas to establish garrisons would have created conflict with the civilians. Despite this, 
the physical and psychological distance was close enough so that soldiers could use all 
the facilities of these cities without difficulty. 
       Establishing garrisons inside cities was more complicated, but was acceptable 
in three cases: first, when the army could already find appropriate space inside the cities; 
second, when it was necessary to fortify the cities for defence, and more army units 
gathered at an eastern frontier for imperial visits, expeditions, or to subdue revolts; third, 
when the cities had developed based on the army camps, like the western urbanisation 
model.  
       Regarding the first case, if there had been the bases of Seleucid army units 
inside the city wall, Roman army units appeared to reuse the spaces for their own camps. 
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The Romans destroyed pre-existing cities only when they felt the necessity show an 
exemplary punishment to their enemies or rebellious provincials. Grainger suggests that 
some Seleucid cities were planned by military considerations, and that the layout mostly 
continued to the Roman period.
300
 Introducing Zeugma, Cyrrhus, and Dura-Europos as 
good examples, Pollard argues that these cities had already had the bases of Seleucid 
and Parthian army units during the Hellenistic period, where Roman army units were 
stationed again.
301
 The Romans also reused Greek stadia as places for the gladiatorial 
spectacles and as training grounds for the recruits.
302
  
       The cities in the province of Mesopotamia (Rhesania, Nisibis, Singara, Hatra), 
Dura-Europos in Syria, and Jerusalem/Aelia-Capitolina in Judaea/Syria-Palaestina 
belong to the second case. The Mesopotamian cities had to be fortified with the army 
camps since these were located on the border with the Parthian empire. An auxiliary 
unit inside the city wall of Dura-Europos fortified this city, but it seems not to have 
been stationed there over a century. Jerusalem/Aelia-Capitolina became the permanent 
base of the legio X Fretensis whose stationing was a kind of punishment for the Jewish 
revolt in 66-73. Sometime after the Bar Kokhba war in 132-5, this unit was moved to 
Elath. Isaac has guessed that this legion might have been stationed on the Temple 




       A plausible hypothesis can be proposed for the process of the Roman military 
occupation of cities. The main force (legionary units) occupied the most important 
strategic positions and major cities on the frontiers, while some vexillations and 
auxiliary units were dispatched to cities and ports situated in the rear of each province. 
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The purpose of these units during wartime was primarily to secure supply lines, but 
could vary when the war was over. They maintained the supply lines, local security, and 
recruitment, and they were also sometimes sent further from existing frontiers to build 
forts to reconnoitre the enemy’s movements. On the outer areas of limes, smaller 
communities were transformed to fortresses, and the camps of small units were situated 
within in them. However, in most cases the Roman army units in the eastern provinces 
were located in garrisons outside cities.  
       It is dubious whether all of the garrison cities had been prosperous and major 
cities before the army units arrived there. Melitene, Satala, Raphanaea, Capparcotna, 
Bostra, and Babylon were cities that had developed from legionary camps. These cities 
began to appear in history with the presence of the XII Fulminata, XV Apollinaris, VI 
Ferrata, II Traiana Fortis, III Cyrenaica, and one of the three Egyptian legions (III, XII, 
XXII), respectively (see Table 14). Although some communities had probably existed in 
the area of Bostra and Babylon, they were insignificant during the Hellenistic period.
304
 
It is noticeable that the growth of these cities rapidly caught up or overtook that of 
previous major cities in that period: Sebastopolis in Cappadocia; Beroea, Antiochus, 
and Damascus in Syria; Scythopolis and Samaria in Judaea, Gerasa in Arabia, and 
Alexandria in Egypt. Procopius described the process of the urbanisation of Melitene 




There was in antiquity a certain town in Lesser Armenia, as it is called, 
not far from the Euphrates River, in which a detachment of Roman 
soldiers was posted. The town was Melitene, and the detachment was 
called a “legion”. In that place the Romans in former times had built a 
stronghold in the form of a square, on level ground, which served 
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adequately as barracks for the soldiers and provided a place where they 
could deposit their standards. Later on, by decision of the Roman emperor 
Trajan, the place received the rank of a city and became the metropolis of 
the province. And as time went on, the city of Melitene became large and 
populous. But since the people were no longer able to live inside the 
fortifications (for it was reduced to a small space, as I have said) they 
settled in the adjoining plain, and here their shrines have been erected and 
the residences of the magistrates and their marketplace, and all the other 
places for the sale of goods, and all the streets and stoas and baths and 
theatres of the city, and whatever else contributes to the embellishment of 
a great city.  
 
Many locations of legionary vexillations and auxiliary units, furthermore, seem to have 
followed the western urbanisation model, such as Phasis and Absarus in Cappadocia, 
Dura-Europos, Ana and Kifrin in Syria, Rhesaina and Hatra in Mesopotamia, Neapolis, 
Emmaus, and Hebron in Judaea, Rabbatmoba and Mampsis in Arabia. Thus, it is hard to 
believe that the contribution of the Roman army to urbanisation was insignificant in the 
eastern provinces, and that this was only a phenomenon in the West. Moreover, there is 
no evidence to show that the Hellenistic major cities were declining, gradually or 
drastically, in their economy because of the Roman rule.  
 
4.5: Conclusion 
       Under the Principate the annona militaris, angareia, and hospitium formed a 
standing part of the general logistics system to supply the Roman army. These 
requisitions per se did not mean the institutional exploitation of civilians. It is true that 
sometimes in emergency situations like military campaigns, imperial visits, or famine, 
the extraordinary levies of grain, transport and accommodation could impose a heavy 
burden on civilians. However, at least these requisitions were covered, to a large extent, 
129 
 
by the cash compensation arranged by the imperial government. The real problem was 
the abuse of requisitions committed at the individual level. As regulations and petitions 
attested, the imperial authorities did not ignore the petitions of provincials, but 
endeavoured to respond. Although these regulations were constantly re-enacted and thus 
were arguably not very effective in themselves, it was a dynamic situation where the 
constant re-enactment of regulations was a necessary process which meant that the level 
of abuses was by and large kept under control, and certainly never became such a 
chronic and severe problem as to weaken fundamentally the provincial economy.    
       The economy of the Near East constantly developed under Roman rule. The 
development of the cities was not, it seems, stunted by the military presence near or 
within them. In normal situations, the Roman army camps did not encroach on civilian 
areas, but kept a certain distance from it. They were stationed close or adjacent to the 
cities rather than within them. In some cities, where had already had appropriate space 
for the camps, or which had followed the western model of urbanisation, army units 
occupied the specific corner of them. On the individual level soldiers interacted 
frequently with civilians, and were major consumers invigorating the local economy. 
Many cities and towns developed from the settlements around the army camps and forts, 
as in the western urbanisation model. The provincial economy reached a healthy and 
sustainable position throughout the Principate, and the Roman army had a significant 




Ch. 5: Roman soldiers in imperial Greek literature 
 
5.1: Introduction 
 The bad side of Roman soldiers was a theme which recurs in provincial writers 
of the first three centuries.
306
 They describe soldiers’ corruption and their violence 
towards provincials to illustrate the bad aspects of Roman rule and to justify provincial 
discontent. Their critical accounts, if relatively few compared to the pro-Roman 
writings, have still been enough to have provided an inspiration for scholars’ post-
colonial perspectives.
307
 In the views of Rome’s subjects, Roman soldiers and their 
camps were the most obvious symbols of Roman imperialism and their subjugation. For 
the Jews in particular, after their expulsion from Jerusalem by Hadrian, the Roman 
empire appeared as the ‘evil empire’.308 
 However, despite occasional revolts by provincials, Roman rule maintained the 
pax Romana for nearly three hundred years. There is no doubt that the big stick of 
Roman military strength was an effective means of control, but it can not have been the 
sufficient condition of that prolonged rule. In the Hellenised East, the pro-Roman stance 
of the local elites was evident, and their co-operation with Roman officials was an 
important factor in maintaining the peace and stability of the provinces.
309
 The 
interaction between soldiers and civilians in the East also seems usually to have been 
one of acceptance rather than of hostility.
310
 Thus the negative aspects of Roman rule 
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and Rome’s soldiers must not be exaggerated, and the positive roles of soldiers must 
also be considered in discussing Roman imperialism. The aim of this chapter is to re-
investigate the image of soldiers revealed in imperial Greek literature, including some 
Latin literature set in the Greek East, and to re-assess nature of that image.  
 
5.2: Roman rule and military force from the views of the Greek elite 
 5.2.1: General attitudes to Roman imperialism 
 Roman imperialism in the East was established in three phases. The first step 
was territorial expansion by means of military force during the second and first 
centuries BCE. The second stage was social integration by the process of cultural 
assimilation during the first two centuries CE. The dominant culture of the East was 
Hellenic, and the Roman rulers promoted Hellenisation rather than Romanisation. 
However, Roman citizenship gradually spread through grants to members of the elite 
who had dealings with emperors and by recruitment to the armed forces. The final phase 
began with the Constitutio Antoniniana issued by emperor Caracalla in 212. This edict 
made all free men of the provinces Roman citizens. 
 When the Romans undertook imperial expansion into the Greek world in the 
second century BCE, the rapid growth of Rome had a huge impact on Greek elites. 
Polybius, a noble Greek forcibly moved to Rome as a hostage after the Third 
Macedonian War, wrote a history of Rome to explain to his fellow Greeks how Rome 
had conquered and brought the whole inhabited world under its dominion within the 
short span of fifty-three years.
311
 In his opinion the Romans could overthrow the 
Carthaginians and subjugate the Greeks because of their superior military force which 
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was based on their sound constitution. In the sixth volume of his Roman history, 
Polybius described the details of Roman military organisation, tactics and discipline.
312
 
 In this period the Greeks considered Roman soldiers as a terrible war machine. 
Describing the capture and sack of Syracuse (212 BCE), Polybius criticised the 
plundering of works of art by Roman soldiers. It was not what he expected, because the 
Romans were supposed to be entirely indifferent to the arts: “while leading the simplest 
of lives, very far removed from all such superfluous magnificence, they were constantly 
victorious over those who possessed the greatest number and finest examples of such 
works”. He denounces the soldiers for acting so as “to abandon the habits of the victors 
and to imitate those of the conquered” through their plunder of Syracuse.313 Plutarch’s 





The Romans were considered by foreign peoples to be skilful in carrying 
on war and formidable fighters; but of gentleness and humanity and, in a 
word, of civil virtues, they had given no proofs, and at this time Marcellus 
seems to have been the first to show the Greeks that the Romans were the 
more observant of justice. For such was his treatment of those who had to 
do with him, and so many were the benefits which he conferred both upon 
cities and private persons, that, if the people of Enna or Megara or 
Syracuse met with any indignities, the blame for these was thought to 
belong to the sufferers rather than to the perpetrators. 
 
 The destruction of Carthage and then of Corinth (146 BCE), when the Greeks 
came under Roman rule, were also used by Polybius to depict the violent aspects of 
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Roman soldiers. Although Polybius’ account of the sack of Corinth does not survive, 




Polybius, who speaks in a tone of pity of the events connected with the 
capture of Corinth, goes on to speak of the disregard shown by the army 
for the works of art and votive offerings; for he says that he was present 
and saw paintings that had been flung to the ground and saw the soldiers 
playing dice on these. 
 
 When Rome transformed its political constitution from the Republic to the 
Principate, the Greeks had to recognise themselves as provincials within the framework 
of the empire, required to conform to the permanent rule of Rome over them. Now 
Roman troops, transformed into a standing army, were garrisoned along the boundaries 
of the empire, and their controlling power over all the provinces was very obvious. The 
Greeks needed an explanation for their subjugation to the Romans, whom they had 
considered a kind of barbaroi. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, a Greek historian writing 
under Augustus, emphasised the Greek origin of Rome in the first book of his Roman 
Antiquities. He argued that those who had denigrated Rome as the refuge of barbarians 
must acknowledge it as another Greek city, and praised the Romans for preserving more 
vestiges of their Greek origins than other Greek colonists.
316
  
 Some nations’ situations were different from that of the Greeks. Josephus, who 
had been a Jewish commander against Rome in the First Jewish War, gave advice to his 
compatriots through a speech he put into the mouth of Agrippa II. This Jewish king 
advised the Jews, assembled to accuse a Roman governor, Gessius Florus, to remain 
calm and to bow to the Roman authority. His argument is based on this: all nations and 
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tribes, even the Greeks, “who were esteemed the noblest of all people under the sun”, 
are subordinate to Roman rule, and, more surprisingly, they are all controlled by only 
about twenty legions and a few auxiliaries.
317
 This was a warning not to despise the 
size of the Roman army, and, in fact, there were twenty-eight legions in the Neronian 
period. 
 
 5.2.2: Greek views of the imperial army 
 Under the Principate, Greek writers were less concerned to analyse Roman 
military power, and instead focused on political ways to develop their status by means 
of close relationships with the philhellene emperors and aristocrats of Rome. In the 
reign of Trajan, Plutarch advised in his Precepts of Statecraft a noble Greek named 
Menemachus about the practical attitude needed for a successful political career. He 
suggests that now Greek elites should forget about military aspirations, but need to 
concentrate on rhetoric: “You should arrange your cloak more carefully and from the 
office of the generals keep your eyes upon the orators’ platform, and not have great 
pride or confidence in you crown, since you see the boots of Roman soldiers just above 
your head”.318 He also stresses the importance of maintaining close relationships with 
leading Romans: “not only the statesman should show himself and his native state 
blameless towards our rulers, but he should also have always a friend among the men of 
high station who have the greatest power as a firm bulwark, so to speak, of his 
administration; for the Romans themselves are most eager to promote the political 
interests of their friends”.319    
 Dio Chrysostom of Prusa, a contemporary of Plutarch, advised the 
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Accordingly to you as his children has he given as guardians and guides 
those who are more prudent than you Alexandrians, and by their 
companionship, not only at the theatre but elsewhere too, your conduct is 
improved.  
 
By ‘guardians’ (παιδαγωγοί), Dio means Roman soldiers, who have been sent from god. 
The Alexandrians had lost their civic independence due to their own troubles with their 
kings, and therefore should obey the Romans, “such reasonable men as governors”.321 
Despite Plutarch’s reference to ‘the boots of Roman soldiers’, the Greek elite’s portrayal 
of Roman soldiers seems to have been changing in the first century from a dreaded war 
machine to guardians. 
 Appian of Alexandria, writing in the mid-second century CE, illustrates the 




From the advent of the emperors to the present time is nearly two hundred 
years more, in the course of which the city has been greatly embellished, 
its revenue much increased, and in the long reign of peace and security 
everything has moved toward a lasting prosperity. Some nations have been 
added to the empire by these emperors, and the revolts of others have been 
suppressed. Possessing the best part of the earth and sea they have, on the 
whole, aimed to preserve their empire by the exercise of prudence, rather 
than to extend their sway indefinitely over poverty-stricken and profitless 
tribes of barbarians, some of whom I have seen at Rome offering 
themselves, by their ambassadors, as its subjects, but the chief of the state 
would not accept them because they would be of no use to it. They give 
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kings to a great many other nations whom they do not wish to have under 
their own government. On some of these subject nations they spend more 
than they receive from them, deeming it dishonourable to give them up 
even though they are costly. They surround the empire with great armies 
and they garrison the whole stretch of land and sea like a single stronghold. 
 
Two interesting ideas appear in this paragraph. First, Appian distinguishes the Roman 
world from the outside where poor and worthless barbarians live. This idea of ‘us and 
them’ signifies that some Greeks have already appreciated themselves as a part of the 
empire, differentiated from those outside it. Second, he describes the empire as if it 
were a fort surrounded with the Roman troops who are stationed on the walls. The 
Roman army is imagined as the institution which gives coherence and its superior 
prosperity to the empire.  
 Slightly later in the second century, Aelius Aristides mentions the armies in the 
same tone in his Regarding Rome: “Thus the cities can be clear of garrisons. Mere 
detachments of horse and foot suffice for the protection of whole countries, and even 
these are not concentrated in the cities with billets in every household, but are dispersed 
throughout the rural area within bounds and orbits of their own. Hence many nations do 
not know where at any time their guardians are”.323 It is clear that he rhetorically 
understated the military presence to highlight the prevalence of peace under Roman rule; 
he even says that now most men hear of wars like “myths”.324 Again, the loyalist view 
stresses the benefits and the low impact of Rome’s military forces.  
 These authors’ perspectives on the empire and its army were hardly different 
from those of a leading Roman, Tacitus. In Tacitus’ Histories Petilius Cerialis, when he 
prepares to deal with the revolt of Civilis, orders the Gallic levies to return to their home 
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towns: “the legions suffice to defend the empire, and the allies might return to the duties 
of peace, secure in the thought that a war which Roman arms had undertaken was 
finished”.325 This curt instruction shows the Romans’ pride that the Roman army 
assures the peaceful life of provincials. In a speech Tacitus puts in the mouth of Petilius 
Cerialis to deter the Gauls from joining Civilis’ revolt, he says:326 
 
We, though so often provoked, have used the right of conquest to burden 
you only with the cost of maintaining peace. For the tranquillity of nations 
can not be preserved without armies; armies can not exist without pay; 
pay can not be furnished without tribute; all else is common between us. 
You often command our legions. You rule these and other provinces. 
There is no privilege, no exclusion. 
 
The message is that the high level of peace and prosperity enjoyed by Rome’s subjects 
is due to the protection of its army, and that there is no discrimination between the 
Romans and provincials in commanding Rome’s forces. The empire they protect 
together is unified against outsiders. 
 
5.3: Roman soldiers in novels: villains or protectors? 
 We have little direct evidence for what ordinary subjects thought about Roman 
soldiers. One indirect indication may be episodes involving Roman soldiers in ancient 
novels. In this section, I will investigate the image of Roman soldiers in Petronius’ 
Satyrica (mid-first century), Achilles Tatius’ Leucippe and Clitophon (early second), 
and Apuleius’ Metamorphoses (late second). Despite the origin and social status of 
Petronius and Apuleius (a Roman senator and a North African notable), their novels are 
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both set in a Greek milieu, of which they may have had some personal knowledge, and 
they were much closer to ordinary experience in the Roman world than we are. Of 
course, these novels are fiction, but we can assume that the backgrounds and character 
types reflect the realities of the Roman world. I will discuss the negative views of 
soldiers in these stories, but also the positive aspects of their portrayal. 
 
 5.3.1: Petronius’ Satyrica 
 This ‘novel’ written by Petronius, a Roman senator and, until his enforced 
suicide, a friend of Nero, portrays the fictional adventures of a man named Encolpius. 
He was a fugitive gladiator as he confessed: “I fled from justice, I cheated the ring, I 
killed my host, and with all these badges of courage I am left forsaken in lodgings in a 
Greek town, a beggar and an exile”.327 Although his ethnic origin is not specified by 
the author, we can suppose from his Greek name that he was meant to be a Greek or at 
least a Hellenised. He was in a love triangle with the other two characters who also have 
Greek names, Ascyltos and Giton. He is presented as having had a Greek rhetorical 
education because he supports the Attic style and denigrates the Asiatic style which 
prevailed at that time.
328
  
 The background to the extant parts of the Satyrica is mostly two cities of Italy, 
Puteoli and Croton, which both belonged to the area of Magna Graecia. Most characters 
whom Encolpius encountered through his travels seem to have Greek origins: 
Agamemnon, Trimalchio, Seleucos, Phileros, Ganymede and Eumolpus. Eumolpus was 
probably from Asia because his personal anecdotes concern the inhabitants and Greek 
culture of Pergamum and Ephesus. All of the events experienced by the main characters 
are set in Greek societies under Roman rule. Thus Petronius, although he was a member 
                                                     
327
 Petronius, Satyrica 81. 
328
 Petronius, Satyrica 2.  
139 
 
of the ruling class of Rome, tried to recreate, or parody, Greek societies in Italy.  
 Roman soldiers appear twice in this novel. First, Encolpius is disarmed and his 





With these words I put on my sword, and recruited my strength with a 
square meal to prevent my losing the battle through weakness. I rushed 
out of doors at once, and went round all the arcades like a madman. My 
face was as of one dumbfoundered with fury, I thought of nothing but 
blood and slaughter, and kept putting my hand to the sword-hilt which I 
had consecrated to the work. Then a soldier, who may have been a 
swindler or a footpad, noticed me, and said, “Hullo, comrade, what 
regiment and company do you belong to?” I lied stoutly about my captain 
and my regiment, and he said, “Well, do soldiers in your force walk about 
in white shoes?” My expression and my trembling showed that I had lied, 
and he ordered me to hand over my arms and look out for myself. So I 
was not only robbed, but my revenge was nipped in the bud. I went back 
to the inn, and by degrees my courage cooled, and I began to bless the 
footpad’s effrontery. 
 
At first sight, Encolpius seems to have been prevented from his rightful revenge by the 
soldier’s coercive order to disarm. However, the soldier’s viewpoint would provide an 
alternative interpretation. The Romans permitted civilians to possess arms for self-
defence or hunting in the countryside, and attempted to disarm them only when they 
first conquered people or when they feared revolt.
330
 The production of armour and 
weapons for Roman forces was even contracted out to provincial craftsmen, despite the 
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risk that rebellious locals could use these supplies to arm themselves.
331
 Noticing 
Encolpius’ sword, the soldier asks him about his centuria and legio in the usual way 
soldiers identify their comrades. When he realises Encolpius is lying, he takes the sword 
from him. By preventing the violence, Encolpius seems likely to commit, the soldier 
preserves public order.  
 There are two interesting points in this story. It indicates that soldiers in civic 
society often did not wear their uniforms. Thus Encolpius can pretend to suspect that the 
man was not a real soldier, but a swindler or a footpad, while he himself might have 
been a soldier. Soldiers could only be identified by checking their details. The more 
important point is Encolpius’ self-reflection at the end of this story. When his anger 
calms, Encolpius begins to give thanks for the soldier’s treatment. He himself admits 
that his intention had to be deterred by someone before it turned into a real crime. The 
implication seems to be that, although subjects can denounce soldiers and their 
unreasonable demands, they also must acknowledge that Roman soldiers play a positive 
role in maintaining public peace and order. 
 The second soldier appears in a love story told by Eumolpus concerning a 
provincial widow and a soldier in Ephesus.
332
 This story is also well known through 
Christopher Fry’s comedy, A Phoenix Too Frequent. The scene of their romance is a 
vault where the widow had recently buried her dead husband. When this poor lady was 
intentionally starving herself to death beside his coffin, she was relieved from the 
sadness by a soldier who was guarding crucified criminals near the vault. He persuaded 
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her to live: “Your poor dead husband’s body here ought to persuade you to keep alive”. 
They came to love each other, and, when the body of one of the crucified men was taken 
down while the soldier was distracted with the widow, she even lent her husband’s 
corpse for the soldier to replace the missing criminal. She said: “Heaven forbid that I 
should look at the same moment on the dead bodies of two men whom I love. No, I 
would rather make a dead man useful, than send a live man to death”. This love affair 
reflects the common problem of an army which did not allow serving soldiers to marry 
and therefore drove them into relations with local women.
333
 Petronius’ fictional 
audience to the telling of this story is mostly appreciative, though one listener reacts 
critically to the widow’s behaviour.334 This reaction, however, does not represent 
provincial hostility towards Roman soldiers, because the criticism is aimed solely at the 
immoral behaviour of the widow, and it is noteworthy that there is no criticism in the 
story of the soldier or the soldier’s relationship with the widow. 
 Thus the two Roman soldiers depicted in the Satyrica depart from the usual 
negative image: one is a protector of public order who prevents a murder caused by 
passion, and the other is a decent man whose flirtation with a provincial woman 
develops into true love. These images were probably what the Romans wanted to be 
seen by provincials 
 
 5.3.2: Apuleius’ Metamorphoses (Golden Ass) 
 Apuleius’ Metamorphoses, the only Latin novel to survive in its entirety, 
provides much information about Roman society and soldiers. While at Hypata in 
Thessaly, the main character, Lucius of Madaurus, is transformed into an ass due to his 
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excessive curiosity about magic, and is subsequently dragged around several regions of 
the Greek world by a succession of owners. During his travels he encounters various 
people from the lower classes of provincial society, including bandits and soldiers. The 
author’s description of Roman soldiers and Greek society offers an imagined insight 
into the relationships between soldiers and civilians, mostly provincials, in the eastern 
provinces in the Antonine period, which may give us some pointers to reality.
335
 
 Through the voice of Photis, Lucius’ lover, Apuleius mentions the police 




“Now take care,” she said, “and come back early from supper, because an 
insane gang of young aristocrats has been disturbing the public peace. You 
will see people lying murdered everywhere right out in the street, and the 
governor’s troops are too far away to relieve the town of all this slaughter. 
Envy of your fine fortune, as well as contempt for you as a foreign visitor, 
could cause you to be ambushed.” 
 
Note that Photis imagines that only the presence of Roman troops would solve this 
problem. Provincial cities and towns had their own public police and commanders 
(παραφύλακιται and εἰρηνάρχαι), who were recruited from the locals. 337  The 
εἰρηνάρχης, a civic post or liturgy filled from local elites, had two or three subordinates 
called διωγμίται, and seems to have been involved in “targeted arrests and judicial 
process”, while the παραφύλακιται performed “routine patrols of outlying areas”.338 
The municipal policing system, however, appears to have had its limitation. Fuhrmann 
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points out some impediments to public order: conflict (stasis) between rich and poor, 
lack of riot police, inter-city competition, vicissitudes of budgetary and liturgical 
constraints in maintaining the police, and the ineffectiveness of policing due to the lack 
of co-ordinated action between neighbouring forces. He concludes that “these 
limitations of local policing may constitute one explanation for emperor’s and 
governors’ involvement in public order and the concomitant growth of military 
policing”.339 A municipal policing system was operating in provincial cities and towns, 
but it was not strong enough to solve problems of public order or to eradicate bandits.
340
 
The εἰρηνάρχαι, who came from the local aristocracy, were also unwilling to take 
effective action to control their peers, and shared the common bias against foreigners.  
 This is illustrated by Lucius’ experiences. Returning later from the dinner to the 
house of his host, Milo, Lucius finds a gang of robbers, in fact young aristocrats, trying 
to break into the house. After a fierce fight, Lucius kills them all.
341
 As a result, he is 





“But by the Providence of the gods, which never allows the guilty to go 
unpunished, before he could slip away by some secret route I was ready 
early in the morning, and I saw to it that he was brought before the 
awesome jurisdiction of your court. So you have before you a defendant 
defiled by manifold murders, a defendant caught in the act, a defendant 
who is a stranger. Be firm and pass sentence on a foreigner for a crime 
which you would severely punish even in the case of one of your fellow-
citizens.” 
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The atmosphere of this court is described as a confrontation between Lucius and the 
others: the local magistrate, the εἰρηνάρχης, their fellows and even the gang of young 
local aristocrats. The local police could not be relied on to deal with problems caused by 
the local elite. In the view of a civilian, like Photis, Roman soldiers could seem to be 
more trustworthy than the local police.
343
  
 When Lucius is turned into an ass, he is dragged off by the bandits who had 
assailed Milo’s house. In her thesis, Hidalgo de la Vega concludes that these bandits in 
the Metamorphoses are implied to be deserters and ex-soldiers because of Apuleius’ 
description of their tactics, equipment, method of recruitment, and worship of Mars.
344
 
Largely inspired by this study, Garraffoni has argued that Apuleius intended to remind 
the Roman elite, his main readers, of the ideal virtus of soldiers through the gallant 
spirit of the robbers depicted in his novel.
345
 Garraffoni’s suggestion, however, is based 
on limited consideration of the linguistic evidence. Apuleius often uses military terms in 
describing not only the robbers, but also others; for example he describes Lucius having 




“Fight,” she said, “and fight fiercely, since I will not give way and I will 
not turn my back. Close in and make a frontal assault, if you are a real 
man. Attack zealously and slay, as you are about to die. Today’s battle 
admits no quarter.” 
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Apuleius frequently uses military titles such as dux, signifer, antesignanus and 
commilito, when he portrays fights.
347
 This implies, first, that Apuleius expected his 
readers to be familiar with the military vocabulary, even in an era of relative peace. It 
also implies that the military actions were topics of public entertainment, especially 
linked with sex and adventure (as in films today). So military allusions could have been 
what Apuleius’ readers wanted.  
 In fact Apuleius tells us nothing about the origin of his fictional bandits, except 
that they have local links, but he does make them glamorise their robbery as if it was a 
successful military operation.
348
 They glorify their robberies by comparing themselves 
to military heroes in history, and dedicate the glory of their success to Mars to whom 
they swore the oath of loyalty. Their links with the local civilian society are revealed 
when we are told that they share their booty with some villagers, presumably as the 
reward for providing supplies or intelligence.
349
 However, in the viewpoint of Lucius-
turned-ass these bandits are not comrades of Robin Hood, but just robbers who must be 
brought to justice, as they eventually are. When they recruit a famous Thracian bandit, 
Haemus (actually he is Tlepolemus who has disguised himself to save his wife), he 
introduces himself as the sole survivor of his great band which had been destroyed by 
the emperor’s army. 350  Apuleius again implies that Roman soldiers are the only 
effective protectors of public order in provincial society.  
 The last story associated with soldiers is in the ninth book of Metamorphoses. 
This story is about a gardener, who acquired Lucius-turned-ass, but soon gets into 
                                                     
347
 As revealed by an electronic search on Perseus (www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/(06/07/2014)). 
348
 Apuleius, Metamorphoses 4.8-22; 7.5-9. 
349
 Apuleius, Metamorphoses 4.1. 
350
 Apuleius, Metamorphoses 7.7. This invented story seems to be based on an actual action of Roman 
soldiers under the order of Marcus Aurelius. AE 1956 124; Millar 1981a: 67. 
146 
 




On the road we encountered a tall man whose dress and manners marked 
him as a legionary. He inquired in a haughty and arrogant tone where my 
master was taking his empty ass. But my master, who was still confused 
with grief and furthermore did not know Latin, walked right past him 
without a word. The soldiers, unable to restrain his natural insolence, took 
offence at the gardener’s silence as if it were an insult and struck him with 
the vine-staff he was carrying, knocking him off my back. The gardener 
then humbly answered that he could not understand what the soldier said 
because he did not know the language. So the soldier responded in Greek. 
“Where,” he asked, “are you taking that ass of yours?” The gardener 
replied that he was heading for the next city. “Well, I need his services,” 
said the other. “He must carry our commanding officer’s baggage from the 
nearby fort with all the other pack-animals.” 
 
This story, along with Epictetus’ advice in his Discourses, is generally used to illustrate 
the overbearing and violent attitude of soldiers towards provincials and the consequent 
hostility of provincials towards soldiers.
352
 Apuleius portrays the soldier as naturally 
aggressive and violent, and it is true that requisitions by soldiers from provincials were 
often seen as oppressive, and were the cause of several extant petitions from 
communities to the Roman authorities.
353
 However, requisitions of transport or supplies, 
which could be made by civilian officials as well as by soldiers, were general and were 
legally sanctioned in a tradition which went back to the Achaemenid system of 
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 Sometimes local magistrates and leaders too illegally abused the system of 
requisitions, which required constant strict regulation by governors and the emperor.
355
 
 The soldier’s attitude is peremptory, but the gardener at first ignores him and 
then brings his fate on himself by resisting. The situation becomes serious, when the 
gardener knocks the soldier down and then escapes with the donkey. What makes it 
even worse is that he runs away with this soldier’s sword, and therefore, “beside his 
personal disgrace, the loss of his sword made him (the soldier) fear the protecting deity 
of his military oath”.356 The soldier and his comrades quickly find the gardener where 
he was hiding, and execute him. For Roman soldiers, the opposition of provincials was 
a predictable reaction to collecting essential materials from them, but having weapons 
stolen by them was more serious. Thus the gardener’s small revolt had to be quelled to 
make good the soldier’s shameful disgrace.357 
 The episodes in Apuleius’ novel are not records of facts, but they are still useful 
reflections of various social aspects. There were unstable factors threatening peaceful 
civilian life in the provincial society: gangs of corrupt local aristocrats, bandits and 
rebels. Apart from their external military function, Roman soldiers acted as public 
police in the cities and the countryside. They were the only force which in practice 
might be relied upon to solve these problems.    
 
 5.3.3: Achilles Tatius’ Leucippe and Clitophon and other Greek novels 
 Greek novels allow us to approach the reality of provincial Greek society more 
directly than the writings of the Latin authors. Five imperial Greek novels are preserved 
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in their entirety: Chariton’s Callirhoe, Achilles Tatius’ Leucippe and Clitophon, Longus’ 
Daphnis and Chloe, Xenophon of Ephesus’ Ephesian Tale, and Heliodoros’ 
Aithiopika.
358
 These novels follow a typical pattern of the plot: two beautiful youths fall 
in love with each other at first sight; soon separated, they experience enforced travels 
and sufferings; finally they meet each other by chance and confirm their love. All the 
heroes and heroines suffer from bandits, who are presented as if they were endemic in 
the Greek East. The point of interest to us is: who saves them? 
 Roman soldiers rarely appear in Greek novels. Among the five Greek novels, 
only in Leucippe and Clitophon we do find some episodes involving soldiers. During 
their journey from Pelusium to Alexandria, Leucippe and Clitophon were captured by 
brigands called ‘herdsmen’ (βουκόλοι) in the delta of the Nile. While the main 
characters of other novels are providentially extricated from their troubles with brigands, 
Clitophon is saved by Roman soldiers.
359
   
 
We had progressed about a quarter of a mile from the village, when there 
came to our ears loud shouting and the sound of trumpets, and a regiment 
of soldiers appeared, all heavily armed. When the robbers saw them, they 
placed us in the middle of their band and waited for their advance, with 
the intention of resisting them. Soon they came on, about fifty in number, 
some with long shields and some with small targets; the robbers, who 
were far their superior in numbers, picked up clods from the ground and 
began hurling them at the soldiers … Then the heavy-armed soldiers came 
in a flood; the battle was severe, with plenty of blows, wounds, and 
slaughter on both side: the experience of the soldiers compensated for 
their inferiority in numbers. We prisoners, seeing that one flank of the 
robbers was weakening, made a concerted rush, broke through their line, 
and ran to join the enemy; they at first did not realise the position, and 
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were ready to slay us, but when they saw that we were unarmed and 
bound, they suspected the truth, received us within the protection of their 
lines, and sent us to the rear and allowed us to remain there quietly. 
Meanwhile a large body of horse charged up; on their approach they 
spread out their wings and completely surrounded the robbers, and thus 
herding them together into a narrow space began to butcher them. Some 
were lying killed, some, half-dead, went on fighting; the rest they took 
alive. 
 
The emergency is not over yet. The main forces of the herdsmen still hold Leucippe as 
their hostage (she is luckily soon rescued by Clitophon), and they even annihilate the 
Roman troops in a battle. However, they are finally wiped out by a greater force 
dispatched from Alexandria, which emancipates the Delta from the threat of the 
herdsmen, and thus allows Leucippe and Clitophon to sail to Alexandria.
360
  
 This story brings to mind the revolt of the Βουκόλοι in 170s in the Delta of 
Egypt attested in historical accounts and the papyri. When the local forces failed to 
suppress their rebellion, the emperor Marcus Aurelius had to send Avidius Cassius, the 
governor of Syria, to subdue the revolt.
361
 However, we are faced with a problem of 
chronology, because Achilles Tatius’ novel is generally thought to have been written in 
the earlier second century, which is the period to which the earliest papyrus fragments 
of the text have been dated.
362
 Alston argues that the revolt of the Βουκόλοι in Leuccipe 
and Clitophon represents a story of unknown origins characterising the unruly 
pastoralists of the northern Delta, which was recycled again for accounts of the revolt in 
the 170s.
363
 He suggests that in the 170s they were protesting against the agricultural 
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exploitation by the Romans in the Delta area.
364
 However, while some elements in the 
story and the ‘history’ may be conventional, it is easier to believe that there had been 
similar revolts before the major outbreak of the 170s, perhaps a chronic pattern of low-
intensity disturbances, and thus that story of the novel is based on a known reality of 
Roman troops acting, with varying success, to control the Delta pastoralists. In any case, 
the novel presents the security role of Roman soldiers as desirable to control the 
herdsmen. 
 Xenophon of Ephesus’ Ephesian Tale is also worthy of notice, although there is 
no mention of Roman soldiers. The heroine and hero of this novel are Anthia and 
Habrokomes, who are of course beautiful enough to attract people’s attention, and get 
married to each other. They are captured by pirates on the way from Rhodes to Egypt, 
and Anthia is soon given to a goatherd because the daughter of the captain loves 
Habrokomes. The goatherd feels pity for her and decides to escape with her. However, 
their ship sank in a storm, and Anthia, one of the few survivors, becomes the captive of 
a bandit, Hippothous, by whom she is in danger of being sacrificed in Cilicia.
365
   
 
The bandit Hippothous’ gang spent that night partying, and the next day 
they got busy with their sacrifice. When everything was prepared - images 
of Ares, firewood, and garlands - the sacrifice was to be carried out in 
their usual manner: they hung the victim that was going to be sacrificed, 
whether human or animal, from a tree, stood at a distance, and tried to hit 
it with javelins, and the god was considered to accept the sacrifice of all 
who scored a hit, while those who missed tried to appease him a second 
time. It was Anthia who was to serve as this kind of sacrificial victim. 
When all was ready and they were about to hang her up, they heard 
rustling in the woods and a din of men. It was the head officer of the peace 
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in Cilicia, whose name was Perilaus, one of the most powerful men in 
Cilicia. This Perilaus attacked the bandits with a large force and killed 
them all, except for a few that he captured alive. 
 
In this story the saviour of Anthia is Perilaus, “the head officer of the peace in Cilicia” 
(ὁ τῆς εἰρήνης τῆς ἐν Κιλικίᾳ προεστώς). As has been explained above, the εἰρηνάρχαι 
were local magistrates in the provinces of Asia Minor, who had been recruited from the 
local elite. An interesting point is that, while Apuleius describes local police as 
untrustworthy protectors of civil life, Xenophon portrays the εἰρηνάρχαι forming as a 
credible policing force as Roman soldiers. Here we can see the gap between the 
provincial perspective on the municipal polices and that of the Romans. In other words, 
rather than big and infrequent actions of the army of governor or emperor, sometimes 
small and frequent actions of the εἰρηνάρχαι could be more helpful to provincials. Local 
policing was perhaps effective, if well run, against low-scale banditry or other outsiders, 
but was pretty hopeless against local upper class criminality.  
   
5.4: The contribution of soldiers to imperial integration 
 5.4.1: The Roman military system in Aelius Aristides’ Regarding Rome 
 The perspective of Aelius Aristides on the Roman military system is important 
since his comments go beyond those of previous extant authors, who had limited their 
discussion of the roles of the Roman armed forces to the deterrence of external enemies 
and the policing of internal discord. He is the first extant rhetorician who focuses on 
Romanisation by means of military service and talks of harmony between army and 
provincials.  
 Aelius Aristides wrote his Regarding Rome as a panegyric to be delivered in the 
presence of Antoninus Pius. Apart from the introduction and the conclusion, the eulogy 
152 
 
consists of six sections: the power of the Roman empire; comparison with other empires; 
comparison with ancient Greek poleis; the Roman military system; their form of 
government; prosperity under Roman rule. He prefaces the Roman military system with 
his admiration for it (72). He discusses the process of recruitment and of gaining 
citizenship (73-8). Then he turns to the walls, as if he was aware of the Antonine Wall, 
and praises the combination of the walls and garrisons (79-84). Lastly, he explains the 
superiority of Roman training, formation and tactics (85-9). We need to focus on his 
description of becoming Roman through military service. First of all, he points out that 
everyone has an “equal right” to serve in the army. The Romans, when they need to 
recruit replacements in moments of crisis, “count no one an alien when they accept him 
for any employment where he can do well and is then needed”.366 On this premise, he 




Who then have been assembled and how? Going over the entire league, 
you looked about carefully for those who would perform this liturgy, and 
when you found them, you released them from the fatherland and gave 
them your own city, so that they became reluctant henceforth to call 
themselves by their original ethnics. Having made them fellow-citizens, 
you made them also soldiers, so that the men from this city would not be 
subject to the levy, and those performing military service would none the 
less be citizens, who together with their enrolment in the army had lost 
their own cities but from that very day had become your fellow-citizens 
and defenders.  
 
He explains that provincials become Roman citizens on the very day when they are 
recruited, and that conscription is not needed because of the great rewards. This 
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explanation is patently an exaggeration, because provincials recruited into auxiliary 
units gained Roman citizenship only after they had completed their military service, and 
maybe the same was true for provincial recruits to legions. However, from recruitment 
they had a Roman name, and were probably under Roman law, which means that they 
could enjoy equal rights as Roman soldiers with the citizen recruits.
368
 
 Aelius Aristides goes on to consider possible complaints caused by the burden 
of the draft on provincials:
369
  
   
Under your hegemony this is the contribution which all make to the armed 
forces, and no city is disaffected. You asked from each only as many as 
would cause no inconvenience to the givers and would not be possible by 
themselves to provide the individual city with sufficient quota of an army 
of its own. Therefore all cities are well pleased with the dispatch of these 
men to be their own representatives in the union army, while locally each 
city has no militia of its own men whatsoever, and for military protection 
they look nowhere but to you, because it is for this sole purpose that those 
who went out from the cities have been marshalled in good order. 
 
He claims that Roman recruitment is reasonable and accepted, because it takes fewer 
men than would be needed for each city to maintain its own army. More striking is his 
claim that provincials view these recruited provincials as their representatives who, 
becoming Roman soldiers, will protect all communities.
370
 Although we do not know 
whether this was his own idea or a view common among contemporary Greek elites, it 
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 5.4.2: Arrian: a Greek general in the Roman army 
 Lucius Flavius Arrianus was a Roman senator who had been born in Nicomedia 
of Bithynia about 89 CE, and had studied under Epictetus at Nicopolis in Epirus. He 
apparently found favour with the emperor Hadrian through his relationship with Avidius 
Nigrinus who was a close friend of Hadrian. This philhellenic emperor brought a 
considerable number of Greeks into the senate, and liked to be in the company with 
educated Greeks. Arrian’s career is best known for his governorship of Cappadocia from 
131 to 137, and the expedition that he led and recorded against the Alans during his 
governorship.
372
 Most Greeks who entered the senate did not become governors of 
military provinces, whereas Cappadocia had two legions, the XII Fulminata and XV 
Apollinaris, and more than a dozen auxiliary units. With these units, as a governor, he 
launched a campaign against the Alans who had invaded Roman territory. 
 Array against the Alans is supposed to be a book about military tactics, but it is 
mostly lost except the chapter about the planned deployment of the Roman units. 
Although it is very short and on a limited topic, we can recover Arrian’s self-image. He 
calls himself Xenophon instead of using his own name, and his units phalanxes instead 
of legions, and his enemy the Scythians instead of the Alans.
373
 It seems that his 
counter-offensive in Cappadocia provided him with an imagined link to the successful 
retreat of Xenophon and the Ten Thousand men in the neighbouring areas. Some Roman 
generals in the Republic and some Roman emperors had also aspired to become like 
Alexander the Great when they planned expeditions against the Parthian empire. In 
sympathy with this ideology, Arrian as a Roman general led Roman armies. Maintaining 
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In any case, the fort itself, in which 400 select troops are quartered, 
seemed to me, owing to the nature of its site, to be very secure, and to lie 
in the most convenient spot for the safety of those who sail this way. In 
addition, a double ditch has been put round the wall, each ditch as broad 
as the other. The wall used to be of earth, and wooden towers were set up 
above it; now both it and the towers are made of baked brick. And its 
foundations are firm, and war engines are installed - and in short, it is 
fully equipped to prevent any of the barbarians from even approaching it, 
let alone to protect the garrison there against the danger of a siege. But 
since the mooring-place for the ships must also be secure, as well as the 
whole area outside the fort settled by veterans of the army, various 
merchants and others, I decided to construct another ditch from the double 
ditch that surrounds the wall as far as the river, which would enclose both 
the harbour and the houses outside the walls. 
 
About a generation later, around 163 CE, Polyaenus wrote his Stratagems in War, which 
he dedicated to Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus when they started a war against the 
Parthians. This Macedonian author emphasises in his preface the victorious Macedonian 
spirit against the Persians, based on the history of Alexander the Great and his 
Macedonian army, but regrets that he can not himself participate due to his old age.
375
 
This feeling of guilt made him dedicate his stratagems to offset his absence. While 
Arrian contributed to the imperial defence as a Roman general, Polyaenus contributed to 
it as a military advisor.  
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 In the mid-second century BCE, Greek elites had been shocked and scared by 
the rapid growth of Roman influence over the Mediterranean region. Roman soldiers 
were the first Romans most Greeks saw. Thus, the image of the Romans was close to 
that of barbarians. However, as the empire entered a period of political stability, Greek 
elites began to appreciate being part of it, and tried to distinguish conceptually the 
Roman world from the outside. On the border line between the empire and the barbarian 
world Roman garrisons were stationed, which were considered its “guardians”. Roman 
troops, surrounding the empire, protected provincials against external enemies and 
assured their peaceful life.  
 Roman soldiers in the novels of the first two centuries were no longer the 
terrible war machine of the Republic. The portrayals of them admit their beneficial role. 
People believed them to be, on the whole, the only trustworthy police force. 
Furthermore, in the Hadrianic-Antonine period a Greek orator focused on the beneficial 
function of the Roman military system through the process of recruitment, and argued 
that the recruited provincials, as Roman citizens and soldiers, contribute to the imperial 
defence without any discrimination. A noble Greek and a Macedonian author 
endeavoured to play the roles of Roman general and military advisor respectively. 
People in the Greek East, were willing to contribute to the military defence of the 
Roman empire as officers, soldiers and advisers. In the mid-second century CE, the 
image of Roman soldiers were no longer that of oppressors; indeed the image of Roman 








Meanwhile Phraates, fearing that Augustus would lead an expedition 
against him because he had not yet performed any of his engagements, 
sent back to him the standards and all the captives, with the exception of a 
few who in shame had destroyed themselves or, eluding detection, 
remained in the country. Augustus received them as if he had conquered 
the Parthian in a war; for he took great pride in the achievement, declaring 
that he had recovered without a struggle what had formerly been lost in 
battle. Indeed, in honour of this success he commanded that sacrifices be 
decreed and likewise a temple to Mars Ultor on the Capitol, in imitation of 
that of Jupiter Feretrius, in which to dedicate the standards; and he himself 
carried out both decrees. Moreover he rode into the city on horseback and 
was honoured with a triumphal arch. (Cassius Dio 54.8) 
 
 Military propaganda directed at the citizens of Rome was an important part of 
the imperial political strategy. Triumphal monuments were dedicated and ceremonies 
were performed in the city to celebrate the victories of the emperor and his army, which 
preserved the pax Romana. Ancient authors frequently described the splendid scenes of 
the triumph. They clearly understood how these spectacles served to reinforce the 
emperor’s political authority.376 In contrast, they rarely recorded whether and how the 
image of martial achievements was propagated in provincial societies. I have argued 
that when provincials had identified themselves as imperial subjects settled inside the 
pomerium of the empire, demarcating themselves from barbarians, they perceived the 
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Roman soldiers as their protectors against them.
377
 Thus propagating military strength 
to the civilians in the provinces would have been useful to legitimise Roman rule over 
them, as part of military strategy, especially in the eastern provinces where the Roman 
empire had a powerful rival, the Parthian empire.  
 The Parthian empire has generally been seen as the Roman empire’s arch-
enemy, competing with it for supremacy in the upper Euphrates region, especially in 
Armenia, from the first century BCE to the early third century CE, until its Arsacid 
dynasty was overthrown by the Sassanid dynasty in 224 CE.
378
 There are two questions 
we need to examine throughout the period. First, whether the relations between the two 
empires were typically hostile, and whether the conflicts were as serious as it has often 
been assumed. Second, was the military strategy of the Parthian empire so aggressive 
that the Romans were right to perceive it as a lethal threat? The idea of a conflict 
between West and East, which has so much modern resonance, might have been 
formulated or created by the Romans, drawing on Greek precedents such as Herodotus, 
as a means to consolidate a ruling ideology for their subjects in the eastern frontier 
zones, despite the fact that actually they shared Hellenistic cultural influence with the 
Arsacid - Sassanid empire.
379
 
 According to modern estimates, the Roman empire in the second century CE 
maintained roughly 400,000 troops, about 0.7% of an estimated total population. Nearly 
a third of the military force was employed to defend its eastern frontier.
380
 Considering 
the length of the border between the two empires, this number still seems somewhat 
insufficient. It would have been impossible for the Romans to secure the eastern 
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provinces, and to carry out further military operations beyond it, unless they succeeded 
in drawing cooperation and support from the provincials there. The claim that the 
Parthians were threatening the Roman East and might be aiming at further conquest 
offered a useful means to identify the security needs of the local populace with those of 
the occupiers, justifying the deployment of the Roman army in the provinces. However, 
this use of military propaganda to elicit provincial loyalty is a possibility into which 
little research has been conducted.
381
 
 The aim of this chapter is to investigate what Roman military propaganda 
against the Arsacid - Sassanid empire there was in the eastern provinces, and to evaluate 
the impact of the propaganda by investigating the reaction of Greeks. The predictable 
problem presents itself: we have to depend entirely on sources written in Latin and 
Greek, mostly biased in favour of Rome, because of lack of evidence from the Iranian 
side.
382
 First, I shall give a brief overview of the history of conflicts between the two 
empires, and evaluate whether the existence of the Parthian empire appeared a real 
threat to Romans. Second, I shall demonstrate that the Romans deliberately exploited an 
image of Persian threat to create and manipulate a propaganda for strategic purpose, and 
the ways in which it was employed to justify its military deployment. 
 
6.2: Review of relations 
 6.2.1: The Late Republic: Crassus to Antony  
 From 92 to 53 BCE Parthia maintained its western border along the Euphrates 
under the agreements made with Sulla and then Pompey.
383
 In this time the imperial 
expansion of Parthia and Rome was directed against the Seleucid kingdom between 
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them rather than against one another. Parthia rejected repeated requests from 
Mithridates VI of Pontus for military support in his war against Rome.
384
 Parthia’s 
foreign policy toward Rome was basically non-confrontational.
385
 
 The situation was changed when Crassus invaded the western frontier of Parthia 
for his own military glory in 53 BCE. His army was destroyed, allegedly by the 
ʻParthian shot’, and lost its legionary standards at the battle of Carrhae. Crassus’ defeat 
shocked the Romans, and marks the moment when the military strength of the Parthians 
was first imprinted on the Romans’ minds. It was followed by a Parthian counter attack: 
two years later, the Parthian prince Pacorus and his general Osaces led their armies to 
raid Roman territory in Syria. Crassus’ invasion had been unprovoked, and the 
subsequent Parthian invasion seems to have been a retaliatory raid rather than an 
attempt at conquest. At that time the Parthians were not equipped for conquest: the 




 This military confrontation, which became entwined with the Roman civil wars, 
continued for about twenty years. Caesar had planned an invasion of Parthia after 
winning the civil war against Pompey, but his project was closed down by his 
assassination in 44 BCE. In 40-38 BCE, under the Second Triumvirate, Quintus 
Labienus, an anti-Caesarean commander, allied with a Parthian prince Pacorus I to 
attack Roman forces in Syria, Judaea, and Asia Minor. Decidius Saxa, who had been 
appointed by Antony as governor of Syria in the preceding year, perished with his 
troops in this war, and their eagle standards were captured by the Parthians.
387
  
 The joint attack of Pacorus I and Labienus could be regarded as a real threat to 
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Rome, but it was essentially an extension of the Roman civil war: the Parthian force had 
first been involved due to the request of Brutus and Cassius.
388
 The political crisis on 
the Roman side offered the chance for the Parthians to interfere. Antony sent Ventidius 
Bassus to stop the Parthian army conquering Asia Minor. Bassus’ counter-attacks 
defeated it, and he executed the two enemy commanders. In 36 BCE Antony led an 
army in person against Parthia, but his campaign resulted in failure. He repeated his 
Parthian operations in 34 BCE with some success, but had to turn to confront his 
Roman rival, Octavian.  
 
 6.2.2: The first and second centuries: Augustus to Lucius Verus 
 After gaining control of Rome, Augustus reverted to diplomatic relations with 
Parthia. An agreement was reached in 20 BCE that the Parthians would return the 
legionary standards and soldiers captured from Crassus and Antony’s forces, and then 
the Roman emperor would approve a king of Armenia proposed from the Parthian royal 
family. Augustus’ propaganda presented this agreement as a great victory.389 The image 
of a Parthian returning the standards was carved on the marble statue of Augustus of 
Prima Porta and widely propagated by the circulation of newly minted coins. 
Diplomatic relations were maintained, more or less, until the reign of Nero. But, based 
on its military strength, the Roman empire was watching for an opportunity to invade 
Parthia during the Principate.
390
 Which of the two major powers would control 
Armenia was the kernel of the problem between them. 
 In 35 CE, the Romans took an opportunity to support a coup against the 
Parthian king Artabanus III, and tried to exploit it for the benefit of Rome. According to 
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Tacitus, the Parthian king first threatened Romans with his proclamation that the ancient 
boundaries of the Achaemenid empire and Macedonia must be reconquered.
391
 It is 
unclear whether he was in practice preparing to campaign in the Roman East, and even 
whether he really claimed imperium over this area. On his proclamation, in fact, some 
Parthian nobles who opposed the rule of Artabanus III contacted Tiberius to ask for his 
support. While the action of the Parthian king had been confined to giving the Armenian 
throne to his son, a Roman invasion of Mesopotamia in support of the rebels induced 
Artabanus to flee, and Tridates III, a Parthian royal hostage from Rome, was installed as 
king of Parthia. Before long, however, Artabanus regained his throne with Scythian 
forces.
392
 This event was more a Roman threat to the Parthians than a Parthian threat to 
Rome. 
 Under Nero, the Romans attempted to annex Armenia, and invaded Parthia. A 
few years before his accession, Armenia had been conquered by the Iberians, and its 
pro-Roman king was killed. While the local Roman commanders took no action, bribed 
by the Iberian leader Rhadamistus, the Parthian king Vologaeses I intervened to give the 
Armenian throne to his brother Tiridates I.
393
 In 54, when Nero became emperor, 
Vologaeses drove the Iberians out of Armenia, helped by the Armenians, and finally 
achieved his end. But at the same time his own throne was threatened by a son Vardanes 
II, and thus he had to withdraw his army from Armenia to subdue the revolt of the son. 
Exploiting this insurrection in Parthia and using the excuse that Tiridates had been 
enthroned as the Armenian king without consulting Rome, Nero sent Corbulo to 
campaign in Armenia in 55-62.
394
 In 62 Caesennius Paetus was appointed to annex 
Armenia as a province. Although he failed, Corbulo retrieved the situation, and the end 
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result in 66 was a return to the Augustan arrangement: Tiridates visited Rome to be 
crowned by Nero.  
 The Flavian emperors maintained mostly good relations with the Parthian kings. 
In 69, when Vespasian was fighting against Vitellius, Vologaeses I offered 40,000 
mounted archers to support him.
395
 Vespasian politely declined the offer from the 
Parthian king and instead recommended that he send envoys to the Senate to report the 
restoration of peace. Afterwards, his son Titus was presented with a golden crown from 
the Parthian king in recognition of his subduing the Jewish revolt.
396
 Vespasian’s 
younger son Domitian hoped to be appointed as the commander of auxiliary troops in 
order to help the Parthian army opposing an invasion of Armenia by the Alans when 
Vologaeses I asked Vespasian for military aid.
397
 Although Vespasian did not grant the 
Parthian king’s request, no consequential issues arose between the two empires. 
Following their father’s foreign policy toward the Parthian empire, Titus and Domitian 
never provoked a war on the eastern frontier throughout their reigns from 79 to 96. 
 Trajan’s ambitious Parthian war in 114-7 destroyed the diplomatic relations 
which had been maintained after the Neronian settlement. Again, the question of the 
Armenian throne brought on the war: in 109 the Parthian king Osroes I invaded 
Armenia to put his nephew Exedares on the throne without the approval of the Roman 
emperor. Trajan’s punitive campaign was not confined to Armenia, despite the repeated 
requests for peace from the Parthians, but progressed to the conquest of Parthian 
territory east of the Euphrates.
398
 Trajan’s motives seem to have been more to gain 
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fame than strategic, and he would aspire to go as far east as Alexander the Great had 
reached.
399
 Trajan formed three new provinces, Greater Armenia, Mesopotamia, and 
Assyria, out of the areas which he had conquered from Parthia. However, in 116-7 the 
Jewish ʻdiaspora’ revolt in Cyrenaica, Egypt, Cyprus, and Mesopotamia hindered his 
campaign, and his death ultimately ended it. 
 On Trajan’s death in 117, Hadrian, governor of Syria and one of Trajan’s 
commander, succeeded him, but immediately abandoned the three provinces newly 
formed by his predecessor and restored normal relations with Parthia. This change in 
policy outraged other Trajanic commanders, and to stifle criticism Hadrian felt it 
necessary to execute four ex-consuls, Lusius Quietus, Avidius Nigrinus, Cornelius 
Palma and Publilius Celsius.
400
 Probably Hadrian believed that the Romans were over-
extending themselves, particularly in the context of the Jewish revolt in Mesopotamia 
and several other vital eastern provinces.
401
 Indeed, it was suspected that the Jewish 
revolt had been instigated by Parthia.
402
 In 70, the Jewish antipathy to Roman rule had 
been heightened but suppressed by the destruction of the second temple, and it could be 
strategically exploited by the Parthians to harass the rear of the Roman frontier. Thus, 
Judaea would be a potential risk factor if the Romans tried either to defend their eastern 
frontier or to resume the war against Parthia. Perhaps Hadrian’s aggressive 
Hellenisation of Judaea, including the founding of Aelia Capitolina at Jerusalem and the 
raising of the temple of Jupiter on the site of the temple of the Jewish god, was meant to 
dilute Jewish resistance.
403
 However, it produced the opposite effect, the Bar Kokhba 
revolt of 132-5. Three years after savage repression of this revolt, Hadrian was 
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succeeded by Antoninus Pius, who followed Rome’s normal policy toward Parthia in 
terms of maintaining the eastern frontier.  
 The Parthian invasion in 161-2, on the death of Antoninus Pius and accession of 
Marcus Aurelius, has been presented as a severe threat to the eastern provinces of Rome. 
The Parthian king Vologaeses IV destroyed at least one legion under Sedatius 
Severianus, the governor of Cappadocia, at Elegeia in Armenia.
404
 He also defeated the 
Roman army led by Attidius Cornelianus, the governor of Syria, and raided the cities of 
Syria.
405
 We have little information about the reason why Vologaeses, the longest 
reigning Parthian king (147-91), suddenly decided to break the long peace with the 
Romans, which had been maintained since the accession of Hadrian in 117. The author 
of the Augustan History claims that Vologaeses had begun preparing this war in the final 
years of Antoninus Pius’ reign.406 A military diploma and an enigmatic inscription 
verify that in 160/1 Antoninus Pius had reinforced the army in Syria with vexillations 
led by Lucius Neratius Proculus, a legate from Cappadocia, on account of a bellum 
Parthicum.
407
 Again, Armenia seems to have been the problem. In the event, 
Vologaeses took the initiative, probably emboldened by news of Pius’ death, and sent an 
army into Armenia to replace its king with his own nominee, Pacorus.
408
 Although Dio 
does not explain what mission Sedatius Severianus had been meant to carry out with his 
legion in Armenia, he had presumably been sent to reinstate the Roman approved king, 
and had grossly underestimated the Parthian forces. The contemporary rhetorician 
Lucian says that a false prophet had encouraged Severianus with regard to his 
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 Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus, who had not had military careers under 
Antoninus Pius, probably did not envisage a full-scale war, but the Parthians’ reaction 
was surprisingly aggressive and even damaged Roman Syria. One of the emperors had 
to make an expedition in person to fight against the Parthians. Lucius Verus took 
command of the operations in 163-6. Following the long Roman tradition to blame 
enemies for starting wars, Roman authors may have tried to retrieve Rome’s reputation 
from the defeats in Armenia and Syria by shifting responsibility for the war onto the 
Parthians. Lucius Verus’ campaign was prompt and well prepared. He took the titles, 
Parthicus and Medicus, because his generals had invaded Parthia and then Media, and 
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 6.2.3: The third century and after: Septimius Severus to the Tetrarchy 
 The Roman emperors of the Severan dynasty developed a more aggressive 
policy towards the Parthian empire, and favoured military solutions to diplomatic 
negotiations. They no longer thought control of Armenia a significant issue, and instead 
chose the direct route to Parthia. In contrast to earlier approaches making a detour 
through the Armenian capital city, Artaxata, from Cappadocia to Parthia, the new route 
was to directly cross over the Euphrates and to drive the enemy down to Ctesiphon 
(Map 5). They led their armies in person to invade the Parthian empire: Septimius 
Severus in 197-8, Caracalla in 216-7, and Severus Alexander (against the Sassanids) in 
232-3.  
 Septimius Severus began his war against the Parthians on the pretext of their 
aid to the usurper Pescennius Niger, whom he had eliminated in 194.
411
 However, the 
Parthian king Vologaeses V had not actually helped the usurper, but had deviously 
responded to Niger’s request for aid: “he would order his governors to collect troops - 
the customary practice whenever it was necessary to raise an army, as they have no 
standing army and do not hire mercenaries”.412 Niger fled to Parthia for refuge after his 
defeat by Severus, but had received no help from it.
413
 This followed the pattern of 
previous Parthian responses to Roman pretenders such as Terentius Maximus (the false 
Nero) and Vespasian: offers of support or refuge, but no more.
414
 Nor did the Parthians 
ever seek to exploit the weakened Roman forces in the frontier zones by launching raids, 
let alone invasions. However, Septimius Severus invaded Parthia in 197, and then 
declared the extension of Roman power over the region east of the Euphrates: 
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Mesopotamia became a province with garrisons.
415
 
 Caracalla, if our sources Cassius Dio and Herodian can be believed, even 
devised a cunning excuse to invade the Parthians.
416
 He proposed he would himself 
marry a daughter of Artabanus V in order to establish peace, and thus his army was able 
to cross the Euphrates and Tigris and to reach Arbela unopposed. Although Cassius Dio 
and Herodian have different views on whether or not Artabanus approved the marriage, 
the point is that Caracalla exploited the situation of apparent negotiations to make a 
sudden invasion. He massacred a considerable number of Parthians and burned their 
cities and towns, and he reported this to the Senate as if he conquered the entire East. 
 In the early reign of Severus Alexander the Arsacid dynasty of the Parthian 
empire was succeeded by the Sassanid dynasty (224), which adopted a more aggressive 
attitude toward the Roman empire. Ardashir I, the founder of the Sassanid dynasty, 
reiterated the same claim that Artabanus III had made about two centuries ago.
417
 
Unlike this Parthian king, who had probably intended to strengthen his political prestige 
rather than to conquer Roman territories, Adashir’s claim to the ancient Persian 
territories was implemented by attacks on Roman Mesopotamia and Syria, which were 
repelled by Severus Alexander. Ardashir’s aggressive policy against the Roman empire 
was continued by his son Shapur I, who conquered Nisibis and Carrhae, which were 
two main Roman fortresses in Mesopotamia. In 244 he defeated the Roman army of 
Gordian III when he undertook a counter-campaign. Shapur then accepted a peace treaty, 
with enormous reparations, requested by the new emperor Philip the Arab.  
 In 250 Shapur I resumed the war and eventually conquered Mesopotamia and 
Syria in three years. He even captured the Roman emperor Valerian at the battle of 
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Edessa in 260, which shocked the Romans and seriously damaged their hegemony in 
the eastern provinces. Exploiting the situation, the ruler of Palmyra, Septimius 
Odenathus, expanded the power of his kingdom, and drove the Sassanids back across 
the Euphrates. After his death, the Palmyrenes under the rule of his wife Zenobia and 
son Vaballathus expanded their area of control to Egypt and Asia Minor, until the 
Roman emperor Aurelian defeated her through his reconquest in 272-3. Ten years later, 
Carus attacked the Sassanids again and plundered Ctesiphon, but when his decease 
stopped further conquest, his successor had to return to Rome. Diocletian finally 
restored the security of the eastern frontier only after several campaigns against the 
Sassanid empire. 
 In outlining the historical background to the three centuries of relations between 
the Romans and Parthians, it is hard to accept the argument that the Parthian empire 
caused the Roman empire serious military threats and crises. Of course, Parthia was 
always regarded as a potential threat to Rome, and exercising hegemony over Armenia 
was always a cause of dispute, but there were only a few substantial threats from Parthia 
among the many external threats faced by the Romans on other frontiers. The real 
threats faced by Roman subjects and territories (excluding Armenia) were confined to 
the campaigns of 40-38 BCE and 161-2 CE, but even these seem not to have been the 
result of an aggressive policy of Parthians. It is doubtful that the Parthians ever had any 
intention of subjugating the eastern provinces of Rome. 
 
 6.2.4: The Parthian shot: a phantom menace 
 The ʻParthian shot’ was a military tactic supposedly employed by the mounted 
archers of Parthia. The Mediterranean armies of the period were mostly infantry-based, 
but the Parthians’ own forces were predominantly cavalry. The ʻParthian shot’ means 
cavalry shooting arrows behind them while retreating from a charge or counter-charge 
171 
 
by their opponents. The tactic meant that the mobile mounted archers of the Parthians 
could inflict serious damage on Roman infantry formations while avoiding Roman 
attempts to engage at close quarters. Our main sources for the ʻParthian shot’ are 
Plutarch and Cassius Dio in their accounts of the catastrophic defeat of Crassus at 
Carrhae in 53 BCE. Roman authors tended to make much of the ʻParthian shot’ as a way 
of explaining away this defeat, and also building up the sense of threat represented by 
the Parthians.  
 There are no mentions of the defeat of Crassus in the extant writings of 
contemporary Roman authors. The oldest records of this event, which belong to the 
Augustan period, are extant only in epitome. The epitome by Justin of the Philippic 
History of Pompeius Trogus, whose father served as a secretary to Julius Caesar during 
the First Triumvirate, has the single sentence: “After this, he (Orodes) carried on a war 
with the Romans, and overthrew their general Crassus, together with his son and all the 
Roman army”.418 Livy’s account of this episode has not survived, but was summarised 
in the Periochae in the fourth century: “Marcus Crassus crossed the river Euphrates, 
carried the war to the Parthian empire, and was defeated in a battle in which his son also 
fell. With the remains of his army, he occupied a hill, and was summoned to a 
conference by the enemy leader, Surena, as if to speak about a truce. However, he was 
captured and killed in a struggle to avoid suffering the indignity of remaining alive”.419  
 The Roman authors in the reign of Augustus were hardly free from his political 
influence.
420
 Responding to his propaganda about the settlement with Parthia in 20 
BCE, they needed to believe that the past disgrace had been liquidated by his supposed 
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victory against the Parthians.
421
 The Augustan poets showed enthusiastic responses in 
particular.
422
 Propaganda was crucial to Augustus’ mode of operation and his need to 
maintain credibility. Under these circumstances, the enemy’s military strength would be 
rarely cited or downplayed. Pompeius Trogus claims that: “Caesar (Augustus) achieved 
more by the grandeur of his name than any other general could have achieved by his 
arms”.423  
 However, in his famous digression comparing Alexander the Great and the 
fourth-century BCE generals of the Roman Republic, Livy implies that it was the 
arrows of Parthian cavalry and the terrain that had destroyed Crassus’ army:424  
 
Proud words I would not speak, but never - and may civil wars be silent - 
never have we been beaten by infantry, never in open battle, never on even, 
or at all events on favourable ground: cavalry and arrows, impassable 
defiles, regions that afford no road to convoys, may well occasion fear in 
heavily armed soldiers.  
 
The same interpretation is implicit in the brief reference by Velleius Paterculus, who had 
served in the eastern army in 1 CE as tribunus militum of Gaius at his negotiations with 
the Parthians: “Crassus had crossed the Euphrates and was now marching toward 
Seleucia when he was surrounded by the king Orodes with his innumerable bands of 
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cavalry, and perished together the greater part of his army”.425  
 Plutarch in the early second century provides the earliest detailed description of 
the ʻParthian shot’ in his Life of Crassus. In narrating the entire process of Crassus’ 
campaign against Parthia, he first comments that Crassus’ neglect of taking more time to 
prepare and to collect intelligence, rather than the superiority of the Parthian military 
force, seems to have been crucial to his defeat.
426
 Later, however, Plutarch describes the 
ʻParthian shot’, which he claims, played an important role in Crassus’ defeat:427  
 
But the Parthians now stood at long intervals from one another and began 
to shoot their arrows from all sides at once, not with any accurate aim (for 
the dense formation of the Romans would not suffer an archer to miss 
even if he wished it), but making vigorous and powerful shots from bows 
which were large and mighty and curved so as to discharge their missiles 
with great force. At once, then, the plight of the Romans was a grievous 
one; for if they kept their ranks, they were wounded in great numbers, and 
if they tried to come to close quarters with the enemy, they were just as far 
from effecting anything and suffered just as much. For the Parthians shot 
as they fled, and next to the Scythians, they do this most effectively; and it 
is a very clever thing to seek safety while still fighting, and to take away 
the shame of flight. 
 
 The next account of the ʻParthian shot’ is in Cassius Dio of the early third 
century. Before narrating the battle of Carrhae, he explicitly draws readers’ attention to 
Parthian military equipment and tactics, rather than to their race, country and customs, 
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because “the examination of these details properly concerns the present narrative, since 
it has come to a point where this knowledge is needed”.428 Cassius Dio details the 





The Parthians make no use of a shield, but their forces consist of mounted 
archers and pikemen (i.e. cataphracts), mostly in full armour. Their 
infantry is small, made up of the weaker men; but even these are all 
archers. They practise from boyhood, and the climate and the land 
combine to aid both horsemanship and archery. The land, being for the 
most part level, is excellent for raising horses and very suitable for riding 
about on horse-back; at any rate, even in war they lead about whole 
droves of horses, so that they can use different ones at different times, can 
ride up suddenly from a distance and also retire to a distance speedily; and 
the atmosphere there, which is very dry and does not contain the least 
moisture, keeps their bowstrings tense, except in the dead of winter. For 
that reason they make no campaigns anywhere during that season but the 
rest of the year they are almost invincible in their own country and in any 
that has similar characteristics. 
 
 Similarly, in recounting Severianus’ defeat in 161, Cassius Dio repeats his 





Vologaesus, it seems, had begun the war by hemming in on all sides the 
Roman legion under Severianus that was stationed at Elegeia, a place in 
Armenia, and then shooting down and destroying the whole force, leaders 
and all; and he was now advancing, powerful and formidable, against the 
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cities of Syria. 
 
By that time Roman armies had become accustomed to dealing with Parthian tactic, and 
had gained victories against it several times, especially in Trajan’s campaigns half a 
century before. The ʻParthian shot’ appears to be used as a cliché to explain this 
embarrassing defeat. 
 It is evident that the Parthian army was famous in the ancient Mediterranean 
world for its mounted archers, but we may doubt whether the ʻParthian shot’ was always 
a crucial element in Roman defeats. Before thinking of the tactical advantage, it is 
necessary to compare the military strengths of both sides in the wars. Plutarch records 
that Crassus was leading about 43,000 soldiers (seven legions, 4,000 cavalry, and 4,000 
light-armed infantry) when he attempted to invade Parthia, while the Parthian 
commander Surena had prepared only 1,000 cataphracts and 9,000 mounted archers to 
face the Roman general at Carrhae.
431
 Plutarch hardly mentions the enemy’s 
infantrymen or famous cataphracts, who were cavalrymen in full armour to be 
employed as the main force in company with the mounted archers. However, by 
stressing the offer of the Armenian king to Crassus, he implies that the Roman army had 




And most of all, Artabazes the king of Armenia gave him courage, for he 
came to his camp with 6,000 horsemen. These were said to be the king’s 
guards and couriers; but he promised 10,000 mail-clad cavalry besides, 
and 30,000 infantry, to be maintained at his own cost. And he tried to 
persuade Crassus to invade Parthia by way of Armenia, for thus he would 
not only lead his forces along in the midst of plenty, which the king 
himself would provide, but would also proceed with safety, confronting 
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the cavalry of the Parthians, in which lay their sole strength, with many 
mountains, and continuous crests, and regions where the horse could not 
well serve. 
 
Crassus refused the offer from the Armenian king, and then carried out his invasion with 
a force of only 4,000 cavalrymen, less than half the number of the Parthian mounted 
soldiers. 20,000 Roman soldiers were killed, 10,000 captured, and 10,000 barely 
escaped with their commander.
433
 Two centuries after, Severianus’ army, presumably a 
legion with some auxiliary units only, was obviously outnumbered by the Parthian force 
in Armenia, and probably again lacking in the cavalry. 
 It must be considered how many soldiers Trajan, Lucius Verus, and Septimius 
Severus had to mobilise for their successful campaigns to advance on the Parthian 
capital city, Ctesiphon. They were able to employ more than 90,000-11,000 troops: at 
least nine legions, auxiliaries (mostly alae and cohortes equitatae) of equivalent number 
to the legionaries, and additional vexillations.
434
 The total number of the troops is more 
than twice as many as Crassus’ army, and the number of cavalrymen is nearly ten times 
greater. Thus the defeats of Crassus and Severianus were inevitable consequences 
caused by their strategic incompetence and smaller military strengths, especially in 
cavalry, not by the mythical tactic of their enemies. 
 Although the tradition of the ʻParthian shot’ seems to have begun under 
Augustus, the two main extant accounts of it come from Plutarch and Cassius Dio. Both 
were Greek authors writing under Roman emperors, Trajan and Severus Alexander 
respectively, who led large military expeditions against Arsacid - Sassanid empire. Our 
two authors reflect the spirit of the times in which they lived, and their accounts of the 
Parthian threat would have suggested to their readers in the Greek East, that these 
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emperors’ campaigns, which required immense manpower and resources from the 
eastern provinces, were justified by the past record of the Parthian threat.  
 There was the one-way threat from Rome to Parthia. As Cornell suggests, the 
Parthians had a Roman problem: by nature the Romans were very aggressive, and they 
contributed to the weakening of the Parthian dynasty, which led to it being overthrown 
by the Sassanid dynasty.
435
 The defensive attitude of the Parthians appears clearer when 
we compare its foreign policy with that of the Sassanids, which did represent a real 
threat to the Romans. However, the image of a Parthian threat against Romans is just as 
strongly represented in our Roman sources as the Sassanid threat, which implies that the 
Roman authorities deliberately exploited this image of a threat to achieving a 
propaganda purpose. Part of that propaganda, as we have seen, was the myth of the 
ʻParthian shot’. The next section looks in more detail at Roman propaganda with regard 
to Parthia.  
 
6.3: Propaganda 
 6.3.1: The importance of crowning the Armenian king 
 The Armenian problem, as we have seen above, was the main cause of 
confrontations between Rome and Parthia throughout the period from Augustus to the 
Antonines. It is thus necessary to investigate the reason why the Romans wanted to 
control appointments to the Armenian throne, while conceding that its candidates should 
come from the Arsacid dynasty of Parthia. The position of Armenia between the Roman 
empire and the Parthian empire has been regarded simply as a ʻbuffer state’, reminding 
us of the Korean peninsula between the United States of America and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics during the Cold War, and of Ukraine between Western 
Europe and Russia these days. However, it would be more sensible to consider the 
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questions of Armenia and the system of choosing its king from contemporary 
perspectives rather than applying the concept of ʻbuffer states’, which is part of the 
modern theory to explain the balance of powers in international relations. 
 The system of appointing kings of Armenia seems to have been begun when 
Augustus made the diplomatic agreement with Phraates IV in 20 BCE. Augustus sent 
Tiberius to Armenia to crown Tigranes V as king of Armenia, who was related to the 
royal families of Parthia by blood, but had spent his teenage years in Rome.
436
 A few 
years after the agreement, Phraates sent four sons as hostages to Augustus. At that time 
the Parthian king was worried about the potential risks that his sons might grow up to be 




Phraates, his successor, was so anxious to obtain the friendship of 
Augustus Caesar, that he even sent the trophies which the Parthians had 
set up as memorials of the defeat of the Romans. He also invited Titius to 
a conference, who was at that time governor of Syria, and delivered into 
his hands, as hostages, four of his legitimate sons, Seraspadanes, 
Rhodaspes, Phraates, and Bonones, with two of their wives and four of 
their sons; for he was apprehensive of conspiracy and attempts on his life. 
He knew that no one could prevail against him, unless he was opposed by 
one of the Arsacid family, to which race the Parthians were strongly 
attached. He therefore removed the sons out of his way, with a view to 
annihilating the hopes of the disaffected. The surviving sons, who live at 
Rome, are entertained as princes at the public expense. The other kings 
(his successors) have continued to send ambassadors (to Rome), and to 
hold conferences (with the Roman governors). 
 
After Phraates’ death, Augustus wielded diplomatic leverage over both the Parthian and 
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Armenian thrones. He managed to appoint Parthian hostages, who had been educated at 
Rome, to both the Parthian and Armenian thrones. In 8 CE, supported by Augustus, the 
Parthian hostage Vonones became king of Parthia, but he was soon expelled from 
Parthia by his opponents under Artabanus III. Augustus allocated the Armenian throne 
to Vonones instead, and his reign continued until Germanicus, on behalf or Tiberius, 
crowned Artaxias the new king of Armenia in 18.
438
 
 It is noticeable that ambassadors and hostages from Parthia and Armenia were 
constantly travelling to Rome during the early Principate.
439
 The Roman emperors 
carefully arranged them to be seen in public places as evidence to prove the propaganda 
of the subjugation of Parthia and Armenia. Augustus intentionally displayed Parthian 




He did however on the day of one of the shows make a display of the first 
Parthian hostages that had ever been sent to Rome, by leading them 
through the middle of the arena and placing them in the second row above 
his own seat. Furthermore, if anything rare and worth seeing was ever 
brought to the city, it was his habit to make a special exhibit of it in any 
convenient place on days when no shows were appointed. 
 
Claudius also made a special effort to display envoys from Parthia and Armenia by 
giving them seats, next to those of the Senate, in the theatre. This arrangement 




He allowed the envoys of the Germans to sit in the orchestra, led by their 
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naive self-confidence; for when they had been taken to the seats occupied 
by the common people and saw the Parthian and Armenian envoys sitting 
with the senate, they moved of their own accord to the same part of the 
theatre, protesting that their merits and rank were no whit inferior.  
 
 Hostages and ambassadors from Parthia and Armenia could not reach Rome 
without using the road system in the provinces of Cappadocia and Syria. It is not known 
which routes they used to take, but they probably travelled through principal cities 
(Melitene, Samosata and Antioch), and then from Antioch continued their journey by 
sea, probably stopping at several ports en route to Italy. They were normally 
accompanied by an entourage which made them conspicuous to the provincials by its 
scale and exotic appearance, and an escort of Roman soldiers.
442
 Thus the diplomatic 
travel of Parthian and Armenian envoys itself would be a useful event to manipulate 
public opinion in the provinces (or at least their major cities), which can be considered 
as kind of propaganda to show the military strength of Rome and its influence over the 
ʻeastern barbarians’. 
 The most impressive recorded diplomatic event in Rome is when the Armenian 
king Tiridates I was crowned by Nero in 66. Clearly, Nero had invested heavily in the 
preparations for this ceremony, and expected some benefit from it. Cassius Dio 
describes Tiridates’ journey to Rome:443 
 
On the other hand, Tiridates presented himself in Rome, bringing with him 
not only his own sons but also those of Vologaesus, of Pacorus, and of 
Monobazus. Their progress all the way from the Euphrates was like a 
triumphal procession. Tiridates himself was at the height of his reputation 
by reason of his age, beauty, family, and intelligence; and his whole 
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retinue of servants together with all his royal paraphernalia accompanied 
him. Three thousand Parthian horsemen and numerous Romans besides 
followed in his train. They were received by gaily decorated cities and by 
peoples who shouted many compliments. Provisions were furnished them 
free of cost, a daily expenditure of 800,000 sesterces for their support 
being thus charged to the public treasury. This went on without change for 
the nine months occupied in their journey. 
 
The ʻnumerous Romans’ presumably indicates the Roman soldiers who escorted the 
train of Tiridates. Vologaeses I of Parthia had been concerned that his brother Tiridates 
should not be seen as a prisoner, and therefore he carefully required several conditions 
from Corbulo to prevent his brother from any kind of dishonour.
444
 As Cassius Dio put 
it above, the Armenian king’s train might be seen like a triumphal procession, but it was 
also a way of showing Roman clemency to those who accepted Roman hegemony. In 
his account of the background to this event, Tacitus points out that the Romans still 
would see Tiridates as “a spectacle to the world, little better than a captive”, and they 
also would “value the reality of their empire and disregard its empty show”.445 Thus, in 
this way, eastern kings, envoys and hostages were used by the Roman emperors as 
means of propaganda to persuade their subjects of their military and diplomatic 
successes and the unchallengeable might of Rome.  
 The system of appointing kings of Armenia was not a uniquely Roman foreign 
relationship or system of world order. The imperial tributary system of ancient China 
(朝貢冊封) also had a similar structure. 朝貢冊封 is a compound word formed from 
tribute (朝貢, chaogong) and installation (冊封, cefeng). Based on Sino-centric ideology, 
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the Chinese authorities categorised neighbouring nations into four barbarian groups (四
夷, siyi) in four main directions: the east (東夷, dongyi), west (西戎, xirong), south (南
蠻, nanman), and north (北狄, beidi), and tried to oblige all the barbarian kings to send 
delegations to offer hostages and tribute in return for the appointment as king.
446
 In the 
early Han dynasty, when the system was instituted, it did not mean de facto control over 
the kings, who governed their subjects independently and sometimes even threatened 
the frontiers of China. The meaning of 冊封 (installation) here was closer to 
approbation in practice because the Chinese emperor approved the kings, who had been 
independently chosen according to their own national laws (like a rex et amicus populi 
Romani). However, as the Han dynasty expanded its imperial power, neighbouring 
nations became more subject to Chinese control and tribute. 
 The Chinese authorities constantly emphasised how many and distant nations 
had sent envoys to offer tribute in order to receive an appointment. Thus the tributary 
system functioned as a diplomatic tool to pacify the frontiers and at the same time as 
propaganda to unify the various ethnic groups inside China by displaying its imperial 
hegemony. A history written by a Chinese official reports that even the Roman emperor 
Marcus Aurelius sent envoys to offer tribute to the Chinese emperor in 166, and 
complains that “the tribute brought was neither precious nor rare, raising suspicion that 
the accounts [of the Roman empire (大秦, daqin)] might be exaggerated”.447 Of course, 
the tributary system of ancient China was not identical to the Roman practice of 
appointing Armenian kings, but the two systems aimed at the same propaganda 
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 6.3.2: The legacy of Alexander the Great 
 Even under Roman rule, Greek authors maintained a certain critical 
independence. There was marked scepticism about Augustan propaganda among 
contemporary Greek elites and authors. They seem to have detected the difference 
between diplomacy and military might - a distinction Augustus sought to blur. They did 
this by comparing the claimed Parthian success of Augustus with the great victories of 
Alexander against the Achaemenid empire in 334-330 BCE, and believed that the 
military strength of Parthia was superior to that of Rome. Rome might have conquered 
the Greeks, it was implied, but even its emperors were not the military equals of 
Alexander. This was the main reason for Livy, writing under Augustus, to digress from 
his narration of the Samnite wars with this question, “What would have been the results 
for Rome if she had been engaged in war with Alexander?”.449  
 Enumerating the reasons why Alexander would have found it impossible to 
overcome contemporary Roman commanders, Livy admonishes the Greeks for thinking 
of the Macedonian king as the superior general. He even tries to set Alexander apart 
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I am only stating facts about which there is no dispute. Are we to regard 
none of these things as serious drawbacks to his merits as a commander? 
Or was there any danger of that happening which the most frivolous of the 
Greeks, who actually extol the Parthians at the expense of the Romans, are 
so constantly harping upon, namely, that the Roman people must have 
bowed before the greatness of Alexander's name - though I do not think 
they had even heard of him - and that not one out of all the Roman chiefs 
would have uttered his true sentiments about him, though men dared to 
attack him in Athens, the very city which had been shattered by 
Macedonian arms and almost well in sight of the smoking ruins of Thebes, 
and the speeches of his assailants are still extant to prove this?  
 
 Greeks frequently compared leading Romans to their own historical figures. At 
the end of 40s BCE the Athenians had voted Brutus and Cassius bronze images to stand 
beside those of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, to intimate that these Roman generals, in 
killing Caesar, had emulated the tyrant killers of archaic Athens.
451
 The prime extant 
example is Plutarch’s Parallel Lives of Greek and Roman leaders. He narrates a Greek 
leader’s achievements first and then deals with a Roman counterpart, followed by a 
comparative treatment of the two characters. The comparison generally argues for the 
superiority of the Greek over the Roman. As the Roman pair for his biography of 
Alexander the Great, Plutarch chose Julius Caesar, who was a good match (both were 
skilled generals, and both died leaving unfinished plans), and politically safer than 
choosing Augustus. Cautiously, Plutarch did not publish a comparison of this pair, 
ostensibly because neither finished their plans for the conquest. But Plutarch relates an 
anecdote about Caesar’s quaestorship in Spain (in 69 BCE), and his readers will have 
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Whereupon Caesar said to them in all seriousness, “I would rather be first 
here than second at Rome.” In like manner we are told again that, in Spain, 
when he was at leisure and was reading from the history of Alexander, he 
was lost in thought for a long time, and then burst into tears. His friends 
were astonished, and asked the reason for his tears. “Do you not think,” 
said he, “it is matter for sorrow that while Alexander, at my age, was 
already king of so many peoples, I have as yet achieved no brilliant 
success?”  
 
Plutarch’s attitude seems to be that of all the Romans only the emperors could be 
compared with Alexander, and Caesar was the adoptive father of the first emperor, 
Augustus. Given the Parthian threat, Greeks readily compared the Roman emperor to 
Alexander the Great, especially in the context of his military response to the barbarians 
from the East. Matching the achievement of the Macedonian king became an important 
task for the Roman emperor who saw himself as responsible for reinforcing imperial 
ideology in the Greek East. 
 The Julio-Claudian emperors appear to have invested in propaganda to 
convince the population of the eastern provinces that the presence of Roman emperor 
and his army were keeping them safe from the Parthian threat. This was more feasible 
than promoting the idea of conquering Parthia. After Augustus’ death in 14 CE, the Res 
Gestae Divi Augusti is said to have been disseminated throughout the empire in the form 
of stone inscriptions in the Latin and Greek languages.
453
 The four known cases of 
inscribed versions in the Greek translation (and the Latin original) are all in Asia Minor: 
Sardis, Ancyra, Pisidian Antioch and Apollonia.
454
 In the Res Gestae military success is 
a recurrent theme, and every diplomatic success to do with Parthian is carefully 
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(26) I extended the boundaries of all the provinces which were bordered 
by races not yet subject to our empire. …  
(29) … The Parthians I compelled to restore to me the spoils and 
standards of three Roman armies, and to seek as suppliants the friendship 
of the Roman people. These standards I deposited in the inner shrine 
which is in the temple of Mars Ultor. 
(32) Kings of the Parthians, Tiridates, and later Phrates, the son of king 
Phrates, took refuge with me as supplications; of the Medes, Artavasdes; 
of the Adiabeni, Artaxares; of the Britons, Dumnobellaunus and 
Tincommius; of the Sugambri, Maelo; of the Marcomanni and Suevi, … 
rus. Phrates, son of Orodes, king of the Parthians, sent all his sons and 
grandsons to me in Italy, not because he had been conquered in war, but 
rather seeking our friendship by means of his own children as pledges. 
And a large number of other nations experienced the good faith of the 
Roman people during my principate who never before had had any 
interchange of embassies or of friendship with the Roman people.  
(33) From me the peoples of the Parthians and of the Medes received the 
kings for whom they asked through ambassadors, the chief men of those 
peoples; the Parthians Vonones, son of king Phrates, grandson of king 
Orodes; the Medes Ariobarzanes, the son of king Artavazdes, grandson of 
king Aiobarzanes. 
 
 After the death of Augustus and accession of Tiberius, Germanicus took on the 
mantle of a possible ʻRoman Alexander’. He was Tiberius’ nephew, adoptive son and 
expected successor, and also a popular commander. In 18 Germanicus was sent to the 
East by Tiberius, apparently to mount a show of force against Parthia.
456
 He spent part 
of the following year in Egypt. A papyrus fragment, found at Oxyrhynchus in 1959 and 
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written in Greek, contains his speech in response to the presentation of decrees in his 
honour at Alexandria.
457
 Along with Germanicus’ edict forbidding unauthorised 
hospitium in Egypt (cited in chapter 4), this illustrates his attempt to gain the hearts and 
minds of the Alexandrians, by claiming that the Romans, in common with the 
Alexandrians, share the legacy of Alexander. After prefatory remarks about difficulty of 
coming to Alexandria, Germanicus (called ʻthe imperator’) continues his speech: 
 
The imperator: “I already imagined it to be a very splendid sight, in the 
first place because of your hero and founder (i.e. Alexander the Great), to 
whom a sort of debt is jointly owed by those who aspire to the same things 
(τοῖς τὸν αὐτὸν ἀντηχομενόις), and then because of the benefactions made 
by my grandfather Augustus and my father (unclear passage).” 
 
In fact Germanicus was a great-nephew of Augustus and his maternal grandfather was 
Mark Antony, the last Roman general to invade Parthia, as the Alexandrians knew full 
well. Thus, viewed in the context of Germanicus’ mission, τοῖς τὸν αὐτὸν ἀντηχομενόις 
probably means championing the freedom of the Greek world against the threat of 
Persia/Parthia.  
 Germanicus died young at Antioch in Syria in 19. Contemporary rumour had it 
that the emperor Tiberius, motivated by jealousy, had secretly ordered Piso, governor of 
Syria, to poison Germanicus.
458
 In his narrative of the funeral of Germanicus in 
Antioch, Tacitus reports some of the speeches praising the dead man. Apparently 
Germanicus was compared to Alexander and, in the Roman style, preferred for his 
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His funeral, devoid of ancestral effigies or procession, was distinguished 
by eulogies and recollections of his virtues. There were those who, 
considering his personal appearance, his early age, and the circumstances 
of his death, to which they added the proximity of the region where he 
perished, compared his decease with that of Alexander the Great: “Each 
eminently handsome, of famous lineage, and in years not much exceeding 
thirty, had fallen among alien races by the treason of their countrymen. 
But the Roman had borne himself as one gentle to his friends, moderate in 
his pleasures, content with a single wife and the children of lawful 
wedlock. Nor was he less a man of the sword; though he lacked the 
other’s temerity, and, when his numerous victories had beaten down the 
Germans, was prohibited from making fast their bondage. But had he been 
the sole arbiter of affairs, of kingly authority and title, he would have 
overtaken the Greek in military fame with an ease proportioned to his 
superiority in clemency, self-command, and all other good qualities”.  
 
Although Tacitus only reports hearsay, and is using Germanicus to criticise Tiberius, 
this fits the evidence that Germanicus himself had tried to exploit the legacy of 
Alexander as propaganda.  
 Nero was a grandson of Germanicus and the last emperor of the Julio-Claudian 
dynasty. After years of operations by his general Corbulo against Armenia and Parthia 
(see section 6.2.2), Nero also planned an eastern expedition in his later years, and in his 
preparations for the war he presented himself as Alexander. Suetonius reports that “Nero 
prepared for an expedition to the Caspian Gates, after enrolling a new legion of raw 
recruits of Italian birth, each six feet tall, which he called the “phalanx of Alexander the 
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Great”.460 Nero might have been influenced by the views of expansionists like Curtius 
Rufus, who is believed to have written his Histories of Alexander the Great in the reign 
of Claudius, and was probably the Roman senator Curtius Rufus of that period.
461
 
 After the Flavians’ consolidation of the eastern frontier, Trajan became the next 
Roman emperor overtly to rival Alexander the Great. He invaded Parthia in 114-7, and 
tried to establish three new provinces there (see section 6.2.2). Trajan had a clear agenda 
for propaganda about his achievements, as emerges from Cassius Dio’s description of 




Then he came to the ocean itself, and when he had learned its nature and 
had seen a ship sailing to India, he said: “I should certainly have crossed 
over to the Indi, too, if I were still young”. For he began to think about the 
Indians and was curious about their affairs, and he counted Alexander a 
lucky man. Yet he would declare that he himself had advanced farther than 
Alexander, and would so write to the senate, although he was unable to 
preserve even the territory that he had subdued. For this achievement he 
obtained among other honours the privilege of celebrating a triumph for as 
many nations as he pleased; for by reason of the large number of the 
peoples of whom he was constantly writing to them they were unable in 
some cases to follow him intelligently or even to use the names correctly.  
 
Cassius Dio took a negative view of Trajan’s propaganda, and even mocked it. His 
opinion is part of general Greek denigration of the Severan emperors for their 
continuous attacks on the Parthian and Sassanid empires (see below).  
 Arrian, a Roman senator and Greek historian, probably served in Trajan’s 
Parthian wars in his twenties, and was governor of Cappadocia under Hadrian from 131 
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 He showed special interest in the eastern frontier, and during his 
governorship wrote some books suggesting ways of dealing with various eastern 
problems. In his Periplus of the Euxine Sea, Arrian provides geographical knowledge of 
the area surrounding the Black Sea, including forts, ports and cities with strategic 
importance. Shortly after this, he completed a Tactical Handbook and the Expedition 
against the Alans, both based on his operation against the Alans. In these books Arrian 
wrote in the third person, referring to himself as Xenophon, and described the Roman 
tactics, especially those concerning cavalry units and military formation, in Greek style. 
Serving a Roman emperor, Arrian was aware of his position as a governor and 
commander, and had to be satisfied with the role of Roman Xenophon. 
 Arrian also dealt with Trajan’s Parthian wars in his Parthica, probably written 
after the campaigns, and spent his later years, under Antoninus Pius, in writing the 
Anabasis of Alexander (with his Indica) and Events after Alexander, although accurate 
dating his works remains problematic.
464
 Arrian’s view of Alexander has two 
contrasting themes: panegyric of the king’s military achievements, and moral criticism 
of his personal errors. However, he ends his book by using an apology for Alexander’s 
faults as a rhetoric device to reinforce his eulogy to the greatest conqueror of history.
465
 
Arrian was probably conscious of the criticism of Alexander under the peaceful eastern 
policy of Hadrian and Antoninus Pius, but he evidently stood for Trajan’s expansionist 
policy rather than his successors’ non-confrontational policy toward Parthia. What he 
wanted to see from the eastern policy of the Roman emperor appears to be Alexander’s 
spirit of harmony and blending between Macedonians and Persians, now between 
Romans and Greeks, in order to carry out further conquests, as he implies in his account 
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of Alexander’s banquet for his army at Opis.466 
 
But when the news was reported to them about the Persians and Medes, 
that the military commands were being given to Persians, that the foreign 
soldiers were being selected and divided into companies, that a Persian 
foot-guard, Persian foot Companions, a Persian regiment of men with 
silver-shields, as well as the cavalry Companions, and another royal 
regiment of cavalry distinct from these, were being called by Macedonian 
names, they were no longer able to restrain themselves; but running in a 
body to the palace, they cast their weapons there in front of the gates as a 
sign of supplication to the king. … Then they took up their weapons and 
returned to the camp, shouting and singing a song of thanksgiving to 
Apollo. After this Alexander offered sacrifice to the gods to whom it was 
his custom to sacrifice, and gave a public banquet, over which he himself 
presided, with the Macedonians sitting around him; and next to them the 
Persians; after whom came the men of the other nations, honoured for 
their personal rank or for some meritorious action. The king and his guests 
drew wine from the same bowl and poured out the same libations, both the 
Grecian prophets and the Magians commencing the ceremony. He prayed 
for other blessings, and especially that harmony and community of rule 
might exist between the Macedonians and Persians.  
 
 After the peaceful relation with Parthia under Hadrian and Antoninus Pius, 
military conflict recommenced in 161 (see section 6.2.2). The Greek author Polyaenus 
collected examples of strategic and tactical devices used by Macedonian leaders from 
king Philip and Alexander to the Diadochi, and compiled them in a handbook under the 
title of Stratagems. This book was dedicated to Lucius Verus before he was leaving for 
his Parthian campaign. Polyaenus’ tone is polite but maintains the spirit of instructing, 
personifying himself a teacher - and a Macedonian as he stresses - giving a lesson to his 
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The gods, your own virtue, and the Roman bravery, that have always 
before crowned with victory the arms of your sacred majesties, Antoninus 
and Verus, will also now attend with success the expedition which you 
have undertaken against Persia and the Parthians. I, who am by birth a 
Macedonian, and have therefore, as it were, a national right to victory over 
the Persians, have determined not to be entirely useless to you in the 
present circumstances; and if my constitution were as robust and hale as it 
used to be, you should not lack in me convincing proof of the a 
Macedonian spirit. Nor, advanced as I am in years, can I bear to be left 
behind without some efforts of service. Accept therefore, illustrious chiefs, 
in a collection of stratagems employed by the most distinguished generals, 
this small aid to military science; which, by exhibiting as in a picture the 
bravery and experience of former commanders, their conduct and 
operations, and the various successes that they achieved, may in some 
instances possibly be of service to yourselves, your polemarchs, our 
generals, the commanders of troops of ten thousand, or one thousand, or 
six hundred men, and whoever you may think fit to invest with military 
command. 
 
 Lucius Verus asked his tutor Marcus Cornelius Fronto to write a history of his 
Parthian campaign. In a letter to his teacher, the emperor expresses his strong wish that 





One thing I wish not indeed to point out to you - the pupil to his master - 
but to offer for your consideration, that you should dwell at length on the 
causes and early stages of the war, and especially our ill success in my 
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absence. Do not be in a hurry to come to my share. Further, I think it 
essential to make quite clear the great superiority of the Parthians before 
my arrival, that the magnitude of my achievements may be manifest. … In 
short, my achievements, whatsoever their character, are no greater, of 
course, than they actually are, but they can be made to seem as great as 
you would have them seem.  
 
Lucius Verus’ general, Avidius Cassius, halted the invasion at Ctesiphon, but the 
emperor presented this as if he had conquered the whole of Parthia. There appear to 
have been many authors who wrote panegyrical accounts of this campaign. In his How 
to Write History, Lucian of Samosata satirises the trend: “No, ever since the present 
situation arose - the war against the barbarians, the disaster in Armenia and the run of 
victories - every single person is writing history; nay more, they are all Thucydideses, 
Herodotuses and Xenophons to us, and very true, it seems, is the saying that “War is the 
father of all things” since at one stroke it has begotten so many historians”.469 He starts 
his criticism of the historians who “neglect to record the events and spend their time 
lauding rulers and generals, extolling their own to the skies and slandering the enemy’s 
beyond all reserve”.470 After Verus died from the plague, however, his co-emperor 
Marcus Aurelius tried to ʻinherit’ Verus’ military achievements by intimating that the 
strategic plans for the Parthian war had primarily been made by himself.
471
 This again 
illustrates the importance of triumphs over Parthia to the Roman emperor. 
 The emperors of the Severan dynasty made more vigorous use of the image of a 
Roman Alexander as a propaganda measure to justify their invasions of the Arsacid - 
Sassanid empire. Our main sources are Cassius Dio and Herodian, who were sceptical 
of the Severan propaganda. Cassius Dio reports an interesting anecdote about Severus 
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Accordingly, he took away from practically all the sanctuaries all the 
books that he could find containing any secret lore, and he locked up the 
tomb of Alexander; this was in order that no one in future should either 
view Alexander’s body or read what was written in the above-mentioned 
books. 
 
Septimius Severus had become the emperor after he defeated and eliminated a number 
of rivals. It was necessary for him to monopolise the legacy of Alexander to prevent a 
future challenger from exploiting Alexander’s name under the period of political 
instability. This implies that professing to follow the legacy of Alexander the Great was 
still an effective way of drawing popular support, although some Greek elites had had 
negative views of it. 
 This propaganda was continued by Caracalla, the son and successor of 
Septimius Severus. He even decorated Rome, the heart of the empire, with statues and 
paintings of Alexander, and introduced himself as the second Alexander. Herodian 
derides the emperor’s aspirations:473  
 
Caracalla, after attending to matters in the garrison camps along the 
Danube River, went down into Thrace at the Macedonian border, and 
immediately he became Alexander the Great. To revive the memory of the 
Macedonian in every possible way, he ordered statues and paintings of his 
hero to be put on public display in all cities. He filled the Capitol, the rest 
of the temples, indeed, all Rome, with statues and paintings designed to 
suggest that he was a second Alexander. At times we saw ridiculous 
portraits, statues with one body which had on each side of a single head 
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the faces of Alexander and the emperor. Caracalla himself went about in 
Macedonian dress, affecting especially the broad sun hat and short boots. 
He enrolled picked youths in a unit which he labelled his Macedonian 
phalanx; its officers bore the names of Alexander’s generals.  
 
Herodian continues his account of Caracalla’s imitation of Greek heroes in some Greek 
cities: the emperor acted as Achilles at Troy, and as Alexander at Alexandria. The local 
people are said to have been pleased or enthusiastic when he worshipped and emulated 
the deified Greek heroes.
474
 But the performance at Alexandria ended in a bizarre 
disaster with the slaughter of local youths.
475
 
 Caracalla also waged a war against Parthia in 216-7 (see section 6.2.3), and 
tried to exaggerate his victory. Herodian reports that the Roman authorities, probably 
together with Greek elites, had to collaborate with the propaganda manufactured by the 




From there he sent word to the senate and the Roman people that the 
entire East was subdued and that all the kingdoms in that region had 
submitted to him. The senators were not unaware of what had actually 
happened (for it is impossible to conceal an emperor’s acts); nevertheless, 
fear and the desire to flatter led them to vote the emperor all the triumphal 
honours. Thereafter, Caracalla spent some time in Mesopotamia, where he 
devoted himself to chariot-driving and to fighting all kinds of wild 
animals. 
  
Caracalla was preparing another Parthian war in 217, but was stopped by his 
assassination, which triggered the civil war between Macrinus and Elagabalus. 
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Supported by his grandmother and Caracalla’s aunt Julia Maesa, Elagabalus became the 
victor in 218. In 221, Elagabalus adopted his cousin and named him ʻAlexander’, who 
became the emperor Severus Alexander the following year. Herodian adds that 
Septimius Severus was also referred as Alexander the Great. But, along with Cassius 




He (Elagabalus) said that Elagabalus (Syro-Roman sun god) had ordered 
him to do this (adoption) and further to call his son’s name Alexander. 
And I (Dio), for my part, am persuaded that all this did come about in very 
truth by some divine arrangement; though I infer this, not from what he 
said, but from the statement made to him by someone else, to the effect 
that an Alexander should come from Emesa to succeed him, … 
 
It was then that the name of Alexianus was changed to Alexander; the 
name of his grandfather (Septimius Severus) became Alexander the Great, 
since the Macedonian was very famous and was held in high esteem by 
the alleged father of them both. Maesa’s daughters, and the old woman too, 
boasted of their adultery with Caracalla, son of Severus, in order to 
increase the soldiers’ love for the youths (Elagabalus and Alexander), who 
thus appeared to be Caracalla’s sons. 
 
 The Roman emperors evidently knew that creating the image of a threat from 
Parthian and Sassanid Persia would be helpful to unify the Greeks of the eastern 
provinces under Roman rule. The anti-Persian tradition and sentiment of the Greeks 
could be exploited as a practical means of attaining the emperor’s aim. This was made 
even stronger by the legacy of Alexander the Great, because other subject nations in the 
East had recognised him as one of their historic heroes, which fostered the popular 
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enthusiasm evident in the so-called Alexander ʻromance’ of the third century.478 The 
Roman emperor could be usefully positioned as a natural successor to Alexander against 
the Persian power. 
 The Greek elites like Cassius Dio and Herodian were critical of this Roman 
propaganda and the reality of the professed intention of imperial expansion to the East. 
These historians probably reflected the feelings of contemporary society, tired of 
constant warfare in the final years of the Severan dynasty.
479
 Perhaps they even hoped 
that the Roman emperors would not surpass Alexander the Great. However, eventually, 
the propaganda was working in the ways that Roman authorities had intended - exerting 
a strong influence on the people in the eastern provinces. They were induced to be part 
of a Roman East, presented as an ʻanti-Parthian’ east.  
 
6.4: Conclusions 
 The purpose of the current chapter has been to examine the role of propaganda 
as part of the military strategy for the eastern frontiers of the Roman empire under the 
Principate. To attain this aim, this chapter has explored whether the existence of the 
Arsacid - Sassanid empire constituted a real threat to the Romans, and whether the 
Roman authorities deliberately exploited the image of a threat as propaganda to 
manipulate their subjects in the eastern provinces. This chapter has also examined the 
effectiveness of the propaganda.  
 In the history of the relations between the Roman empire and the Arsacid - 
Sassanid empire, we have seen that the Parthians and Sassanids rarely showed any 
intention of invading the Roman empire, while the Romans periodically did invade and 
seek to control Parthian territory, primarily Armenia and Mesopotamia. The imperial 
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expansion of Rome stagnated after the death of Augustus, but the East was still open for 
further opportunities. In contrast to the other frontiers, the eastern frontier still had a 
distinct value of further territorial extension. However, it was impossible to undertake 
without the support of subjects in the eastern provinces. The Roman authorities were 
able to nurture this perception of eastern threat in the eastern provinces where the 
Greeks had shared the victorious tradition against their Persian enemy. Roman 
historiography consistently harped on the eastern threat, and invented motifs such as the 
ʻParthian shot’. 
 The role of the Roman emperors was particularly important in creating this 
propaganda. They carefully exploited Parthian and Armenian ambassadors, and forced 
Parthia to concede that the Armenian king should be confirmed by Rome. Emulating or 
excelling Alexander the Great became an ideology to consolidate the various ethnic 
groups in the eastern provinces under Roman rule, and to justify the presence of the 
Roman army. This propaganda, a Roman Alexander against the Parthian/Persian threat, 
was, in general, effective among the ruling class of the Roman East, mostly Greeks, 
because they had to find a way to espouse imperial ideology and at the same time to 
maintain their historical pride, although some were critical of its supposed 
implementation by some emperors. The Roman propaganda was manufactured by the 
Roman authorities to justify their military strategy in the east, and, despite some elite 
scepticism and the resistance of the Jews, it seems to have had considerable widespread 
and long-term success in uniting the eastern provincials in support of Rome’s military 




Ch. 7: Conclusions 
 
 In this thesis, I have argued that in the eastern provinces the Roman authorities 
of the Principate had a conscious policy of trying to deploy and employ their armed 
forces in order to win the hearts and minds of the local populations. I have also 
suggested that this formed part of a military strategy to exploiting local human and 
material resources to confront the Arsacid - Sassanid empire, not dissimilar to the 
purpose of the ʻhearts and minds’ policy in modern military strategy (see chapter 1). 
Through a mixture of practical measures to make their military occupation acceptable 
and of anti-Persian propaganda, the Romans tried to incorporate the eastern provincial 
communities into the imperium populi Romani and to promote social integration 
between soldiers and provincials. Indeed, this strategy was a success in that it laid the 
groundwork for the restoration of the frontier zones in the late third century. 
 In chapter 2, I have argued that the hypothesis of ʻlocalisation’, meaning an 
increasing trend towards ʻlocal’ recruitment of soldiers e castris, which led to the 
formation of a separate caste of soldiers outside of provincial society, is simply wrong. 
During the three hundred years of the Principate, the Roman armed forces in the eastern 
provinces increased from at least six legions, thirteen alae, eleven cohortes and one 
fleet under Augustus to Gaius to at least twelve legions, twenty alae, some seventy 
cohortes and three fleets under Severus Alexander. The number of soldiers increased 
from 47,000 to 127,500, which accounted for 17.4% and 31.5% respectively of the total 
military strength of the empire. The increasing demand for recruitment to the legions 
entailed the gradual change of recruiting pattern from the regional and provincial 
recruitment of the first century to the recruitment in the West (mainly Italy and Africa) 
and the Danube in the second and third centuries. However, the recruits e castris 
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comprised only 5 to 6% of the total recruits throughout the Principate. A fair number of 
auxiliary units were raised in the eastern provinces; some were deployed near where 
they had been formed and some were dispatched to other provinces. Presumably the 
recruitment to auxiliary units followed the same trends as of the recruitment of 
legionary units. Therefore, the pattern of military recruitment in the eastern provinces 
was never localised, but always depended largely on recruits from other provinces, 
which is significant in that the Roman armed forces therefore maintained their multi-
cultural identity.  
 In chapter 3 I have studied the procedures for recruitment and veteran 
settlement, using epigraphic and papyrological evidence mainly from Asia Minor and 
Egypt respectively. I have argued for the strategic thinking behind the processes. The 
increasing demand for military recruits in the East inevitably required some 
conscription in addition to volunteering. However, conscription was conducted only 
when volunteers were not enough, and it seems that the Romans did not bother to 
maintain full strength in peacetime. The plague under Marcus Aurelius probably made 
normal recruitment more difficult, but the Severans were able to increase the overall 
size of the army and wage numerous campaigns, so any problems were apparently 
short-term. A majority of recruits flowed from the Latin West and neighbouring 
provinces, and they will have influenced the thinking and behaviour of the local and 
provincial recruits. Under the same military law and discipline, they were trained as 
Roman soldiers and blended without distinction of citizens or non-citizens during the 
mandatory service of twenty-five years. After discharge, they could share with their 
family members the privileged status of Roman citizenship. The number of veterans 
was small compared to the total population, but their influence over urban areas was 
never small. They continued to maintain their connections with civilians which they had 
built up throughout their period of service. In the case of the Roman garrisons at Syene 
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in Egypt, the soldiers interacted with the civilians from 25 BCE to the reign of 
Diocletian, and seem to have formed close relationships with the local priests, an 
important element in the local elite. 
 In chapter 4 I have challenged the idea that the logistics system of Roman 
armed forces hindered the economic growth of the eastern provinces with the heavy 
burden of requisitions imposed on subjects. The annona militaris, angareia and 
hospitium were instituted as part of the general logistics system for military supply and 
transportation, and also the support of the Roman imperial administration. Irregular 
levies could be imposed in emergency situations, but the Roman government generally 
arranged cash compensation for compulsory requisitions. The abuse of requisitions was 
a chronic problem, common to all imperial powers, but the Roman authorities were 
ready to respond to the petitions of provincials, and issued and tried to implement 
protective regulations. On the local level, the military presence near or within cities has 
been considered to have stunted urban development. However, the Romans normally 
reused the military camps of the Hellenistic kingdoms and therefore their army camps 
did not encroach on civilian areas, while the soldiers were major consumers who 
revitalised the local economy. In fact, there is no good evidence to show that the 
presence of military camps stagnated the provincial economy of the eastern provinces.   
 In chapter 5 I have investigated the changing image of Roman soldiers from 
brutal invaders to reliable guardians in imperial Greek literature, including some Latin 
literature which is set in the Greek East. The works discussed include Petronius’ 
Satyrica, Apuleius’ Metamorphoses, Achilles Tatius’ Leucippe and Clitophon with some 
Greek novels, Aelius Aristides’ Regarding Rome and Arrian’s Array against the Alans. 
As the Roman empire established its political stability, Greek elites began to accept 
themselves as part of it and consciously started to distinguish between outsiders as 
ʻbarbarians’ and insiders, themselves included, as ʻRomans’. Roman soldiers in Greek 
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novels are presented as the only effective and trustworthy police force, in contrast to 
municipal police forces, who were unwilling or unable to act against upper class 
criminality. From the mid-second century, Greek elites contributed to the imperial 
defence more actively than just commenting on it. Whereas Aelius Aristides delivered a 
panegyric on the beneficial function of the Roman military system, distributing 
citizenship through the processes of recruitment, Arrian served as a governor and led an 
expedition against a barbarian tribe, the Alans. 
 I have argued in chapter 6 that, as propaganda for their military strategy, the 
Roman authorities on one hand created a Parthian threat by continuing the image of the 
Persian threat, and on the other used the legacy of Alexander the Great to claim a role as 
defenders of the Greeks. The history of the relations between Rome and Parthia shows 
that the Romans continued to invade the western frontier of Parthia, while the Parthians 
rarely invaded the eastern provinces of Rome. But the Romans, also using the 
threatening myth of the ʻParthian shot’, manipulated their subjects into agreeing to 
support their military operations in the frontier zones. The Roman emperors also tried to 
exploit embassies from the Armenian and Parthian kings to present a public image of 
the superiority of Roman power. The propaganda of the emperor as a Roman Alexander 
against the Persian-Parthian threat was crucial to justify Rome’s military strategy on the 
eastern frontier. This was effective in uniting the various eastern nations to cooperate 
with and even serve in Rome’s military domination of their territories. 
 In summary, through propaganda about its military power and policies to make 
their garrisoning of the provinces and their soldiers acceptable to the local populations, 
the Roman authorities promoted a beneficial image of their imperial rule and might, and 
eventually rooted it in the eastern provinces. Thus I argue that the Romans did have a 
deliberate policy of winning hearts and minds and that it was a success in that it helped 
them to maintain and expand the territorial integrity of the eastern provinces for over 
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three hundred years. 
 As a postscript, I note a couple of ways in which this thesis could be developed 
and improved. There are some topics which have only been touched on or not covered. 
One example is the issue of language, which comes up in Apuleius’ story of the gardner 
and the soldier and in the case study of Syene. Whereas Latin was the official language 
of the Roman army (and central administration), there is much evidence that soldiers, 
like most of the populations of the eastern provinces, used Greek as their lingua franca. 
To what extent they knew and used local languages, such as Aramaic and Egyptian, is 
another matter. Second, I am (or we are) still stuck in the frame of post-colonial 
perspective. One of my intentions was to position this study between Ando’s positive 
view of Roman imperialism and Mattingly’s negative view. But in some parts of my 
thesis, I have found this difficult, perhaps because of my national background as a South 
Korean whose ancestors suffered terribly under Japanese imperialism from 1910 to 
1945, and since have been sandwiched between the USSR/China and the USA. 
Nevertheless, we must be aware of the fact that the ideology of post-colonialism will 
also pass, as the imperial perspective has done over the last few centuries. Although this 
ideology has brought us to productive discussions about various aspects of the Roman 
world, sometimes it draws our attention away from what the Romans actually wrote, 
made and built. Thus, Roman sources and materials must be read and interpreted in a 
balanced perspective. 
 In 1987 the British historian Paul Kennedy wrote a book, The Rise and Fall of 
the Great Powers, which was first translated into Chinese, The Rise of the Great Powers 
(大國崛起, Daguo Jueqi), in 2006-7, and then translated into many other Asian 
languages. This book presents all the types of western imperialisms in the early modern 
and modern periods. The modern imperialists tried to pick up useful ideas from Rome’s 
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system of provincial administration and military strategy. Interestingly, a considerable 
number of Asian leaders now attempt to learn from those ideas in their dreams of 
national prosperity and military power. This implies that they are beginning to think of 
imperialism as a strategic system, rather judge how far it was bad or good to themselves. 
Thus, Rome’s administrative system and military strategy in the provinces could 
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